[lit-ideas] what is important is to note the
- From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 15:23:24 +0200
sliding scales, the world civilization is based on the western thinking
(which in this little provincial Gauleiter is his own thoughts when
oppressed by constipation)
did it happen? no, the chinese do not think this bullshit of the 'beings of
being' or the Being of the beings' etc.
this little clown though, as usual that his "thoughts" were the last in
along line of geniuses of which he was the last.
some problems are difficult (e.g. the problem of universals, or platonic
problems of justice) voila, it is enough to claim that Aquinas or Plato or
Ockamm forgot the being of the being of the bingo of the bings, and one can
go on forever.....
groups of clowns then pick this up and further propagates it noting how
close it is to religious pronouncements, outright bullshit ('science' being
the domain of nature etc. etc., can someone explain why people worry about
the age of the universe? what are we going to dominate? big bang? come on
martin.. you can pull the legs of idiots like gadamer.... but there are
limits...)
On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Does Heidegger himself say that what he is opposed to is 'scientism' and
> not science ? The passages below (from THE END OF PHILOSOPHY
> AND THE TASK OF THINKING (1969)) do not mention the term 'scientism' bur
> rather 'sciences,' 'scientific attitude,' scientific- technological
> world' and so on. O.K.
>
>
> 9. No prophecy is necessary to recognize that the sciences now
> establishing
> themselves will soon be determined and steered by the new fundamental
> science
> which is called cybernetics. This science corresponds to the determination
> of
> man as an acting social being. For it is the theory of the steering of the
> possible planning and arrangement of human labor. Cybernetics transforms
> language into an exchange of news. The arts become regulated-regulating
> instruments of information.
>
> 10. The development of philosophy into the independent sciences which,
> however,
> interdependently communicate among themselves ever more markedly, is the
> legitimate completion of philosophy. Philosophy is ending in the present
> age. It
> has found its place in the scientific attitude of socially active
> humanity. But
> the fundamental characteristic of this scientific attitude is its
> cybernetic,
> that is, technological character. The need to ask about modern technology
> is
> presumably dying out to the same extent that technology more definitely
> characterizes and regulates the appearance of the totality of the world
> and the
> position of man in it.
>
> 11. The sciences will interpret everything which in their structure is
> still
> reminiscent of the origin from philosophy in accordance with the rules of
> science, that is, technologically. Every science understands the
> categories upon
> which it remains dependent for the articulation and delineation of its
> area of
> investigation as working hypotheses. Their truth is measured not only in
> terms of
> the effect that their application brings about within the progress of
> research.
> Scientific truth is equated with the efficiency of these effects.
>
> 12. The sciences are now taking over as their own task what philosophy
> in the
> course of its history tried to present in certain places, and even there
> only
> inadequately, that is, the ontologies of the various regions of beings
> (nature,
> history, law, art). The interest of the sciences is directed toward the
> theory
> of the necessary structural concepts of the coordinated areas of
> investigation.
> "Theory" means now supposition of the categories, which are allowed only a
> cybernetic function, but denied any ontological meaning. The operational
> and
> model character of representational-calculative thinking becomes dominant.
>
> 13. However, the sciences still speak about the Being of beings in the
> unavoidable supposition of their regional categories. They just don't say
> so.
> They can deny their origin from philosophy, but never dispense with it.
> For in
> the scientific attitude of the sciences, the document of their birth from
> philosophy still speaks. The end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of
> the
> manipulable arrangement of a scientific- technological world and of the
> social
> order proper to this world. The end of philosophy means the beginning of
> the
> world civilization based upon Western European thinking.
>
>
> On Thursday, March 27, 2014 1:47 PM, Donal McEvoy <
> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> >'Anti-scientism' (i.e., rejection of the view that science 'provides the
> primary and most significant access to ourselves and the world') is most
> definitely not automatically 'anti-science'.>
>
> May I suggest the explanation for this is because "scientism" is a false
> or mistaken view (or understanding) of "science" (hence to be anti- this
> false view is not to be anti- genuine science).
>
> But there is a problem here: many who are anti-scientism, for example
> Wittgenstein, may be considered on close examination not to see that
> "scientism" is a false or mistaken view of "science" itself (I would be
> certainly interested to see evidence that Wittgenstein recognises that
> "scientism" is not a proper reflection of genuine science, as I am unaware
> that he does clearly recognise this). This false equation of "scientism"
> with genuine science leads to a misconceived hostility to science itself -
> in other words, even if science is seen as valid within its domain, it is
> conceived as giving rise to an inevitable and destructive "scientism"
> within wider culture.
>
> The correct solution is not to mistake "scientism" for a genuine
> reflection of "science".
