[lit-ideas]
- From: "Adriano Palma" <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2012 15:46:35 +0200
** Low Priority **
** Reply Requested by 6/12/2012 (Tuesday) **
I drop the case, it is indeed hopeless
>>> Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx> 12/06/2012 03:21 PM >>>
Adriano Palma wrote:
"It is false that a truth predicate is 'redundant', viz. precisely
either the Tarskian or the Kripkean constructions (the former dates 80
years of age, the latter, more than 30, and it follows precisely fixed
points in the hierarchy.) There are two intuitive, semi formal
reasons, for this.
... 2. consider a simple case, of an utterance, as some are wont to
couch their views in, x utters "I met Mickey Mouse". whether or not
the quoted utterance is true depends on x's meeting mickey or not.
One, more often than not, device (of humans, not of mice) is to reply:
"Is it true or is it a joke?" note that both are possible, x's
utterance may be a joke (hence you may have a theory of truth
in-fiction, of truth in-humor, and so forth), or the quoted utterance
may be true, in which case one may left wondering whether X met a
ghost, an hallucination, Y dressed a mickey mouse, is drinking too
much, and so forth."
A truth predicate (i.e. 'is true') is redundant as part of any
assertion. That is "I met Mickey Mouse", as an assertion, requires the
understanding of a truth predicate. Adding a truth predicate, by
saying something like, "It is true that I met Mickey Mouse", doesn't
add anything to the original assertion. Furthermore, if the assertion
"I met Mickey Mouse" benefits, in some way, from the addition of a
truth predicate, then the new and improved assertion, "It is true that
I met Mickey Mouse", would be similarly in need of benefit, usw. Every
instance of language use carries with it an implied truth predicate,
in some form or another, without which, as Wittgenstein argues,
language use would not be possible. It is also this association of
meaning in language and truthfulness that makes possible T-sentences.
However, as Adriano notes, language use also contains jokes and
mistakes, and so there is then also a need to ascertain whether
particular instances of language use are true in that language. This
is where, and here I am following Donald Davidson, a theory of truth
comes into play. A theory of truth does not determine that an
assertion is true or not, but rather describes the parts of a language
that are true in a particular language. A theory of truth is therefore
an empirical project of determining what aspects of a particular
language are understood as true by the relevant language users. As our
knowledge of ourselves and the world around us changes, so also does
the range of particular elements of language use considered as true,
also change. A theory of truth keeps track of what counts as true and
what doesn't. On this understanding of the use of truth predicates,
that is the empirical project of tracking what we take to be true,
then truth predicates are not redundant, and are in fact quite
important.
Put more simply, the assertion of "I met Mickey Mouse" is a different
form of language use from the assertion "It is true that X met Mickey
Mouse". The first implies the truth predicate while the second
includes the truth predicate on the assumption of empirically
determining a particular state of affairs.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Please find our Email Disclaimer here: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/disclaimer/
Other related posts:
