[lit-ideas] Re: with or without Bush
- From: JulieReneB@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 2 Aug 2004 20:47:51 EDT
<<Open Letter To Thomas Kean â?? Chairman Of The 9/11 Commission - From FBI
Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds
August 1, 2004
Thomas Kean, Chairman
National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
Dear Chairman Kean:
It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on September 11;
during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant threat of
terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission,
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, was
created by law to investigate â??facts and circumstances related to the
terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001â?? and to â??provide recommendations to
safeguard
against future acts of terrorismâ??, and has now issued its â??9/11 Commission
Reportâ??. You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report, its
recommendations, and implementation of these recommendations, with our trust
and
backing, our tax money, our security, and our lives. Unfortunately, I find
your
report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence
issues that I am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as a witness
to
the commission, I made you aware of. Thus, I must assume that other serious
issues that I am not aware of were in the same manner omitted from your
report.
These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on
its conclusions and recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our
national
security, we are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to
ask for clarification of issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the
report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American Citizen, a former FBI
translator,
a whistleblower, a witness for a United States Congressional investigation,
a witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice Inspector General
investigation, and a witness for your own 9/11 Commission investigation,
request
your answers to, and your public acknowledgement of, the following questions
and issues:
After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at the FBIâ??s
largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down, even
stop, translation of critical information related to terrorist activities so
that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of â??
extensive backlog of untranslated documentsâ??, and justify its request for
budget and
staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were desperately
seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and its
language units to provide them with needed translated information, hundreds of
translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not to
translate
and to let the work pile up ( please refer to the CBS-60 Minutes transcript
dated October 2002, and provided to your investigators in January-February
2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (
Please
refer to Senator Grassley and Senator Leahyâ??s letters during the summer of
2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This confirmed
report has been reported to be substantiated by the Department of Justice
Inspector General Report (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and
FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I
provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue
and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. ( Please refer
to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004).
Today, almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since this
information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the
administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their
positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBIâ??s Counter
terrorism
and Counterintelligence efforts. Your report has omitted any reference to
this most serious issue, has foregone any accountability what so ever, and
your
recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which when left
un-addressed will have even more serious consequences. This issue is systemic
and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and
this serious issue despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can
budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic
management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, â?? Intelligence
Czarâ??, in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this
problem?
Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish Translator, was hired by the FBI after
September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive
information related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureauâ??s
investigation. Melek
Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be granted only
after conducting a thorough background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson used
to work for a semi-legit organizations that were the FBIâ??s targets of
investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with two
individuals
who were FBIâ??s targets of investigation. For months Melek Can Dickerson
blocked all-important information related to these semi-legit organizations
and the
individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if
not thousands, of documents related to these targets as â?? Not Pertinent.â??
Melek Can Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these
documents
important to the FBIâ??s investigations and our fight against terrorism. Melek
Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali,
took hundreds of pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside
the FBI to unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her
direct supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to
certain 9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported
to
FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to
continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and
to maintain her Top Secret clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI
management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the
Bureau if this security breach and espionage case was investigated and made
public, especially after going through Robert Hanssenâ??s case (FBI spy
scandal).
This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary
Committee
( Please refer to Senator Leahy and Grassleyâ??s letters dated June 19 and
August 13, 2002, and Senator Grassleyâ??s statement on CBS-60 Minutes in
October
2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This Dickerson
incident received major coverage by the press (Please refer to media
background provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). According
to
Director Mueller, the Inspector General criticized the FBI for failing to
adequately pursue this espionage report regarding Melek Can Dickerson ( Please
refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you
prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a
detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses
willing to corroborate this, and additional documents. ( Please refer to
tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on
February 11, 2004).
Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the
FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the
United States Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in
charge
of FBI personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in their
positions and in charge of translation quality and translation departmentsâ??
security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily
left the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated
criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal conducts
remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising Arabic
language units of the FBIâ??s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
investigations. Your report has omitted these significant incidents, has
foregone any
accountability what so ever, and your recommendations have refrained from
addressing this serious information security breach and highly likely
espionage
issue. This issue needs to be investigated and criminally prosecuted. The
translation of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with
loyalties
to our enemies. Important â??chit-chatsâ?? and â??chattersâ?? are being
intentionally blocked. Why did your report choose to exclude this information
and these
serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can
budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic
management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, â??Intelligence
Czar
â??, in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this
problem?
Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11
terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been
providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a
translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned
by Osama Bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level
intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan.
Through
his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden
was
planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting 4-5 major
cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the
individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the
United
States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The
agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special
Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism, Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington
Field Office, by filing â??302â?? forms, and the translator translated and
documented this information. No action was taken by the Special Agent in
Charge, and
after 9/11 the agents and the translators were told to â??keep quietâ??
regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with
the FBI
informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to Director Mueller in
writing, and later to the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press
reported this incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on
July 21, 2004 stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information
was
received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to
Director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the Commission never
raised this particular issue with him during the hearing ( Please refer to
Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004). Mr. Sarshar reported this issue
to
your investigators on February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific
dates, location, witness names, and the contact information for that
particular
Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the information ( Please
refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided to your investigators during a
2.5 hours testimony by Mr. Sarshar on February 12, 2004). I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of
other witnesses, and documents I had seen. ( Please refer to tape-recorded
3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on
February
11, 2004). Mr. Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector
General with specific information regarding this issue ( Please refer to
DOJ-IG
report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the
completion of your report).
After almost three years since September 11, many officials still refuse to
admit to having specific information regarding the terroristsâ?? plans to
attack
the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the 9/11
attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their possible link
to
terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the
terrorist attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information
regarding the â?? use of airplanesâ??, â??major US cities as targetsâ??, and
â??Osama
Bin Laden issuing the order.â?? Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific
information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same
place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field
Office, in Washington DC. Yet, your report claims that not having a central
place
where all intelligence could be gathered as one of the main factors in our
intelligence failure. Why did your report choose to exclude the information
regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed
opportunities? Why was this significant incident not mentioned; despite the
public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and
briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by
refraining from asking him questions regarding this significant incident and
lapse during your hearing ( Please remember that you ran out of questions
during your hearings with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do
not
cite a â??time limitâ?? excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve
these problems and failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic management
at
FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, â??
Intelligence Czarâ??, in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and
resolve this problem?
Over two years ago, and after two â??unclassifiedâ?? sessions with FBI
officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director Mueller,
Attorney
General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of
unqualified translators in charge of translating high level sensitive
intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish
translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he
had
failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not
understand or speak even elementary level English. He had failed English
proficiency
tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target language. Still,
Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other qualified translator
candidates, but because his wife worked in FBI Headquarters as a language
proficiency
exam administrator. Almost everybody in FBI Headquarters and the FBI
Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet, Kevin was given the task of
translating the most sensitive terrorist related information, and he was sent
to
Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic
language detainees (Turkish, Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc.). The FBI was supposed to be
trying to obtain information regarding possible future attack plans from these
detainees, and yet, the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather
and translate this information. Further, these detainees were either
released or detained or prosecuted based on information received and
translated by
unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and
Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesenâ??s case ( Please refer to
Senate letters and documents provided to your investigators in January-February
2004). CBS-60 Minutes showed Kevinâ??s picture and stated his name as one of
the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, and as a case confirmed by
the FBI ( Please refer to CBS-60 Minutes transcript provided to your
investigators). Department of Justice Inspector General had a detailed account
of
these problems ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I
provided
your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the
names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. ( Please refer to
tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators
on February 11, 2004).