>
> For example, it is a kind of "scientism" to say that because
> "consciousness" is not observable from any third-person perspective [we can
> say "He saw her car" but not "He saw her consciousness"], and because
> "observation" of a scientific sort must be more than mere "first-person"
> observation, so "science" must dispense with "consciousness" because
> "consciousness" is an anti-scientific notion. Such "scientism" is flawed:
> the most such reasoning might show is that "consciousness" is a
> non-scientific phenomenon - but even whether that is shown depends on
> whether we take mere "first-person" observation as being always inadequate
> to constitute scientific observation, for it may be argued it is adequate
> when there is no alternative "third-person" means to further test for
> "consciousness" [i.e. we are entitled to accept our own conscious
> experience of "consciousness" as an adequate test of our having
> consciousness when there is no alternative "third-person" perspective that
> can observe the existence or non-existence of our consciousness].
>
> "Scientism" does great harm to genuine science and its place in our
> culture: but so does the false equation of "scientism" with genuine
> science. Despite what Chris writes, I think it may be doubted that many of
> the philosophers who oppose "scientism" see that they are merely opposing a
> fictional view of "science" itself.
>
> Donal
>
>
>
>
> On Thursday, 27 March 2014, 9:18, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> namely the access to dental science denies the humanity of having
> cavities deal t with by reading pages of heidegger and his wife
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 11:14 AM, <cblists@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> Here's an indication of why some people bother at all about Heidegger and
> his philosophy (a paragraph from Simon Critchley's introduction to _A
> Companion to Continental Philosophy_):
>
> "From a Continental perspective, the adoption of scientism in philosophy
> fails to grasp the critical and cultural function of philosophy; that is,
> it fails to see the complicity between a scientific culture and what
> Nietzsche diagnosed as nihilism. What this means is that philosophical
> scientism fails to see the role that science and technology play in the
> alienation of human beings from the world through the latter's
> objectification into a causally determined realm of nature or, more
> aggregiously, into a reified realm of commodities manipulated by an
> instrumental rationality. In a Heideggerian register, scientism rests on
> the false assumption that the scientific or theoretical way of viewing
> things - what Heidegger calls the present-at-hand - provides the primary
> and most significant access to ourselves and the world. Heidegger shows
> that the scientific view of the world is derivative and parasitic upon a
> prior practical view of the world as ready-to-hand, that is, the environing
> world that is closest, most familiar, and most meaningful to us, the world
> that is always colored by our cognitive, ethical and aesthetic values.
> That is to say, scientism or what Husserl calls objectivism, overlooks the
> phenomenon of the *life-world* which is the enabling condition for
> scientific practice. Although such an anti-scientism *can* lead to
> obscurantism - which in many ways is the inverted or perverted
> counter-concept to scientism - it *need* not do so. The critique of
> scientism, at least within phenomenology, does not seek to refute or negate
> the results of scientific research in the name of some mystical
> apprehension of the unity of man and nature, or whatever; it rather simply
> insists that science does not provide the primary and most significant
> access to a sense of ourselves and the world. What is perhaps required
> here is what Heidegger referred to in _Being and Time_ as 'an existential
> conception of science' that would show how the practices of the natural
> sciences arise out of life-world practices, and that the latter are not
> simply reducible to the former."
>
> [Simon Critchley, "Introduction: what is Continental philosophy?", in
> Simon Critchley and William R Schrtoeder, eds. _A Companion to Continental
> Philosopy_, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998; p. 13]
>
> Of course, one does not have to side with either Heidegger or Husserl in
> order to be critical of 'scientism' - Adorno (with all of his antipathies,
> particularly to the former) immediately comes to (well, at least, *my*)
> mind.
>
> And one must be fair to the scientists themselves. Not all are (or were)
> 'realists' when it comes to philosophizing about their endeavours; indeed
> some regard(ed) realism as an impediment to scientific progress (the
> 'parenthetical' past tense of 'regard' is prompted by thoughts of the
> debate between the early developers of quantum theory and Einstein; the
> former thought that Einstein's commitment to realism was a serious
> hindrance).
>
> 'Anti-scientism' (i.e., rejection of the view that science 'provides the
> primary and most significant access to ourselves and the world') is most
> definitely not automatically 'anti-science'.
>
> Chris Bruce,
> in Kiel, Germany
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> palma, e TheKwini, KZN
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> palma
>
> cell phone is 0762362391
>
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> *only when in Europe*:
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> 29 rue d'Ulm
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--
palma, e TheKwini, KZN
palma
cell phone is 0762362391
*only when in Europe*:
inst. J. Nicod
29 rue d'Ulm
f-75005 paris france
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