[lit-ideas]

  • From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 07:17:31 +0000

Fail to see the points. The idea of body is a senile idiocy of common sense, 
likewise the embodiment etc.

From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On 
Behalf Of John McCreery
Sent: 31 January 2015 02:16
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The location of location

One modern view says that the problem in question is a non-question because, so 
far as anyone can actually see, knowledge is always embodied. Why do we imagine 
objects embedded in space-time? The answer is straightforward. Our bodies are 
so constructed that a limited set of options, up or down, front or back, left 
or right, determine how we naturally think about things. We can force ourselves 
to imagine worlds with 1, 2, 4 or 11 dimensions -- mathematicians and 
physicists do it all the time. But this is a matter of tweaking or 
extrapolating from our usual three-dimensional way of describing the location 
of things. That may, if current physics is right, be only a crude approximation 
of the way the universe is. (The "11" mentioned above is borrowed from science 
news descriptions of the number of dimensions required to account for the 
behavior of elementary particles if they work in the ways that current physics 
say they do.) It may be of historical interest to wonder how Descartes (or 
others reading Descartes) dealt with a problem created by his ontology. But, 
given that the ontology in question is pretty much defunct, the issue is of 
only historical interest.

Just saying,


John

Sent from my iPad

On 2015/01/31, at 3:03, Omar Kusturica 
<omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx<mailto:omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
It would surely be contradictory on my part to argue that mind and knowledge 
exist in time, and also to argue that they don't exist. :) The observation that 
they exist in time clearly entails that they exist in some sense, the question 
is how to make sense of that sense. It *might* not necessarily be separate from 
the physical, but it might also be. Also, integrating mind and matter is 
compatible with some versions of idealism just as it is compatible with some 
forms of materialism. (Although radical idealism seems to have little 
credibility nowadays, while radical materialism has some credibility.) I 
certainly don't aspire to provide answers to all these Questions here, or 
probably anywhere.

O.K.

On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Donal McEvoy 
<donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might seem>

The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them, but, for 
example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that are extended in 
Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is unextended in 
Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located within a field that 
lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a hypostasization to treat space 
and time as if they are 'extended' by referring to them in measurable terms so 
that it appears they have varieties of size; and even if it is true that they 
may be measured in size, that does not make them extended in Descartes' sense)? 
[Compare: how can an 'unextended' force like gravity affect an extended 
physical object, even one the size of a sun?]

We might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can exist 
in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem of 
explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time.

These kinds of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers, 
particularly philosophers without sound understanding of science - they need to 
be approached taking into close account what we may conjecture about these 
things in the light of our best contemporary theories in physics.

Popper would stress that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for 
these things - for example, we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for 
how or why W1 objects are located within space/time. It may be that 
contemporary physics will be overthrown before we have a better approach to 
such questions - e.g. that the relations between space/time and W1 objects will 
be theorised to be quite different to how they might be taken to be in the 
light of our present physics (itself a difficult and controversial question).

Popper would also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be achieved in 
this area - though we may make better or worse guesses in the light of our 
evolving scientific knowledge.

This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of locating W1 objects 
within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing the admitted 
difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to space/time and in 
relation to W1.

Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to doubt the 
existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward affects on W1) 
because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we do not similarly and 
impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time do not exist simply because 
there are difficulties in explaining how they relate to one another.

Dnl
Ldn

On Friday, 30 January 2015, 13:37, Donal McEvoy 
<donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:

>If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it 
>exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious point.>

While trying to work out something more substantial on these issues of 
'location', I note that, in Popper's conception, W3 is not "timeless" a la 
Plato but has a history - and so W3 content would apparently exist in time. 
Likewise the succession of thoughts in W2 would seem to imply that W2 content 
also exists in time.

I should also add that Popper, unlike Kant, is a realist as to time and change 
- and has indeed asserted that the reality of time and change are the crux of 
realism.

But my own workings out began by reflecting on the location of W1 objects 
within W1 - and particularly within space and time where these are conceived as 
dimensions of W1. Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it 
might seem - and it seems to me these problems should be addressed first if we 
are to keep in proper perspective the admitted problems of localising W2 and W3 
content.

Dnl

On Thursday, 29 January 2015, 16:34, Omar Kusturica 
<omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx<mailto:omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>> wrote:

If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it exists 
in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious point.

Descartes' mind is obviously burdened with left-overs from Christian soul, 
which is supposed to be eternal.

O.K.

On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Redacted sender 
Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx<mailto:Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> for DMARC 
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
In a message dated 1/26/2015 2:08:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
I agree it would appear contradictory to  argue (1) pain belongs to W2 but
(2) that pain also is located within the W1  brain and (3) W2 is located in
a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2  events, like conscious
pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location  of any W1 events].
I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem  as to the
'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there  is a 
large
and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But  these
admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive arguments
against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
I don't intend to suggest  a solution to these large problems but here
clarify that Popper's position is  that W3 "exists but exists nowhere" and that
W2 is located not within W1 but  somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
It seems that we have no obvious model for  locating anything in space and
time except in the way we seek to locate W1  objects within W1: and this
creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of  any clear model for how we
'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
Despite this, it  seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness exists;
and though it is less  overwhelming, the strong case is that consciousness
is distinct from being a  mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
consciousness in any W1 processes  as these are conceived by science.
So we quickly reach one of the immense  and weird imponderables of the
mind-body problem, that have given rise to very  different reactions - including
that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes  consciousness to be
merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an  illusion, the
mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable  strangeness. 
There is
no present possible position without strangeness - the  radical materialist,
in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against  the strangeness
of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem  less
strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2 that
cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms.

It  seems simpler to postulate that space-time belongs in w1 only?

There's  the physical world, and space and time are physical 'concepts' or
entities or  items.

w2 is the world of thinking.

Palma:

"Note that, if  Descartes were right, thought can’t have extension
properties, such as temporal  properties."

The implicature is that Descartes ain't right?

If an  item in the world of 'psychology' has spatio-temporal
qualifications, it seems  to me because it 'corresponds' in some way to some 
item in the
physical world,  which necessarily does.

w3, the world of concepts and stuff surely does  not require on the other
hand any sort of Cartesian spatio-temporal coordinate.  But surely the
CONTENT of a book on space and time (such as Einstein's) belongs  in this 'third
reich', as Popper's predecessor also called it.

Cheers,

Speranza




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