[lit-ideas] Re: we are now hard at work with daffy duck
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 12:46:07 +0100 (BST)
You may evidently have misheard that I was hoi-sined by my own canard, and this
led you at an alarming rate to "daffy duck". Such are the wonders of the human
mind. The royal "we" is noted. Bless.
________________________________
From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, 13 April 2012, 10:54
Subject: [lit-ideas] we are now hard at work with daffy duck
נכון >>> Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> 13/04/2012 11:50 AM >>>
There are longer ways but here is a shorter way with Richard Henninge’s post.
Richard, as I recall, knows important things about the shortcomings of the
English translation of Wittgenstein’s work. Whatever these shortcomings, for
example in conveying the exact sense of W’s writing in German, they were
translated by humans not computers. And this for good reason.Their shortcomings
would arguably be much greater if the translation had been performed by a
computer following some programme: and that is because computers have no grasp
of the “sense” of language as humans do. What computers do by way of processing
“rules” does not involve their grasping the “sense” of the “rules” involved.
A simple example: a computer may contain an error in its programme so that it
produces the calculation ‘2 + 2 = 44’; but where a human would baulk because
they grasp that this must be mistaken, the computer, having no grasp of the
sense of what it processes, will not baulk at this mistake – it will not baulk
because it does not grasp it must be a mistake [it will only ‘baulk’ if another
part of its programme causes it to ‘baulk’ i.e. treat this as an “error”]. A
computer will no more baulk at ‘2 + 2 = 44’ than will a blackboard it is
chalked on: for, in Popper’s useful terms, both the computer and the blackboard
are confined to processing information at the level of World 1, and lack
conscious understanding of the content they process [still less, in Popper's
terms, do they grasp the World 3 content or mathematical principle according to
which '2 + 2 = 44' must be a mistake).
And so what computers do cannot be taken to show anything about the “sense” of
a “rule” in the sense in which W is interested in “rules” and their “sense”:
for what computers do by way of processing does not involve computers grasping
the “sense” of a “rule”. And since their processing does not involve grasping
the sense of a rule, what they do cannot be taken to show that the “sense” of a
“rule” may be said (on the basis that it is “said” in what they process).
Richard’s attempted refutation is therefore entirely misconceived.
What Richard should really try to do (if he really wants to refute W's
position) is state a “rule” so that its sense is _said_ in what is stated: but
stating a computer programme, even one comprising “rules” [of computation], is
not to state any “rules” whose “sense” is _said_ in what is stated.
Wittgenstein would also agree that Richard’s attempted refutation is entirely
misconceived because [in W’s use of “rules” and their ‘sense’] stating a
computer programme, even one comprising “rules” [of computation], is not to
state any “rules” whose “sense” is _said_ in what is stated. Stating 'a
computer programme' no more achieves this than stating 'this combination of
chemicals always produces this compound' achieves stating a "rule" whose sense
is _said_ in what is stated (indeed, it no more achieves this than actually
'combining the chemicals to produce the compound' would amount to 'saying' the
_sense_ of the chemical "rule" involved).
Richard's suggested "refutation" is as hopelessly naive as Moore's refutation
of idealism by holding his hands out. It is no better than if Richard had
chalked some mathematical "rule" on a blackboard and then claimed, "See, the
sense of that "rule" has just been _said_ in what I chalked".* Or no better
than if Richard chalked some proposition on a blackboard and then claimed,
"See, the sense of that proposition has just been _said_ in what I chalked".**
As to any such claims, the answer is "No, it hasn't" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, both
'later'* and 'earlier'**).
Anyone who thinks the answer is otherwise simply does not 'get it' re
Wittgenstein.
Donal
Who thinks history shows people should be careful before being first to allege
others are hoist by their own petard
________________________________
From: Richard Henninge <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Friday, 13 April 2012, 5:05
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online - amplification re
PI
Donal Hoisted On His Own Petard
So choose your weapons as you wish - any example of a "rule" participants
prefer (though personally a mathematical "rule" is I suggest best here for
bringing out W's POV, and so that i[s] what I offered for discussion).
>
>Bring it on.
Dnl
>Ldn
>
>So the weapon chosen by Donal is a rule, preferably mathematical (since that
>is "best . . . for bringing out W's POV), with victory to go to anyone who can
>show that it is _not_ the case that
> for W, their sense is not /said/ in 'what is said' but can only be
> shown. So all the apparent clear articulation or expression of "rules"
> is beside the point and philosophically deceiving if we think 'what is
> said' contains the sense of the "rules".
I will reserve judgment on rules unprogrammable, since they indeed fall into
the realm of anthropology and linguistics, where only observation can begin to
reveal what and when something is a rule and what constitutes its having been
followed. I believe this is a fundamentally open question in Wittgenstein and
what really makes for all the fun of his Untersuchungen, his philosophical
"under-seekings" in which he pokes at, teases, twists, probes, and twiddles
with the freaky human language we live and breath in, in an effort to get some
kind of grip, hold, purchase on what he clearly sees as an infinitely tricky
subject that is not about to yield as categoric a solution as the purported POV
Donal attributes to him.
