[lit-ideas] Re: nofi, from https://philosophynow.org/issues/83/Hume_on_Is_and_Ought

  • From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 09:42:53 +0000

Bananas speak Russian or else you ought not to spout bullshit [pr. 1]
Bananas don’t speak Russian [pr. 2]
Hence you ought not to spout bullshit.
By DS.
If you deny disjunctive syllogism, you may take your beef to logic, not to me.
If you believe DS has to be replaced with something else, say what.
The rest is usual exhibition of mental diarrohea typical of self styled 
philosophers.


From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On 
Behalf Of Donal McEvoy
Sent: 03 September 2014 23:50
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: nofi, from 
https://philosophynow.org/issues/83/Hume_on_Is_and_Ought


>But is No-Ought-From-Is true? Not quite. It is an instance of the logical 
>principle that in a valid inference there can be no matter in the conclusion 
>that is not contained in the premises, and as the New Zealand logician Arthur 
>Prior pointed out this is not strictly correct. However, what we can show is 
>that if you have non-logical words in the conclusion of a valid inference that 
>do not appear in the premises they will be vacuous in a certain sense and that 
>in a logically valid argument you can’t get anything non-vacuous out that you 
>haven’t put in. This gives us No-Non-Vacuous–Ought-From-Is which is close 
>enough to the original NOFI to sustain Hume’s key arguments. So for 
>simplicity’s sake we will stick with No-Ought-From-Is in its original form.>

The above is an unclear and invalid argument against the so-called 
"naturalistic fallacy". It fails to show that even a "vacuous" "ought" may be 
derived or deduced from an "is". Leaving Hume's views (and G.E. Moore's) aside, 
we can defend a version of the "naturalistic fallacy" that would insist there 
is never a logically valid deduction of an "ought" from an "is": what we may do 
is deduce an "ought" from an "ought" but never from an "is", and it always a 
confusion to suggest otherwise.

Let us say we have a situation where what "ought" to be the case is also what 
"is" the case: for example, that not only should Paul repay Peter the money he 
borrowed but also it is the case that Paul repays Peter - from all this, can we 
now "deduce" that what is the case here also "ought" to be the case? Yes, but 
in saying this we have not deduced the "ought" from any "is" but from another 
"ought": the fact Paul repays Peter is not a fact from which we can deduce that 
Paul ought to repay Peter; rather from the "ought" that "Paul should repay 
Peter" we can deduce that "Paul repays Peter" is what ought to be the case. In 
this kind of deduction there is no deduction of an "ought" from an "is".

The quoted passage fails to give any clear or cogent argument showing that some 
sort of "vacuous" "ought" may be deduced or derived from some "is". Having 
failed in this, we need not take seriously any suggestion that the passage 
offers any serious alternative to the view that an "ought" can never be derived 
from an "is".

It should be emphasised that this version of the "naturalistic fallacy" is 
compatible with claims that what "ought" to be the case may be conditional on 
certain facts:- as long as we recognise these claims are themselves "oughts" 
and never are "oughts" deduced or derived from facts.

What may happen is that certain views [e.g. certain forms of utilitarianism] 
assert that what "ought" may be established by certain facts [e.g. what "ought" 
= what in fact produces 'the greatest pleasure for the greatest number']. 
Proponents of such views may lose sight of the fact that their assertion here 
is not itself an assertion of non-moral fact but an "ought". In this way, they 
may disguise that such claims - that what "ought" may be defined in terms of 
certain facts - are never claims that are provable by facts or derivable from 
facts*, but are always an "ought" (however well-disguised or embedded in 
factual talk).

Donal
*Even if we could show it was in fact the case that "something" would produce 
'the greatest pleasure for the greatest number', that would never show that 
"something" is what ought to be the case. And what ought to be the case could 
not be deduced or derived from any such merely non-moral factual demonstration.



On Wednesday, 3 September 2014, 17:59, palma 
<palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx<mailto:palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>> wrote:

given this inane liking of pop culture, I shall oblige by quoting a simple 
popular article, that none the less is written by someone who knows what he 
(was) talking about


this from Pigden, Charles

But is No-Ought-From-Is true? Not quite. It is an instance of the logical 
principle that in a valid inference there can be no matter in the conclusion 
that is not contained in the premises, and as the New Zealand logician Arthur 
Prior pointed out this is not strictly correct. However, what we can show is 
that if you have non-logical words in the conclusion of a valid inference that 
do not appear in the premises they will be vacuous in a certain sense and that 
in a logically valid argument you can’t get anything non-vacuous out that you 
haven’t put in. This gives us No-Non-Vacuous–Ought-From-Is which is close 
enough to the original NOFI to sustain Hume’s key arguments. So for 
simplicity’s sake we will stick with No-Ought-From-Is in its original form.


On Wed, Sep 3, 2014 at 6:44 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky 
<wokshevs@xxxxxx<mailto:wokshevs@xxxxxx>> wrote:
I missed your pointing out decades ago why you believe the NF is not a fallacy.
But perhaps we could stay with Searle.

Since we are a dialogical community of inquiry, after all, and not all of us may
have read Searle on the NF, why don't you hum a few bars of the tune you believe
Searle was crooning so we may all chirp in on whether Searle got it right "50
yrs ago (!)" and/or on whether you got Searle right of course. Always good to
be singing from the same page of the hymn book.

Eschewing mightily ...

(And no-one say "Gesundheit.")

Walter O
Dacha Svetlaya Polyana


Quoting Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx<mailto:Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>>:

> That is what you believe. I don't, for reasons pointed out decades ago. You
> may enjoy refuting the views published 50 yrs ago (!) e.g by J. R. Searle. In
> Phil Rev 1n 1964. The piece is available even on the www via courtesy of duke
> press. You may equally enjoy A. Prior's work on the subject. I have no idea
> of what political commentary you have. Feel free to eschew whatever it is
> that ought to be eschewed
> best
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> 
> [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]
> On Behalf Of Walter C. Okshevsky
> Sent: 02 September 2014 21:36
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; Eric
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Vedr: Three arguments against quantitative social
> "science" as science
>
> With reference to your question (and eschewing all political commentary), I
> would say, yes, the naturalistic fallacy (Hume's version) is indeed a logical
> fallacy. An argument with all (only) empirical premises cannot validly
> conclude with a moral or any value judgement.  That's what I believe and I
> think you ought to agree.
>
> On his dacha,
>
> Walter O
>
>
> Quoting Eric  <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx<mailto:mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx>>:
>
> > >> Compare and contrast: many believe that much of the turmoil in the
> > >> near
> > east is caused (con-caused) by the very existence of the state of Israel.
> > Come onto stage the "humean" theorist who tells me that there is no
> "proof"
> > of that.
> >
> >
> >
> > It is impossible to prove "beliefs" (values) by facts, is it not?
> >
> > One cannot demonstrate or prove values by facts--z.b., to show those
> > who question the worth of Israel's existence are fools--but one CAN
> > report the statistical results of opinion polls, and use those results
> > to "update a web of beliefs" (Quine).
> >
> > Eric
> >
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