[lit-ideas] standard confusions
- From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2014 06:33:33 +0000
If people were to get Hume right....... it would be a "nice day" as the yanks
say.
CERTAINLY one can reach any practical judgment in any theoretical way. For
those of the generation www one can devote some time to set up a programm run
by Cohen of the nyt and let the machine crank up any judgment, practical,
scientific, philosophical, financial, private life advisory, or anything one
likes.
Hume the great man saw quite distinctly that any judgment if it has to "bring
about" acts has components that are "contents of beliefs" and motivational
structures much harder to pin down.
That is why I can be perfectly convinced, say by M Gandhi, that I should "turn
the second cheek" or some such, and thereby concurrently smack the face of the
English policeman with a cosh.
One thing that I suggest to avoid is uninformed idiocy.
Regards
-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Walter C. Okshevsky
Sent: 04 September 2014 21:16
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; Omar Kusturica
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Moral Distinctions Not deriv'd from Reason
Just a couple of Kantian thoughts from the dacha:
There are technical, prudential, etc, meanings of "right" and "wrong." However,
to speak of *moral* right or wrong is to speak either of obligation (ought) or
permissibility in moral terms. What is morally right is either obligatory or
permitted. What is morally wrong is either morally forbidden or morally
impermissible.
So, yes, I would think that if you claim that action or maxim P is right, you
may only be claiming that P is morally permissible but not obligatory (i.e.,
ought to be done).
I agree that it is possible to do moral wrong (though not intentionally). But
I don't see how that fact connects up with our discussion.
If you claim that something is right "in theoretical terms" only, you are not
making a moral (practical judgement). There is no "simply theoretical" when it
comes to practical judgement. I guess that's how it got it's name.
Walter O
MUN
Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> However, moral discussions can also proceed in terms of what is right
> or wrong without necessarily passing to 'ought,' can they not ? I can
> argue that something is right in theoretical terms without necessarily
> commanding that it ought to be done. (It is possible to do wrong, or
> not do what is right, after all.)
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > My last post today. The passage analysed by Pigden is as per below.
> > From Hume's pen:
> >
> >
> > ‘Moral Distinctions Not deriv’d from Reason’.
> >
> > In those days, philosophers felt like ENTITLING things and sections.
> > But the title is not relevant. What is relevant is the content of the
> > section:
> >
> > Hume writes:
> >
> >
> > "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
> always
> > remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
> > way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes
> > observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am
> > surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
> > propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is
> > not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is
> > imperceptible"
> >
> > This seems hyperbolic, since HE perceived it, and so do I. So he
> > means
> that
> > the change is _subtle_ rather. He ought to use words more precisely!
> >
> > Hume (or "Home", as the original spelling went) goes on:
> >
> > "; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or
> > ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’tis
> > necessary that it shou’ d be observ’d and explain’d; and at
> > the same time that a reason should
> be
> > given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
> > relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
> > different from it … [I]
> am
> > persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wou’d subvert
> > all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the
> > distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the
> > relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason."
> >
> > I think that von Wright and H. Paul Grice would use an 'alethic'
> > operator here (unknown to Hume):
> >
> > Ë«p
> >
> > We then oppose this assertion sign (which is in fact a double sign,
> > 'affirmation' and 'judgement') to an 'imperative' sign (which would
> > comprise the cases that Hume perceived -- though he deemed
> > imperceptible) of an 'is'
> > turning into an 'ought to':
> >
> > !p
> >
> > Hume: "that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is,
> > and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
> > ought, or an ought not."
> >
> > Hume mentions: discussions of God -- natural theology, say -- or
> > philosophical theology, as opposed to dogmatic theology of this or
> > that religion.
> > And then he mentions 'vice' and 'virtue' and 'human affairs'.
> >
> > I agree with Pigden that the issue is very complex!
> >
> > Hume speaks of 'copulation'. He means 'copula', as in
> >
> > The S is P.
> >
> > versus
> >
> > The S OUGHT TO BE P.
> >
> > Where 'ought to be' is another copulation or copula. An 'imperative'
> > copulation, as it were, and not an assertoric copulation involved in
> > the Frege sign.
> >
> > Since 'virtue' (not to mention 'God') seems like a value- or
> > ought-laden expression, it's not surprising that an author (such as
> > Hume criticises) would use, to vary the prose, an 'is' here, and an
> > 'ought' there, because he would rely on his addressee to understand
> > that he is staying in the realm of 'morality'.
> >
> > The title to the section refers to Hume's fork or 'law' (which
> > admittedly sounds rather grand, as Pigden notes). But while Hume
> > woke Kant up from
> his
> > dogmatic slumber, Kant was courageous enough to, following
> > Aristotle, assert strongly that THERE is such a thing as the place
> > of reason in ethics!
> >
> > -----
> >
> > Oddly, Witters once got very offended when he found out that Toulmin
> > had borrowed all his ideas from him on this very issue! (*)
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> > Speranza
> >
> > *. The title of Toulmin's dissertation at Cantab. is "The place of
> > reason in ethics", later turned, typically, into a hardcover book!
> >
> >
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