After more than two years since Kevin Taskesenâ??s case was publicly confirmed,
and after almost two years since CBS-60 Minutes broadcasted Taskesenâ??s case,
Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish and Turkic
language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that
Kevin
Taskesen was not qualified to perform the task of translating sensitive
intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him
in charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those
individuals in the FBIâ??s hiring department and those who facilitated the
hiring of
unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism are still in those departments
and remain in their positions. Yet, your report does not mention this case, or
these chronic problems within the FBI translation departments, and within
the FBIâ??s hiring and screening departments. The issue of accountability for
those responsible for these practices that endangers our national security is
not brought up even once in your report. This issue, as with others, is
systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this
information
and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How
can budget increases address and resolve the intentional continuation of
ineptitude and incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the
addition of a new bureaucratic layer, â?? Intelligence Czarâ??, in its cocoon
removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an
agent from a (city name omitted) field office, re-sent a certain document to
the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This
Special Agent, in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed
that,
considering his target of investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and
the issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain
information that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist
activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office
and retranslated verbatim, the field agentâ??s hunch appeared to be correct.
The
new translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures,
and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed
certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the
Middle East, through network contacts and bribery. However, after the
re-translation was completed and the new significant information was revealed,
the
unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali,
decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the Special Agent who had
requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note
stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation
was
accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation would
hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language
department. The FBI agent requesting the retranslation never received the
accurate translation of that document. I provided your investigators with a
detailed
and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular
investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (
Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided
to your investigators on February 11, 2004). This information was also
provided to the Department of Justice Inspector General (Please refer to
DOJ-IG
report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the
completion of your report).
Only one month after the catastrophic events of September 11; while many
agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, and to
investigate those responsible for the attacks, those with possible connections
to the attack, and those who might be planning possible future attacks; the
bureaucratic administrators in the FBIâ??s largest and most important
translation
unit were covering up their past failures, blocking important leads and
information, and jeopardizing on going terrorist investigations. The supervisor
involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain important
Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a
record of previous misconducts. After this supervisorâ??s several severe
misconducts were reported to the FBIâ??s higher-level management, after his
conducts were
reported to the Inspector Generalâ??s Office, to the United States Congress,
and to the 9/11 Commission, he was promoted to include the FBIâ??s Arabic
language unit under his supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali,
remains
in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit
receiving those chitchats that our color-coded threat system is based upon.
Yet your
report contains zero information regarding these systemic problems that led
us to our failure in preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report,
there are no references to individuals responsible for hindering past and
current investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security
and
our lives for their career advancement and security. This issue, as with
others, is systemic and departmental. Why does your report choose to exclude
this
information and these serious issues despite all the evidence and briefings
you received? Why does your report adamantly refrain from assigning any
accountability to any individuals responsible for our past and current
failures?
How can budget increases address and resolve these intentional acts committed
by self-serving career civil servants? How can the addition of a new
bureaucratic layer, â?? Intelligence Czarâ??, in its cocoon removed from the
action
lines, address and resolve this problem?
The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing
information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and between intelligence
agencies. To this date the public has not been told of intentional blocking of
intelligence, and has not been told that certain information, despite its
direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related activities, is not given
to or
shared with Counterterrorism units, their investigations, and countering
terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to 9/11, and remains in
effect after 9/11. If Counterintelligence receives information that contains
money laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities, directly
linked to terrorist activities; and if that information involves certain
nations, certain semi-legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or
political relations in this country, then, that information is not shared with
Counterterrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences. In certain
cases,
frustrated FBI agents cited â?? direct pressure by the State Department,â??
and
in other cases â??sensitive diplomatic relationsâ?? is cited. The Department
of
Justice Inspector General received detailed and specific information and
evidence regarding this issue ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel
Edmonds
and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).
I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this
issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names
of certain U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities. (
Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided
to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
After almost three years the American people still do not know that thousands
of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of â?? protecting
certain foreign business relations.â?? The victims family members still do not
realize that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for over
two
years has been blocked due to the unspoken decisions made and disguised under
â??
safeguarding certain diplomatic relations.â?? Your report did not even attempt
to address these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed
under any gag. Your hearings did not include questions regarding these
unspoken and unwritten policies and practices. Despite your full awareness and
understanding of certain criminal conduct that connects to certain terrorist
related activities, committed by certain U.S. officials and high-level
government employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations into this
conduct, although under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How
can
budget increases address and resolve these problems, when some of them are
caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can a new bureaucratic
layer, â?? Intelligence Czarâ??, in its cocoon removed from the action lines,
override these unwritten policies and unspoken practices incompatible with our
national security?