Instead, I will address the easy lob that Donal throws at us in his high-arcing
gauntlet--a rule eminently programmable, so programmable that any computer
could be made to play the game according to that rule. And--you must be getting
ahead of me with this argumentation--if a computer, a mindless computer, mind
you, can play the game perfectly according to the rule--say, of taking a number
and adding 2 to it and then of adding 2 to the number then generated [Donal's
suggested rule]--(chess would be an acceptable alternative), then the "sense"
of that rule is most definitely contained in "what is said," since that is all
a computer can "understand." The commands or instructions do not "show" the
computer what to do at any given point in the game; it's not as if the computer
is looking over the programmer's shoulder and learning by "seeing" the rule in
action shown to it, then applying it, by trial and error, over a gradual
learning curve, by doing, up
to a mastery of performing according to it: no, the computer takes the
rigorous logic of its program, a sequence of written directives that it carries
out faithfully, mindlessly, to play the "game" according to the rules, which is
basically all it knows and all it will ever need to know. You can program a
window to lower its blinds when the sunlight hitting its sensors surpasses a
specific light intensity parameter; you can tell a person to do the same thing,
to follow this rule, to play this game. In each case the sense of the rule is
contained in "what is said," and not "in what is shown."
Furthermore, Donal's corollary insight into Wittgenstein's _Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus_
[It may be noted that W's position here, re "rules" in PI, *parallels* [my
emphasis RH] his position re "propositions" in TLP: for TLP holds that there is
no proposition whose sense is _said_, rather than shown, in 'what is said' by
the proposition i.e. no proposition 'says' its sense - rather, a "proposition
shows its sense". And it may further be noted that we are likewise apt to
wrongly think that 'what can only be shown' re the sense of a "proposition" is
_said_ by the proposition, for again 'what can only be shown' ordinarily
_seems to be there_ in 'what is said'].
>
>
is but another self-hoisting petard, especially and ironically, when he thinks
he has discovered a passage in it in which Wittgenstein seems explicitly to
support his notion that the sense of a proposition is not said by the
proposition, but only shown by the proposition:
>[From the C. K. Ogden translation <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5740>
>
>4.022 The proposition shows its sense.
>The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And
>it says, that they do so stand.>
>[italicization mine, RH, in accordance with the original]
>
A computer "knows not seems." It cuts always to the chase, logically speaking.
It cannot know "how things stand" unless you tell it "they do so stand." The
show/say distinction is reserved for the humans in attendance, but the computer
can process the propositions as instructions that it, so to speak, takes on
faith as being true, according to the sense "on their face." For the computer,
the show/say distinction collapses. Ideally, if a computer were fed
Wittgenstein's numbered propositions, it could "go on" with the language-game
they create, by following the rules of the game that they make up, in so far as
it could generate new non-contradictory propositions employing the terms used
in the TLP. For example, in keeping with Wittgenstein's rigorous logic (which
is little else than his extreme attention to the wording he chooses, and hence
my--personal--exasperation when translators play fast and loose with his
formulations, and, I think, his
exasperation when people in his midst play fast and loose with their own use
of language, hence, too, his readiness to raise a poker against such abuses on
occasion) the computer would not be able or allowed to spit out such
propositions as
The proposition says its sense.
The proposition says how things stand.
The proposition shows that things do so stand.
You'll notice that these three bogus, infelicitous propositions literally
violate the rules implied by (or contained in) the 3-prop world encompassed in
4.022, a world in which sense, which is how things stand, cannot be said, but
it, sense, i.e. how things stand, can indeed be shown, whereas that things do
so stand cannot be shown; that can only be said. What we learn from this
playing (serious philosophical playing) with the language is that the
proposition does *double duty*, a double duty in keeping with Frege's key Sinn
and Bedeutung distinction. Frege's interest was to create a language, a logic,
that would facilitate the advancement of science, or knowledge, by exposing
cases in which the difference is crucial. For instance, that the moon is made
out of green cheese is a legitimate Sinn, our word "sense" in the above
discussion, but the proposition cannot flat-out say that, basically claim that.
It must take a conservative two-step of (1)
presenting or setting out or describing or showing how things would be if that
were so (this Sinn, or sense, after all, can turn out to be Unsinn, or
nonsense), and (2) saying or stating or claiming, maintaining that it is so.
As I said, the computer is a fine follower of rules and its following of rules
is not affected by the saying/showing distinction. "For all intents and
purposes" the propositions it has to work with in its programming "say" their
sense directly to it since it accepts the truth of everything the program tells
it (to do). The fact that one could use the words show and say interchangeably
when describing how the computer "learns" the rules of a game it can play
thereafter, should be indication enough that the distinction plays no rôle
here, and hence is not, as Donal says
beside the point and philosophically deceiving if we think 'what is
>> said' contains the sense of the "rules".
