[lit-ideas] Re: while

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 11:35:18 +0100

Is that work available on the Net ? I don't like buying books much. :)

O.K.

On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 10:39 AM, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>
> ​the heideggerina bullshitting in plainly annoying, it maybe worth while
> (more so for literary people) to look at the actual aesthetics of those
> positions.
> best way in is the "for metaphysics of death" by G Simmel, of 1909 1910​
> btw, I have no idea of who this henry is
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 12:14 PM, dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <
> dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> On p. 121 of "Quaestio Subtilissima", D. P. Henry proposes this
>> formalisation of
>>
>> i. The Nothing noths
>>
>> (He distinguishes this  from
>>
>> ii. The nothing noths.)
>>
>> iii. ͻ[[Λ]](Λ)
>>
>> The use of "[[...]]" Henry borrows from Oxford philosopher A. N. Prior.
>>
>> On p. 120, he notes that the 'the' "portents some sort of singularity",
>> which Henry symbolises as
>>
>> iv. sol(Λ)
>>
>> Henry says that (iv)  justifies "the use of the capital initial letter".
>>
>> Henry concludes the section on Heidegger with the remark that (i) can thus
>> be seen as being sensical and "a truth derivable from the deductive
>> metaphysics" which he is constructing.
>>
>> I agree with J. L. Scherb that this was a "pre-war debate" (pre-Second
>> World War) between Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger about allegedly
>> (as  D.
>> P. Henry has it) meaningless metaphysical statements such as  "The Nothing
>> noths" ("Das  Nichts
>> nichtet").
>>
>> Within the mainstream of  20th century analytical  philosophy  this
>> statement, "The Nothing noths"  has come to be regarded as  obvious
>> metaphysical
>> nonsense.
>>
>> And it was Sir Freddie Ayer who brought the news to Oxford. It is said
>> that
>>  Oxford could not BEAR with the 'enfant terrible' -- but I WOULD
>> distinguish  between a Carnapian scientist approach and Ayer's, which was
>> directed
>> towards  empiricist epistemoly in general -- and Ayer did not stay at
>> Oxford
>> for long,  finding a post in London. In terms of the history of
>> philosophy,
>> this is seen as  Oxford never having 'bought' the idea that metaphysical
>> statements were, as Ayer  thought he had shown, after Carnap,
>> 'meaningless'.
>> There were hordes of  philosophers practicising metaphysics THEN (think
>> Collingwood) as there are  hordes of philosophers practising metaphysics
>> NOW at
>> Oxford
>>
>> As we all know, this led to an unfortunate confrontation between
>> analytical  and continental  philosophy -- with Sartre assuming the
>> Heideggerian
>> position and generalising it: "Das Nichts nichtet" and  consciousness is
>> "le
>> néant néantisant".
>>
>> The judgement of "The Nothing noths" as nonsense was somewhat 'corrected'
>> by D. P. Henry.
>>
>> But the conflict still seems to exist.
>>
>> Henry's remark didn't find its way to  a  greater  audience, because Henry
>> didn't *prove* his claim in a   canonical way, and because Henry's remark
>> may be alleged to contains  an ambiguity, which may give rise to
>> criticism.
>>
>> The required disambiguation, together with the missing proofs, can be
>> given
>>  within the ontology introduced by Stanisław Leśniewski -- notably
>> protothetic -- that Grice adored ("protothetic (why?)" -- "Aspects of
>> Reason" --
>> Grice had a taste for a Polish neologism).
>>
>> Ludger Honnefelder calls the systems Stanisław Leśniewski, which  were
>> developed roughly at the same pre-war time  (1913-1939), a new  beginning
>> of
>> metaphysics.
>>
>> They systems of Stanisław Leśniewski (that Henry learned via Geach --
>> whose  mother was Polish) provide the missing link (to use a  metaphor)
>> between
>> Heidegger and Carnap (and Ayer).
>>
>> The systems of Stanisław Leśniewski can thus be regarded as an ontological
>>  (if not metaphysical) supplement to and a  partial correction of  Michael
>> Friedman's essay on Heidegger, Carnap and Cassirer.
>>
>> A  hermeneutical conclusion may be drawn from this that allows  for a
>> reconciliation between two types of
>> philosophy.
>>
>> This is possible not only in terms of Cassirer's observations,  but also
>> along the lines of "logical form", broadly conceived -- as  Henry
>> suggested.
>>
>> The hermeneutical outcome suggests that one CAN make use  of PRECISE logic
>> tools in a more general  way than Carnap himself  allowed (if not Ayer and
>> less so Grice), alla D. P. Henry, without having  to declare that at a few
>> central  statements of Heidegger's   Fundamentalontologie are pure
>> nonsense --
>> but rather pretty illuminating --  if you think of them ("and even if you
>> don't").
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Speranza
>>
>> Refs.:
>> Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic
>> Grice, "System Q"
>> Grice, "Philosophical Eschatology".
>> Henry, Quæstio subtilissima.
>> Ryle, Review of Heidegger, "Sein und Zeit", Mind, 1929, vol. 38.
>>
>>
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>>
>
>
> --
> palma,   etheKwini, KZN
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