One has to give JL some credit for the tenacity with which he defends his grice. Fukinbeliciana ! On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 9:13 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > -----Original Message----- > From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto: > lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Sent: 21 March 2015 21:11 > To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana > > Hart was a virtuous legal philosopher. > > My last post today! > > Why do moral theorists such as Grice and Grice use 'contract', and > quasi-contract, when they don't mean it. Cfr. Locke on compact? > > Is there a legal implicature, there, somewhere? > > (Grice and Grice refer to Grice the author of "Studies in the way of words" > and Grice the author of "The grounds of moral judgement"). > > As Ann Cudd says, "the metaphor of the social contract requires some > interpretation in order to apply it to the situation of morality or > politics", so Grice and Grice are being _metaphorical_ (or figurative). > Literally, there is no contract (even if 'literalness' IS one of the > _figures_ of speech, even if a boring one). > > Of course, we have to distinguish as to whether Grice and Grice are > proposing contractarianism or mere contractualism. > > Contractarianism has its roots in Hobbes, whose account is based on mutual > self-interest. Morality consists in those forms of cooperative behaviour > that it is mutually advantageous for self-interested agents to engage in. > (The most prominent modern exponent is David Gauthier). > > By contrast, any form of contractualism is grounded on the equal moral > status of persons. > > ----- One may still need to study the legal implicature behind the use of > 'contract', even if figurative, in both contractualism, contractarianism, > and Grice's quasi-contractualism. > > But back to O. K.'s point about 'Hart is virtuous' being kind of vacuous, > or rather seldom made, qua utterance (I should revise his actual wording), > I found further evidence for the contrary -- what's the fun of philosophy > if we are not going to discuss? > > For Socrates, virtue is one. > > The Stoics adhered to the Socratic doctrine that virtue is one. > > For Plato, granted, virtues are four: > > temperance: σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē) > prudence: φρόνησις (phronēsis) > courage: ἀνδρεία (andreia) > justice: δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē) > > But D. Carr, however (in "the cardinal virtues and Plato's psychologism", > Philosophical Quarterly) considers either of the above FOUR virtue > combinations as mutually reducible and therefore NOT cardinal. > > Gregory Vlastos goes further. In "The Unity of virtues in the > "Protagoras"", Review of Metaphysics, 25) Vlastos argues alla Grice that > Plato subscribes to a unified view of virtues -- 'virtue is entire'. > > In "Protagoras" (and also in "Meno") Plato argues that the separate > virtues can't exist independently. > > Plato offers as evidence the logical contradiction of saying that Smith, > for example, acted with wisdom, yet in an unjust way. Or that Smith acted > with bravery (fortitude), yet without wisdom. > > Plato was a philosopher, i.e. a lover of wisdom, and this possibly biased > into thinking that virtue is synonymous with wisdom -- and that it can be > taught (possibly at the Academy -- no fee required. Things changed with > Aristotle). (Geary disagrees: "Plato taught love-of-wisdom; not wisdom"). > > Seneca, the Roman Stoic, also held that virtue is entire -- even if he > perhaps lacked it. > > His reasoning is, like Plato, based on linguistic analysis -- now Latin, > not Greek. > > Seneca explicitly says that perfect prudence is indistinguishable from > perfect virtue. > > "Considering all consequences, a prudent man would act in the identical > way as a virtuous person." > > "If that's not a linguistic proof that virtue is entire, I don't know > what is." > > Nero found that VERY offensive and ordered Seneca to commit suicide. This > was not 'by law'; for otherwise Seneca could have appealed (vide Hart, > "Law as coercive orders", in "The Concept of Law"). > > The thesis of the Unity of Virtue happens to be then a well-known tenet > of ancient Graeco-Roman ethics, and Griceian one, at that. > > The strongest version of the thesis, is held by Socrates and Plato. As > Grice puts it, it states that Virtue is One (said solemnly). > > A weaker but still very strong version of the thesis for the integrity of > virtue claims rather that there are various virtues (like branches of > philosophy -- Grice's point about saying that Hart is ONLY a 'legal' > philosopher (or Oxford's "man at legal philosophy") gets, via something > like damn by faint praise, that Hart was not good at philosophy) are SO > INTEGRATED with each other that a person cannot have one virtue without > having all the > others. > > To have one virtue, in other words, is to have them all. (Mutatis > mutandis, there is only one problem in philosophy, namely all of them). > > One cannot be truly courageous unless one is also just; one cannot be > truly just unless one is also generous, as well as temperate, magnanimous, > truthful, friendly, witty and so on. > > On the face of it, however, this thesis SEEMS plainly false. > > Indeed, on most of the occasions in which the Stoics exposed the thesis > of the Unity of the Virtues it was scornfully dismissed as one of the > weakest aspects of Graeco-Roman ethics -- it became fashionable again with > Cato > the younger. > > The thesis of the integrity of virtue is a puzzle that generates the > right conversational implicature. For something can be true BUT misleading > -- or 'misleading but true' -- Myro, who knew Grice well once formulated a > "Grice rule": if what Grice says strikes me first as plainly false, it is > ultimately true; and vice versa"). > > The thesis that virtue (like philosophy) is entire is not an empirical > thesis, arrived at or supported by empirical evidence, neither is it a > straightforwardly normative thesis of the kind just mentioned. > > Rather, the thesis is one that falls out of a broader normative view as a > corollary. > > It may be understood as the conclusion of an argument that rests in part > on normative and analytic premises. > > Moreover, it seems to me that the premises of the argument are quite > plausible and that therefore the argument in favour of a qualified form of > the thesis is quite strong. > > The classical Graeco-Roman (and indeed Griceian) thesis of the unity of > virtue is understood to imply that to have one virtue is to have them all. > > If a person is courageous, according to this thesis, then he will also be > generous, just, truthful, and temperate. > > Similarly, if he is just, he will possess courage as well as all the rest > of the virtues. > > Grice does not elaborate the point, but if virtue is entire, so is vice. > One of his adages against weakness of the will was of a man being 'caught > in the grip of a vice', but he admitted the utterance could trigger the > wrong implicature in context -- especially in Oxford if not America. > > In Oxford, what Americans call a vise is a vice, and so, 'he was caught in > the grip of a vice' may well mean, in Oxford, that he is held by the tool > that carpenters use. > > vice1 -- Latin vitium "defect, offense, blemish, imperfection," in both > physical and moral senses (in Medieval Latin also vicium; source also of > Italian vezzo "usage, entertainment"), from PIE *wi-tio-, from root *wei- > "vice, fault, guilt." > > vice2 -- (spelt 'vice' in America) Anglo-French vice, Old French vis, viz > "screw," from Latin vitis "vine, tendril of a vine," literally "that which > winds," from root of viere "to bind, twist" (see withy). Also in Middle > English, "device like a screw or winch for bending a crossbow or catapult; > spiral staircase; the screw of a press; twisted tie for fastening a hood > under the chin." The modern meaning "clamping tool with two jaws closed by > a screw" is first recorded c.1500. > > But Hart _knew_ that! > > Cheers, > > Speranza > > . > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > >