As a poll worker in NJ, I am keenly aware of questions of vote integrity.
The system in my county for this year's general election uses a new
computerized technology that allows a voter to vote anywhere in the county,
once. The voter brings in some form of ID or declares his or her identity.
The worker then enters it into the system and the person is then allowed to
vote.
A feature that makes this system interesting is that the bar code on the sample
ballot that was received in the mail or the bar code on the voter's driver's
license is acceptable ID to get them into the system. They seem to be
identical. Once that ID is entered, no one else can claim to be that person
for purposes of voting in any given election. The registration device then
prints out a blank ballot which will be inserted into the actual voting machine
and will instruct the machine which localized ballot to present to the voter.
When the voter makes a selection, it is printed on the ballot. After
completing the selections, the machine shows the voter the completed ballot.
If the ballot matches what the voter wants, the machine enters the data on its
memory chip and stores the ballot. If it does not agree with what the voter
wants, the ballot can be rejected and the voter can get a new ballot to replace
the spoiled ballot. So far, I have seen two rejected ballots. [about 1.5%]
The stored ballots are a paper trail in case the digital tally is challenged.
Voters can vote anywhere in the county as the sign in system eliminates the
need for paper books. The registry machines operate on a centralized data base
to prevent duplication.
What prompts this note is that an online report of New York early voting shows
the voting taking place at manual privacy stands. If this is the standard for
New York voting this year, it is almost certain that, despite the physical
presence of paper ballots, there is likely to be at least one challenge to the
results.
I am impressed by the security of the system we are using in NJ. It is simpler
than it sounds.
Eric