>
Richard Henninge
University of Mainz
----- Original Message -----
>From: Donal McEvoy
>To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 12:01 PM
>Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online - amplification
>re PI
>
>
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
>
>>Phil wrote
>
>> >The issue is not the rules, which can be clearly articulated,
>> but rather their use.>
>
>to which Donal replied
>
>> Phil puzzles me by earlier asking for clarity where I have been very
>> clear and indeed have used italics to identify a key tenet that provides
>> a fundamental continuity between TLP and PI: /the sense of 'what is
>> said' is never said in 'what is said/ etc.
>
>In the Tractatus, the sense of a proposition is how things would be if it were
>true.>
>
>Robert seems to posit this last claim as if it refutes, or is somehow
>inconsistent with, my claimed "key tenet".
>It does not refute the "key tenet". It is quite consistent that (a) the sense
>of a proposition is how things would be if it were true and (b) the sense of a
>proposition is never _said_ in 'what is said' by a proposition.
>
>And indeed what Robert then quotes from W plainly reflects that this is W's
>position:-
>
>>[From the C. K. Ogden translation <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5740>
>
>4.022 The proposition shows its sense.
>The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And
>it says, that they do so stand.>
>
>Exactly as my "key tenet" has it. A proposition "_shows_ its sense". It does
>not 'say' its sense. Its sense is not _said_ in 'what is said' but can only be
>_shown_ (even if it is shown by 'what is said').
>
>So what Robert seems to offer by way of counter-example turns out to be an
>example of W 'saying' [or, strictly speaking, _showing_] the "key tenet".
>
>
>Robert then objects to this 'key tenet' in PI, in particular my claims below:-
>
>>> Now this tenet means that we can perhaps have rules that seem "clearly
>> articulated" or whose sense is clear. But, and it is a fundamental but
>> for W, their sense is not /said/ in 'what is said' but can only be
>> shown. So all the apparent clear articulation or expression of "rules"
>> is beside the point and philosophically deceiving if we think 'what is
>> said' contains the sense of the "rules".
>
>I don't recognize anything of what Wittgenstein says in this.>
>
>Robert continues:-
>
>>He nowhere explicitly says it>
>
>Here we may agree. (And I have tried to explain why W does not 'say' this
>explicitly, even though this is his POV - a POV that marks a fundamental
>continuity between TLP and PI).
>
>>> We might argue out a case to see W's POV here: take the rule 'for every
>> number add 2 and then for that number add two' and then ask how "what is
>> said" determines its sense?
>
>Why should we do this, when much richer examples are right there in the text? >
>
>Fair enough, Robert doesn't like this example (there are reasons a
>mathematical "rule" is, imo, a good example to start with, but be that as it
>may). Choose any example you like and we may argue it. What is the argument
>about? As per the "key tenet", I shall be arguing that no matter what example
>of a "rule" is chosen, W's POV is that the sense of any such "rule" is not
>_said_ in 'what is said' when we state the "rule". And if an example is
>chosen, where someone claims that they have stated a "rule" whose sense is
>_said_ in 'what is said', I will put what I take to be W's POV - and 'point
>to' what W takes as 'showing' that any such claim _only appears true_ by a
>kind of optical illusion where we have simply assumed 'what can only be shown'
>as being 'said' in 'what is said' (something we are unthinkingly apt to do, as
>'what can only be shown' ordinarily _seems to be there_ in 'what is said').
>
>While I may express what I take to be W's POV in my own terms, I will also try
>to relate those terms expressly to what W writes.
>
>The issue is stark and goes to fundamentals. My claim is not merely that there
>are _some_ "rules" [as W means the term] whose sense is not 'said' in a
>statement of that "rule", but that (for W) *there is no "rule" whose sense is
>_said_ in a statement of that "rule"*.
>
>[It may be noted that W's position here, re "rules" in PI, parallels his
>position re "propositions" in TLP: for TLP holds that there is no proposition
>whose sense is _said_, rather than shown, in 'what is said' by the proposition
>i.e. no proposition 'says' its sense - rather, a "proposition shows its
>sense". And it may further be noted that we are likewise apt to wrongly think
>that 'what can only be shown' re the sense of a "proposition" is _said_ by the
>proposition, for again 'what can only be shown' ordinarily _seems to be
>there_ in 'what is said'].
>
>So choose your weapons as you wish - any example of a "rule" participants
>prefer (though personally a mathematical "rule" is I suggest best here for
>bringing out W's POV, and so that it what I offered for discussion).
>
>Bring it on.
>
>Dnl
>Ldn
>
>
>
>
>
>digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
>
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