Adriano Palma wrote: "It is false that a truth predicate is 'redundant', viz. precisely either the Tarskian or the Kripkean constructions (the former dates 80 years of age, the latter, more than 30, and it follows precisely fixed points in the hierarchy.) There are two intuitive, semi formal reasons, for this. ... 2. consider a simple case, of an utterance, as some are wont to couch their views in, x utters "I met Mickey Mouse". whether or not the quoted utterance is true depends on x's meeting mickey or not. One, more often than not, device (of humans, not of mice) is to reply: "Is it true or is it a joke?" note that both are possible, x's utterance may be a joke (hence you may have a theory of truth in-fiction, of truth in-humor, and so forth), or the quoted utterance may be true, in which case one may left wondering whether X met a ghost, an hallucination, Y dressed a mickey mouse, is drinking too much, and so forth." A truth predicate (i.e. 'is true') is redundant as part of any assertion. That is "I met Mickey Mouse", as an assertion, requires the understanding of a truth predicate. Adding a truth predicate, by saying something like, "It is true that I met Mickey Mouse", doesn't add anything to the original assertion. Furthermore, if the assertion "I met Mickey Mouse" benefits, in some way, from the addition of a truth predicate, then the new and improved assertion, "It is true that I met Mickey Mouse", would be similarly in need of benefit, usw. Every instance of language use carries with it an implied truth predicate, in some form or another, without which, as Wittgenstein argues, language use would not be possible. It is also this association of meaning in language and truthfulness that makes possible T-sentences. However, as Adriano notes, language use also contains jokes and mistakes, and so there is then also a need to ascertain whether particular instances of language use are true in that language. This is where, and here I am following Donald Davidson, a theory of truth comes into play. A theory of truth does not determine that an assertion is true or not, but rather describes the parts of a language that are true in a particular language. A theory of truth is therefore an empirical project of determining what aspects of a particular language are understood as true by the relevant language users. As our knowledge of ourselves and the world around us changes, so also does the range of particular elements of language use considered as true, also change. A theory of truth keeps track of what counts as true and what doesn't. On this understanding of the use of truth predicates, that is the empirical project of tracking what we take to be true, then truth predicates are not redundant, and are in fact quite important. Put more simply, the assertion of "I met Mickey Mouse" is a different form of language use from the assertion "It is true that X met Mickey Mouse". The first implies the truth predicate while the second includes the truth predicate on the assumption of empirically determining a particular state of affairs. Sincerely, Phil Enns ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html