nah
On Thu, 30 Nov 2017 at 01:25, Redacted sender jlsperanza for DMARC <
dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
McEvoy: “[T]he comments of Lord Collins about "sterile" analysis may be--
taken as rebuke to conceptual analysis.”
It is interesting that this is later rephrased as ‘sterile’ being the
topic, rather than the analysis:
“Reference was made in argument to the well-known definition of "cause of
action" put forward by Diplock LJ in *Letang v Cooper* *1 QB 232* ,
242-243. I am conscious that this is (as Lord Collins says) a sterile topic
[…].”
However, note the continuation:
“[B]ut I venture to repeat something that I said in a dissenting judgment
in *Smith v Henniker-Major & Co* *Ch 182* , para 95 (just before the
passage quoted by Lord Collins): I have to say that in the context of §35
of the Limitation Act I am uneasy about the process of lifting either of
these CLASSIC DEFINITIONS out of the legal lexicon, as it were, and reading
them into the language of §35(5)(a). The notion of ‘a factual situation’
which ‘arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts’ as
another set of facts is not an easy one to grasp.”
where the idea (concept, notion) of a ‘notion’ NOT being an “easy to
grasp” one may remind some of Baroness Hale and her emphasis on, as McEvoy
points out, “‘conceptual’ (“as in ‘conceptually difficult’).”
Something being conceptually difficult may relate to it involving a notion
that is “not an easy one to grasp” (with the attending implicature that its
‘analysis’ may not prove as ‘sterile’ as _that_).
Grunebaum possibly would think that Lord Collins’s use of ‘sterile’
relates (_sans_ the pun) to The English Futilitarians – as used by Bergmann
when rejecting an invitation at Oxford to spend a Saturday morning with J.
L. Austin’s Play Group!
Cheers,
Speranza
