this grice is a favorite of Speranza? pray tell, what is the world coming to... even speranza corrupted by the oxonian worms On Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 1:26 AM, Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>wrote: > Omar K. was wondering about a reference to Davidson: > > "Well, if Davidson really thought "that you cannot have a 'sentence' ("The > cat sat on the mat") without the BELIEF (or opinion) to the effect that > the cat sat on the mat." he must have been stark mad. I am thinking that > this is probably a misunderstanding. [...] Okay, we might say that lying, > if > successful, requires at least one person to believe it, but if there is no > way of accounting for jokes, fictions, second/language teaching examples, > examples on Lit/ideas etc., without presupposing 'belief' in the > proposition, this is basically ridiculous." > > A bit of context may be in order. > > The reference to Davidson came from P. Enns, who was quoting Davidson as, > as it were, a way to illuminate the prose of Heidegger (specifically > Heidgger's writings on the nature of language -- the early and the later > Heidegger, in conjunction). Let us have that first-hand quote again. > > Perhaps after that, we can immerse onto the question of the priority or > alleged priority (as per Davidson) of opinions over utterances that Omar > K. > is, in my reading, addressing: > > P. Enns had written: > > "Alongside the importance of Heidegger's essay, 'The question concerning > technology', which discusses instrumental reason and the role of technique > [...,] I would also add Heidegger's work on language in *Being > and Time* as well as his later essays, such as 'The way to language'. In > these writings, Heidegger explores the ways in which language is > constitutive of understanding and the intelligibility of the world, not as > a tool or lens with which we encounter the world, as though language were > something through which we picture, represent or refer to the world, but > rather as being human. Whether it is in his discussion of how language is > a > necessary condition for human life in the world, or the way in which > language precedes our understanding of the world, Heidegger tries to show > us that > language is much more than a means of communication. While the later > Heidegger does occasionally indulge in a mystification of language, > in both the early and later writings, his aim, to borrow a phrase from > Davidson, is to re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects > whose > antics make our sentences and opinions true or false." > > To re-word: > > To re-establish unmediated (i.e. _sans_ representation?) > > touch with the familiar objects > > (such as cats and mats) > > whose antics (notably the cat) make our sentencs AND OPINIONS > [my emphasis -- Speranza] true [...]." > > We now corroborate, thanks to P. Enns, that the quote comes from > Davidson's sort of famous 'conceptual scheme' essay. > > In trying to elaborate on the Davidson quote, I ended up emphasising the > role of 'representation' (not a word Davidson uses admittedly). > > And I thought of bringing in Peacocke (who's written extensively on this, > and, in my view, brilliantly). > > And, I thought of ALSO bringing, 'into the bargain', as it were, Popper -- > since McEvoy has a serious interest in this philosopher and it looked as if > Popper's Kantianism may contradict some of Davidson's points -- and _a > fortiori_, Heidegger: that there is such a thing as an unmediated touch > with > stuff. (I hope my phrasing is clear!) > > Omar notes: > > "Well, if Davidson really thought "that you cannot have a 'sentence' ("The > cat sat on the mat") without the BELIEF (or opinion) to the effect that > the cat sat on the mat." he must have been stark mad. I am thinking that > this is probably a misunderstanding. ... Okay, we might say that lying, if > successful, requires at least one person to believe it, but if there is no > way of accounting for jokes, fictions, second/language teaching examples, > examples on Lit/ideas etc., without presupposing 'belief' in the > proposition, > this is basically ridiculous." > > Yes. > > It may be interesting to emphasise that Davidson is speaking of 'sentences > and opinions' in the quoted passage > > -- where 'opinion' must stand for belief (or some such 'cognitive' > psychological attitude -- versus a conative one such as 'desire', which are > fulfilled or not, rather than true or false). > > But this should perhaps trigger, if we are in the right philosophical > mood, a broader question. > > It is easy enough, after all, alla Davidson, to ascribe truth to sentences > -- rather than to opinions. > > This is the Tarski schema. Yet, in some conceptions of knowledge (notably > the one one and again contradicted by McEvoy) it is _beliefs_ that are > primarily true, not sentences -- Plato's Theaetetus, the earliest source > possibly, as cited by Gettier. > > > Davidson has gone on record as a symmetricalist: he cannot have an opinion > without a sentence and vice versa -- this is for him both an > epistemological AND an ontological point. (I was inspired into this > interpretation of > Davidson's philosophy by Anita Avramides DPhil dissertation at Oxford, > advised > by Strawson). > > On the other hand, for those philosophers who have explored the idea of > content (as Peacocke has -- as in his book, "Content", Blackwell, but > also in > his inaugural lecture as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics at Oxford), > the role of representation becomes crucial. > > In Peacocke's case, it is perceptual content that counts, which may brings > a dose of scepticism to Davidson's realist (if that's what it is, even > scientific-realist) idea that there is or should be or could be an > unmediated > touch with familiar things and their antics -- I would NOT use 'object' > which presupposes a full epistemology alla Kant). > > Alston (in his classic "Philosophy of Language") famously (or is it > infamously cites Grice (a favourite philosopher of mine) as an > 'ideationist', > alla Locke. For Locke, indeed, there is 'mediate' signification, and > 'immediate' signfiication. And this may relate to Davidson's use of > 'unmediated' in > the quote provided by Enns. > > Locke, Alston says, holds that words SIGNIFY, immediately, the IDEAS in the > mind of he or she who uses them -- but they signify, or aim at signifying, > mediately, the THINGS for which these ideas stand -- hence (I think) what > Popper, elsewhere, refers to as the new 'way of ideas' (which becomes, > eventually, the title of Grice's posthumous book). > > Perhaps talk of representation as keyword here sounds pretentious. It > shouldn't, I hope! > > Cheers, > > Speranza > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > -- palma, e TheKwini, KZN palma cell phone is 0762362391 *only when in Europe*: inst. J. Nicod 29 rue d'Ulm f-75005 paris france