[Wittrs] Re: Following a Rule
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2009 14:48:40 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Rob de Villiers <wittrs@...> wrote:
>
> You say:
>
> "At the lowest level, the computer hardware implements
> a causal structure, that I agree is non-rule-following."
>
> And then later:
> "Second, there are some things we *do* recognize as
> rules. What are they, exactly? Interesting problem.
> Exercising my particular-based nominalism, let's say that
> if someone writes some rules down, and we can see that
> some agency operates by checking the rules and acting
> on them, then we have rule-following. The computer is
> the archetype of rule-following."
>
> Some comments:
>
> The first and last of these sentences are prima-facie
> plain contradictory.
No sir.
That is, if so, it is in exactly the opposite
way from what I believe you are suggesting.
The second may be a bit flabby in phrasing,
but the second is meant only to echo the conventional
opinion of the matter, that computers follow the logical
rules that define their hardware behaviors and the
particular program running. If you want to argue
with that, that's your privilege, but don't be
surprised if your computer bites off your fingers
in pique.
I'm making two arguments, which cut in another
direction. It is the *first* of my sentences which
is tendentious, that computers follow rules ONLY in
the matter of the particular program, and that their
lower (lowest) levels of operations work otherwise,
by physical causation.
This follows Dennett's arguments about the reducibility
of mind generally, avoiding homuncular problems, as long
as each reduction is simpler and simpler. However he
does not consider causation as different from rules.
My separation of the two is tendentious, too.
> The computer is absolutely NOT the archetype of rule-
> following. The archetypes of rule following are PEOPLE
> playing games, speaking languages, doing mathematics,
> drawing up legal contracts, composing sonnets, et cetera.
That is sort of LW's argument about continuing a
sequence. It offends common sense. Turing provided
an entire theory based on a much more natural
interpretation of the matter, but of course LW rejected
it. I suggest the existence and operation of each and
every computer system today, shows that in this matter
Turing and common sense are much closer to a coherent
argument, than was LW.
And it is certainly not a matter of either rules
are normative and computers are "just" something else,
causal, logical, whatever. Rereading Popper's
"Of Clouds and Clocks" in "Objective Knowledge", he
discusses the very deterministic clocks and the random
and loosely organized clouds, reviews the idea that things
must be one or the other, and asserts another view, that
maybe this real world is not quite either, and we'd better
leave some room in our theories for closer examination.
I've long had some similar ideas to that, I hesitate
to get quite that foundational, but in the end, I suggest
much about computation will indeed end up in that
middle area, causal not being quite as fully deterministic
as alleged, and open systems not necessarily being as
open and non-rule-based as all that, either.
--
Is my interpretation a tiny bit forced? Sure.
But I'm afraid it goes places and justifies itself,
or will if I ever get it down in a full argument,
but I think the outline is clear enough.
Was I waiting for Neil or someone else to make
something like your argument, that my two-level
argument is wrong, and if the first level is causal,
then all levels are just causal? Sure. But as I
point out above, that assertion flies in the face
of any view that explains why computers differ
significantly from rocks. If a computer is just
causal processes, well, a rock has causal processes,
too. Or, famously, the paint on Searle's wall
has causal processes. The question, that Searle
elides and you would ignore, is just what is there
about computers' causal processes, that people find
congenial to use for computing, compared to the
paint on the wall. "Oh, well, they are the *proper*
causal processes for computing" you will answer.
Quite. But you really can't stop there.
Josh
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