[lit-ideas] Re: lit-ideas Digest (editing) and Missouri)
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2008 14:45:09 -0330
Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> Walter wrote
>
> > Something conceptually odd about "no longer believing what one thought one
> > believed." Imagine that what one thought one believed - call the
> propositional
> > content of the belief "P" - really was believed. In that case, it's
> possible
> > for one to "no longer" believe P, and believe not-P, since there was indeed
> a
> > time at which one did believe P.
RP:
> There may be something conceptually odd about it but there's also
> something unsatisfying about a merely schematic account of what might be
> going on here; schematic insofar as neither a context for or examples
> of one's saying 'I no longer believe what I thought I believed,' are
> given. (One small point: one may no longer believe P—which one formerly
> thought one believed—without believing not-P; one may say—and this seems
> to me a fairly common experience—that one thought one believed P, but
> now one doesn't know what to believe, or what one believes.)
>
> I wonder how much of this is of any philosophical significance? It
> strikes me as a fairly common way of expressing oneself ('I thought I
> believed he was innocent, but now I don't,' e.g.), and when one does say
> such a thing, one's interlocutors don't respond with Wittgensteinian
> grimaces, shake their heads in bewilderment, or otherwise reveal
> metaphysical discomfort.
>
> Of course, it might be argued, against all reason, that ordinary people
> seldom know what they really mean what they say (part of the evidence
> for this being that they, unlike philosophers, often say things that
> when coldly analyzed make no sense, and thus could not be meant by
> anyone). So, the suggestion that it's a common way of speaking cuts only
> the illusion of ice.
>
> What, then? I frequently tell my students they you may not know what
> they believe until they try to say it (like now, right here, in front of
> your classmates). But isn't this, like, paradoxical? Why? Well, beliefs
> are usually 'about' something, and to try to discover what you believe
> about something you must have at least an inkling (technical term) of
> what you 'think' about it before you try to arrive at a belief. True,
> but that you have a few thoughts about something and would like to get
> clearer about them doesn't show that in order to come to see what you
> believe you must already have a belief. Of course you might already
> think you had a belief about Smith's character, and then realize, by
> bringing this belief on stage and interrogating it, that you no longer
> had *that* belief about it, but another belief entirely, or none.
>
> There's having a firm belief, grounded in what the believer takes to be
> sound evidence, and there's thinking you have a belief. Walter seems not
> to believe in the latter.
>
> > Now imagine that one is mistaken about what one thought one believed. In
> other
> > words, what one thought one believed one never actually did believe. One
> never
> > believed P. In that case, it would be impossible for one to "no longer"
> believe
> > P since one never did believe P in the first place.
>
> I've tried, clumsily, to suggest that what I suggest to my students,
> with respect to their trying to discover what their own beliefs are
> (these would be the difficult, the complicated, the far-from-simple
> ones) by getting them out in the open might result in the logical
> epiphany expressed by 'I thought I believed Mill was wrong about
> peanuts; I see now that he wasn't, and that what I thought I believed
> was mistaken.' 'But, why not just say you believed it, or that you
> weren't quite certain if you did?' Why not say you believed Mill was
> wrong, and now see that he wasn't?'
>
> There's a difference, I think. I wonder if I can make it clear. I'll
> try, but not right now.
snip
WO:
I'm looking forward to Robert's efforts at clarifying his belief that there is
a
difference here. Or is it but a thought about a belief? Note I have no problem
with the idea of "thinking about what one believes" or "thinking about what one
should believe." Robert's pedagogical advice to the student is very sensible
and
I wish I had a euro for every time I suggested to a student something akin to:
"Think about the dilemma here for awhile and then tell me what you believe the
principal should do in this case." Suspension of belief and judgement is an
epistemic virtue, to be sure.
My problem rests in the locutions of the form: "I thought I
believed Mill was mistaken about peanuts ..." I side with Robert's imaginary
interlocutor who asks: "But why not just say you believed it .... and now see
that he wasn't."
Smith: I thought I believed that P.
Jones: How do you know?
Smith: Because I now don't believe P any more. (Smith may go agnostic or
atheist
here.)
Jones: But you believe that it's true that you thought you believed that P.
Smith: Yes, I just said that. Didn't I?
Jones. Yes, I think you did. But why say you thought you believed instead of
saying you believed that P and now you believe not-P (or now you don't know
what to believe.)
Smith: Can we go now?
Jones: If nobody else has anything to add ... OK, drafts due on Friday and you
better believe that and not just think you believe it!
Walter O
MUN
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