[lit-ideas] Re: mostly to robert PAUL - Re: on "worth" and "not worth"
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 12:17:51 +0100 (BST)
________________________________
From: adriano paolo shaul gershom palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, 26 June 2012, 9:09
Subject: [lit-ideas] mostly to robert PAUL - Re: on "worth" and "not worth"
>Dear Robert, a small piece of possibly helpful information.
It is Lichtenberg who presented the intelligent and deep point you mention.
Descartes is, according to Lichtenberg, to infer that "some thing or other
[thinks]" or else that "there is thought going on".>
The problem surely goes much deeper than that thought does not necessitate an
'I' having 'thought'. Unless we simply beg the question by assuming 'thought'
is 'thought' [in which case it may be safe to say if there is 'thought' then
"there is thought going on"], from what appears to be 'thought' it does not
follow there is actually is 'thought': that is, without further assumptions or
argument, it cannot be said that what we take to be 'thought' is actually
'thought' rather than something else which we mistake for thought.
Afaik, Locke [for all his faults] was one of the first great philosophers to
emphasise [as against Descartes] that the nature of 'thought' may not be
transparent, even from having 'thought' - and it is but a step further along to
realise that what we take to be having 'thought' is not self-validating as a
truth, for 'thought' might turn out not only to be 'I-less' but also (strange
as it may seem) 'thought-less'.
But the fundamental mistake here is in thinking, a la Descartes, that we should
find a secure and incontrovertible point from which to base our philosophy: not
only is there no such point, but it may be doubted that what might appear most
secure and incontrovertible [e.g. a tautology like '1 = 1'] affords anything
like an adequate basis for understanding, especially as many of the most
important aspects of human understanding are far from secure or
incontrovertible.
If we give up the search for anything like an utterly secure and
incontrovertible starting-point, the logical character of these problems is
changed: no longer is it "How do we prove 'thought' attaches to an 'I'?" etc.
but, on balance, "Is it more likely than not that there are selves and that
there are 'thoughts'?" etc.
It must also be borne in mind that even if 'thought' does not necessitate an
'I' having 'thought', it does not follow that there is no 'I' having 'thought':
this conclusion would follow from proof that 'thought' necessitates that there
is no 'I' having 'thought'. But absence of proof of p is not proof of non-p.
Donal
Non-justificationists R Us
[Taking this opportunity to note a similarity between the daring of Neesken's
penalty against Germany in 1974 and Pirlo's against England on Sunday, but also
differences: not just that technically Pirlo's was perhaps more daring, but
that his motive was different - Neeskens was out to make fools of the Germans
but Pirlo's brazen confidence was designed to psyche out the opposition, who
then failed in their next penalties].
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