[lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]

  • From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2015 06:11:05 +0000

It is indeed embarrassing this constant exhibition of idiocy on the part of 
this people.
A, not really -- but let me be generous, quasi noble while stupid tradition of 
empiricism slips into behaviourism and all of sudden all assholes in the 
anglosphere are excited by having found the way to claim that the dog does not 
have 'pain' that the feeling is "in" the brain, that the pain is not "in" the 
hand, etc.
fascinating

-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On 
Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: 24 January 2015 01:42
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Wittgenstein's Toothache

In a message dated 1/23/2015 11:52:34 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, 
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes in "Re: Facing the Music": Take a dog with 
toothache. The dog has no access to W3 in Popper's conception. The dog may 
experience pain as if the pain is emanating from the tooth with caries. We  
humans may know this is an illusion: the pain is not located in the tooth at 
all rather the pain is in the brain or is a product of the brain, and the brain 
then  'locates' the pain as if it is in the body where the tooth is. The dog 's 
 experience of toothache involves a complex interaction of W1 states (including 
 links between the W1 action of caries and the W1 of the central nervous 
system)  and W2 states (including the conscious state which 'locates' the pain 
as if is  emanating from the tooth). A human can experience toothache in a way 
that  involves just W1 and W2 in a way similar to the dog. But the dog will 
have no  conscious understanding that its brain is 'locating' the pain in the 
tooth (when  the pain is actually located in the brain rather than in the 
tooth), and the dog  will have no grasp of the issue of caries or its effect on 
its central nervous  system (for "caries" and "CNS" here involve W3 theoretical 
knowledge), nor will  the dog grasp in W3 terms that there is a potential 
solution to its plight in  the form of a veterinary dentist:- conversely, the 
human understanding of  toothache, where it encompasses all these things that a 
dog cannot grasp, may be  a W3-dependent understanding. 
So there is a merely W1/W2 sense in which a human  might experience and know 
that they are having a toothache, but there is also a  W3-dependent sense of 
experiencing and knowing that they are having a toothache  which goes beyond 
this. We may also speculate as to the downward causation of W3-dependent 
experience on experience in its W1/W2 form: for example, a person's experience 
of a toothache may be altered by their W3-dependent knowledge, for example that 
the pain is simply a figment of the CSN/brain or that dental treatment is 
available to cure it - so we may for example speculate (and even subject to 
psychological tests) that the experience of having a toothache may  differ if 
we are in the position to get immediate treatment from how we experience it 
when there is no possibility of getting any treatment. 
This  kind of speculation and testing abandons the idea that 'experience' 
is always  one simple level of entity for the idea that experience is a complex 
product of  many interacting layers, including different layers that belong or 
derive from  W1, W2 or W3. 

I don't know if it was Moore who instilled in Witters a  fascination with 
toothaches.

He (Witters) used to say, to echo Aune, that  

i. I have a toothache.

is incorrigible, and H. P. G. makes a few  interesting points about

a. incorrigibility

and

b.  privileged access 

(borrowing from Witters and Anscombe) in "From the  banal to the bizarre" 
(one of his publications: his presidential address to the  American 
Philosophical Association, Pacific Division).

It may different,  it seems, with POPPER having a toothache.

Since McEvoy mentions dogs, it  may do to mention Witters on lions, and 
rephrase.

Androcles, however,  apparently did understand the lion's ache -- and was 
nicely rewarded for it  (from being eaten by the animal).

For Witters says,

"If a lion  could talk, we could not understand him."

This is  elucidatory:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_Investigations

It  is this emphasis on becoming attentive to the social backdrop against which 
 language is rendered intelligible that explains Wittgenstein's elliptical  
comment that "If a lion could talk, we could not understand  him."

Witters' claim is _general_ (while he denied it, he craved for  them). An 
instance would be of a lion saying:

i. I have a  toothache.

Or

ii. I have an ache in my right anterior foot,  Androcles.

(Androcles: Mmm. Let me see. No wonder. You have a big thorn  on the pad there. 
Let me remove it, force pus from the wound, and bandage  it.)
 
Mutatis mutandis, McEvoy's dog:
 
"Take a dog with toothache. The dog has no access to W3 in Popper's conception. 
The dog may experience pain as if the pain is emanating from the tooth with 
caries."
 
In summary, while
 
iii. I have an ache in my tooth.
 
may be _literally_ false.
 
ii. I have a toothache.
 
may IMPLICATE that
 
iii. It seems to me AS IF I have an ache in my tooth.
 
-- for dogs, lions, and humans alike. (Cfr. H. P. G., "Can I have a pain in  my 
tail?").
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
 
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