I know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation cannot be
brushed off as minor problems among many significant problems. Translation
units are the frontline in gathering, translating, and disseminating
intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack may, and
probably
will, come in the form of a message or document in foreign language that will
have to be translated. That message may be given to the translation unit
headed
and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even stops,
translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his department,
who has participated in certain criminal activities and security breaches, and
who has been engaged in covering up failures and criminal conducts within the
department, so it may never be translated in time if ever. That message may
go to Kevin Taskesen, or another unqualified translator; so it may never be
translated correctly and be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer
within the language department; so it may never be translated fully, if at
all. That message may come to the attention of an agent of a foreign
organization who works as a translator in the FBI translation department, who
may choose
to block it; so it may never get translated. If then an attack occurs, which
could have been prevented by acting on information in that message, who will
tell family members of the new terrorist attack victims that nothing more
could have been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we
do know.
I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBIâ??s
translation unit during the most crucial times after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain problems and cases
within
the Bureauâ??s language units, and in light of what has already been
established
as facts. As you are fully aware, the facts, incidents, and problems cited in
this letter are by NO means based upon personal opinion or un-verified
allegations. As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents were found
confirmed by a Senior Republican Senator, Charles Grassley, and a Senior
Democrat
Senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct
knowledge of the Department of Justice Inspector Generalâ??s report on my
allegations,
â?? none of my allegations were disproved.â?? As you are fully aware, even FBI
officials â?? confirmed all my allegations and denied noneâ?? during their
unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago.
However,
neither your commissionâ??s hearings, nor your commissionâ??s five hundred
sixty seven-page report, nor your recommendations include these serious
issues,
major incidents, and systemic problems. Your reportâ??s coverage of FBI
translation problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote #25).
Yet,
your commission is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to
hastily implement your measures and recommendations based upon your incomplete
and deficient report.
In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to
correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all
visible symptoms. Your Commissionâ??s investigations, hearings, and report have
chosen not to consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing â??visibleâ??,
because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the
intelligence community and have been written about in the press. I am
emphasizing â??
visibleâ?? because the few specific symptoms I provided you with in this
letter have
been confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your
commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true
symptoms
of our failed intelligence system. Your Commission intentionally bypassed
these severe symptoms, and chose not to include them in its five hundred and
sixty seven-page report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre
9/11,
without a comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our
intelligence system, without assigning any accountability what so ever, and
therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is
attempting to
divert attention from the real problems, and to prescribe a cure through hasty
and costly measures. It is like attempting to put a gold-lined expensive
porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with a rotten root, without first
treating the root, and without first cleaning/shaving the infected tooth.
Respectfully,
Sibel D. Edmonds
CC: Senate Judiciary Committee
CC: Senate Intelligence Committee
CC: House Government Reform Committee
CC: Family Steering Committee
CC: Press
**********
STANDARD DISCLAIMER FROM UQ.ORG: UnansweredQuestions.org does not
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hope that the reader finds in it inspiration to work with us further, in
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greater, common understanding of the unanswered questions which now lie
before us. >>
_http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0408/S00012.htm_
(http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0408/S00012.htm)
========Original Message======== Subj: [lit-ideas] Re: with or without
Bush Date: 8/2/2004 7:20:09 PM Central Daylight Time From:
_aamago@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (mailto:aamago@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) To:
_lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(mailto:lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) , _lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(mailto:lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) Sent on:
-----Original Message-----
From: Scribe1865@xxxxxxx
Sent: Aug 2, 2004 7:51 PM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] with or without Bush
Stan maintains that if Bush had not been in office, Bin Laden would have
been
captured. As if a change of presidents could alter tactical and strategic
factors that work to Bin Laden's benefit. Taken as a statement of
convictions,
Stan's hyperbole is hunky-dory. Taken as a tactical prediction . . . well .
. .
it's a fine statement of convictions.
A.A. Eric, are you that much of a fatalist? Is Bin Laden that much in
control that if another president had pursued him instead of Iraq, with the
world's support, nothing would be different?
Andy
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