[lit-ideas] while

  • From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 11:39:34 +0200

​the heideggerina bullshitting in plainly annoying, it maybe worth while
(more so for literary people) to look at the actual aesthetics of those
positions.
best way in is the "for metaphysics of death" by G Simmel, of 1909 1910​
btw, I have no idea of who this henry is




On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 12:14 PM, dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <
dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On p. 121 of "Quaestio Subtilissima", D. P. Henry proposes this
> formalisation of
>
> i. The Nothing noths
>
> (He distinguishes this  from
>
> ii. The nothing noths.)
>
> iii. ͻ[[Λ]](Λ)
>
> The use of "[[...]]" Henry borrows from Oxford philosopher A. N. Prior.
>
> On p. 120, he notes that the 'the' "portents some sort of singularity",
> which Henry symbolises as
>
> iv. sol(Λ)
>
> Henry says that (iv)  justifies "the use of the capital initial letter".
>
> Henry concludes the section on Heidegger with the remark that (i) can thus
> be seen as being sensical and "a truth derivable from the deductive
> metaphysics" which he is constructing.
>
> I agree with J. L. Scherb that this was a "pre-war debate" (pre-Second
> World War) between Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger about allegedly (as
> D.
> P. Henry has it) meaningless metaphysical statements such as  "The Nothing
> noths" ("Das  Nichts
> nichtet").
>
> Within the mainstream of  20th century analytical  philosophy  this
> statement, "The Nothing noths"  has come to be regarded as  obvious
> metaphysical
> nonsense.
>
> And it was Sir Freddie Ayer who brought the news to Oxford. It is said that
>  Oxford could not BEAR with the 'enfant terrible' -- but I WOULD
> distinguish  between a Carnapian scientist approach and Ayer's, which was
> directed
> towards  empiricist epistemoly in general -- and Ayer did not stay at
> Oxford
> for long,  finding a post in London. In terms of the history of philosophy,
> this is seen as  Oxford never having 'bought' the idea that metaphysical
> statements were, as Ayer  thought he had shown, after Carnap,
> 'meaningless'.
> There were hordes of  philosophers practicising metaphysics THEN (think
> Collingwood) as there are  hordes of philosophers practising metaphysics
> NOW at
> Oxford
>
> As we all know, this led to an unfortunate confrontation between
> analytical  and continental  philosophy -- with Sartre assuming the
> Heideggerian
> position and generalising it: "Das Nichts nichtet" and  consciousness is
> "le
> néant néantisant".
>
> The judgement of "The Nothing noths" as nonsense was somewhat 'corrected'
> by D. P. Henry.
>
> But the conflict still seems to exist.
>
> Henry's remark didn't find its way to  a  greater  audience, because Henry
> didn't *prove* his claim in a   canonical way, and because Henry's remark
> may be alleged to contains  an ambiguity, which may give rise to criticism.
>
> The required disambiguation, together with the missing proofs, can be given
>  within the ontology introduced by Stanisław Leśniewski -- notably
> protothetic -- that Grice adored ("protothetic (why?)" -- "Aspects of
> Reason" --
> Grice had a taste for a Polish neologism).
>
> Ludger Honnefelder calls the systems Stanisław Leśniewski, which  were
> developed roughly at the same pre-war time  (1913-1939), a new  beginning
> of
> metaphysics.
>
> They systems of Stanisław Leśniewski (that Henry learned via Geach --
> whose  mother was Polish) provide the missing link (to use a  metaphor)
> between
> Heidegger and Carnap (and Ayer).
>
> The systems of Stanisław Leśniewski can thus be regarded as an ontological
>  (if not metaphysical) supplement to and a  partial correction of  Michael
> Friedman's essay on Heidegger, Carnap and Cassirer.
>
> A  hermeneutical conclusion may be drawn from this that allows  for a
> reconciliation between two types of
> philosophy.
>
> This is possible not only in terms of Cassirer's observations,  but also
> along the lines of "logical form", broadly conceived -- as  Henry
> suggested.
>
> The hermeneutical outcome suggests that one CAN make use  of PRECISE logic
> tools in a more general  way than Carnap himself  allowed (if not Ayer and
> less so Grice), alla D. P. Henry, without having  to declare that at a few
> central  statements of Heidegger's   Fundamentalontologie are pure
> nonsense --
> but rather pretty illuminating --  if you think of them ("and even if you
> don't").
>
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
> Refs.:
> Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic
> Grice, "System Q"
> Grice, "Philosophical Eschatology".
> Henry, Quæstio subtilissima.
> Ryle, Review of Heidegger, "Sein und Zeit", Mind, 1929, vol. 38.
>
>
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