Fwd: RE: High availability/contingency for DNS?
- From: Martin Bach <development@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 21:22:31 +0000
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: RE: High availability/contingency for DNS?
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:16:39 -0600
From: Zito, Matthew <Matt_Zito@xxxxxxx>
To: development@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <development@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Maybe you can forward this to the list for me, as my list setup is borked at
the moment.
In any case, DNS is built to be redundant fundamentally. First off, the local
resolver on a machine can be configured to look at multiple servers - if one is
down, it fails over to the next one automatically. Then, the authoritative
servers for zones can be configured with multiple sets - if one returns with an
error, servers and resolvers will roll on to the next authoritative machine.
The only place you run into real errors is when a machine believes it is
authoritative for a zone but has incorrect data. This can get quite messy, as
caching servers will start to hang on to the negative responses, making it
difficult to troubleshoot and fix. This isn't the protocol's fault, though,
it's really the implementation behaving badly.
Matt
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Other related posts:
- » Fwd: RE: High availability/contingency for DNS? - Martin Bach
