[THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis

  • From: "Wilson, Christopher" <CMWilson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 13:13:18 -0500

Yup, that's exactly what they are concerned about.  Can't see inside the


I'm looking into the 2 factor options.  I did see SMS Passcode, but SMS
is not a standard feature on company cell phones for, you guessed it,
security reasons.  


This is all helpful discussion.  I'm still optimistic that problem can
be resolved with negotiation.  



From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Berny Stapleton
Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2009 11:23 AM
To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis


CSG / CAG is SSL, they can't see in it with a packet sniffer, it is a
tunneling protocol, so they are worried about what else might get
tunneled over it.

If they are that worried about it, give it to them for them to manage.
That will allay a lot of their fears.

For the price of AppSense, you might be able to do two factor auth,
which apparently is one of their primary concerns. Also, have you looked
at something like SMS passcode or something like that as a cheaper two
factor auth?


2009/8/25 Greg Reese <gareese@xxxxxxxxx>

and Nazi mutants could over run the walls and raze the whole place to
the ground.

If they are happy with VPN, they should be happy with a CSG/CAG.
Happier, since with a CSG/CAG, the client device is not an active node
on the network like it is with a VPN.

You can do a double hop DMZ with this if that will help them sleep
better at night.


On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 10:22 AM, Wilson, Christopher
<CMWilson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

It seems to be more about their perimeter security philosophy than
anything.  Multi-hop DMZ, with three rings to get through before you are
internal.  They don't like that it hops right by their perimeter rings.
They also don't like that it runs on Windows, so maybe the CAG would
appease that.  


I'm not sure the kind of attack, but the argument goes something like
this.  If we provide remote access to this Citrix server, someone could
potentially hack it and get administrative access, and then what?  It
seems like an anti-windows bias coming from a unix oriented team.  In
this argument, vague as it is, if the server is the vulnerability I
thought I would attack it at the server level.  (Obviously we already
patch and run AV).  So I brought in AppSense.  I thought they would dig
the lock down of processes on the server, and security policies that
filter on client location.  They weren't impressed. They want something
else that sits in the DMZ as a barrier.  


This team has apparently been pretty dogmatic about their policies, but
I am hoping to find someone who will reason with me :-).   I appreciate
you guys helping me make my case.



From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Robert K Coffman Jr. -Info From Data Corp.
Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2009 10:04 AM
To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis


>The security team believes Citrix Secure Gateway with single factor
authentication doesn't provide enough protection from external attack 

What kind of attack are they trying to prevent?  


Both CSG and CAG use SSL...  With the CAG you could limit the exposure
of  WI to the internet.  I don't know CAG that well (yet), but other
than that I don't know that it is more secure than CSG.


- Bob Coffman



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