[lit-ideas] Re: while

  • From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 13:18:15 +0200

it was sent to you

On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 12:35 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

>  Is that work available on the Net ? I don't like buying books much. :)
>
>  O.K.
>
> On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 10:39 AM, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>>
>>  ​the heideggerina bullshitting in plainly annoying, it maybe worth
>> while (more so for literary people) to look at the actual aesthetics of
>> those positions.
>> best way in is the "for metaphysics of death" by G Simmel, of 1909 1910​
>> btw, I have no idea of who this henry is
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 12:14 PM, dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <
>> dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>> On p. 121 of "Quaestio Subtilissima", D. P. Henry proposes this
>>> formalisation of
>>>
>>> i. The Nothing noths
>>>
>>> (He distinguishes this  from
>>>
>>> ii. The nothing noths.)
>>>
>>> iii. ͻ[[Λ]](Λ)
>>>
>>> The use of "[[...]]" Henry borrows from Oxford philosopher A. N. Prior.
>>>
>>> On p. 120, he notes that the 'the' "portents some sort of singularity",
>>> which Henry symbolises as
>>>
>>> iv. sol(Λ)
>>>
>>> Henry says that (iv)  justifies "the use of the capital initial letter".
>>>
>>> Henry concludes the section on Heidegger with the remark that (i) can
>>> thus
>>> be seen as being sensical and "a truth derivable from the deductive
>>> metaphysics" which he is constructing.
>>>
>>> I agree with J. L. Scherb that this was a "pre-war debate" (pre-Second
>>> World War) between Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger about allegedly
>>> (as  D.
>>> P. Henry has it) meaningless metaphysical statements such as  "The
>>> Nothing
>>> noths" ("Das  Nichts
>>> nichtet").
>>>
>>> Within the mainstream of  20th century analytical  philosophy  this
>>> statement, "The Nothing noths"  has come to be regarded as  obvious
>>> metaphysical
>>> nonsense.
>>>
>>> And it was Sir Freddie Ayer who brought the news to Oxford. It is said
>>> that
>>>  Oxford could not BEAR with the 'enfant terrible' -- but I WOULD
>>> distinguish  between a Carnapian scientist approach and Ayer's, which
>>> was directed
>>> towards  empiricist epistemoly in general -- and Ayer did not stay at
>>> Oxford
>>> for long,  finding a post in London. In terms of the history of
>>> philosophy,
>>> this is seen as  Oxford never having 'bought' the idea that metaphysical
>>> statements were, as Ayer  thought he had shown, after Carnap,
>>> 'meaningless'.
>>> There were hordes of  philosophers practicising metaphysics THEN (think
>>> Collingwood) as there are  hordes of philosophers practising metaphysics
>>> NOW at
>>> Oxford
>>>
>>> As we all know, this led to an unfortunate confrontation between
>>> analytical  and continental  philosophy -- with Sartre assuming the
>>> Heideggerian
>>> position and generalising it: "Das Nichts nichtet" and  consciousness is
>>> "le
>>> néant néantisant".
>>>
>>> The judgement of "The Nothing noths" as nonsense was somewhat 'corrected'
>>> by D. P. Henry.
>>>
>>> But the conflict still seems to exist.
>>>
>>> Henry's remark didn't find its way to  a  greater  audience, because
>>> Henry
>>> didn't *prove* his claim in a   canonical way, and because Henry's remark
>>> may be alleged to contains  an ambiguity, which may give rise to
>>> criticism.
>>>
>>> The required disambiguation, together with the missing proofs, can be
>>> given
>>>  within the ontology introduced by Stanisław Leśniewski -- notably
>>> protothetic -- that Grice adored ("protothetic (why?)" -- "Aspects of
>>> Reason" --
>>> Grice had a taste for a Polish neologism).
>>>
>>> Ludger Honnefelder calls the systems Stanisław Leśniewski, which  were
>>> developed roughly at the same pre-war time  (1913-1939), a new
>>> beginning of
>>> metaphysics.
>>>
>>> They systems of Stanisław Leśniewski (that Henry learned via Geach --
>>> whose  mother was Polish) provide the missing link (to use a  metaphor)
>>> between
>>> Heidegger and Carnap (and Ayer).
>>>
>>> The systems of Stanisław Leśniewski can thus be regarded as an
>>> ontological
>>>  (if not metaphysical) supplement to and a  partial correction of
>>> Michael
>>> Friedman's essay on Heidegger, Carnap and Cassirer.
>>>
>>> A  hermeneutical conclusion may be drawn from this that allows  for a
>>> reconciliation between two types of
>>> philosophy.
>>>
>>> This is possible not only in terms of Cassirer's observations,  but also
>>> along the lines of "logical form", broadly conceived -- as  Henry
>>> suggested.
>>>
>>> The hermeneutical outcome suggests that one CAN make use  of PRECISE
>>> logic
>>> tools in a more general  way than Carnap himself  allowed (if not Ayer
>>> and
>>> less so Grice), alla D. P. Henry, without having  to declare that at a
>>> few
>>> central  statements of Heidegger's   Fundamentalontologie are pure
>>> nonsense --
>>> but rather pretty illuminating --  if you think of them ("and even if you
>>> don't").
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Speranza
>>>
>>> Refs.:
>>> Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic
>>> Grice, "System Q"
>>> Grice, "Philosophical Eschatology".
>>> Henry, Quæstio subtilissima.
>>> Ryle, Review of Heidegger, "Sein und Zeit", Mind, 1929, vol. 38.
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
>>  --
>>  palma,   etheKwini, KZN
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  palma
>>
>>  cell phone is 0762362391
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  *only when in Europe*:
>>
>> inst. J. Nicod
>>
>> 29 rue d'Ulm
>>
>> f-75005 paris france
>>
>>
>>
>


-- 
palma,   etheKwini, KZN












 palma

cell phone is 0762362391




 *only when in Europe*:

inst. J. Nicod

29 rue d'Ulm

f-75005 paris france

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