[Wittrs] Following a rule
- From: "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2009 03:55:57 -0000
"jrstern" wrote:
>>> It suggests rule-based would not work for machines,
>>> either, when obviously it does.
>> I'm not sure where you are getting that.
> Well, how else can we look at it?
> If LW tells us rule explanations are insufficient for how
> Johnny extends the sequence 2,4,6 ..., just why would it
> be any better for a machine?
I guess it all depends on what it means to follow a rule. While we
might interpret it as following a rule (our rule), it isn't really
following anything. Rather, its action is that of physical causation.
The way we get a mechanism to follow a rule, is that we modify the
causal structure, so that the action due to physical causation can be
said (by us) to be following the rule.
I am inclined to think that the notion of following a rule, as used in
ordinary human action, carries with it the implication that we could
choose to not follow the rule. So there's an implied assumption of the
exercise of free will in the notion of rule following. We would not
usually describe reflex action (such as the knee jerk) to be rule
following.
That's why I don't think mechanical systems really raise any questions
about rule following.
Rule following in mathematics is perhaps a more interesting case.
It is my impression that Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with the
question if discerning what is the rule, or what "following the rule"
amounts to. That is generally a problem with rule following in
language, in sports such as football or baseball, and generally in
every day activities that we consider to be rule following.
In mathematics, we tend to define everything so precisely that there
are no issues with discerning what is the rule. And that seems to also
apply to a logical game such as chess.
Regards,
Neil
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