[lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]
- From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2015 15:38:21 +0200
sauf a cause de...
save for case assignment, nobody can be avec 'tu' in french
bestest
On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 3:35 PM, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> ありがとうございます。Mercy buckets, as my grandma used to say.
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Feb 1, 2015, at 4:50 PM, Julie Campbell <juliereneb@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Je suis avec tu, John.
>
> On Saturday, January 31, 2015, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>> 我不懂你的意思。你可以用普通话说明吗？ 我不知道你的方言。
>>
>> 马
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Sent from my iPad
>>
>> On 2015/01/31, at 18:54, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> Par excellence mon ami basho sait comment rigoler avec les savants.
>>
>> Comme d’habitude avec la sottiserie mediatique
>>
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>> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [
>> mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *John McCreery
>> *Sent:* 31 January 2015 11:35
>> *To:* Lit-Ideas
>> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]
>>
>>
>>
>> Have never noticed that your comments are more meaningful than the
>> barking of a mad dog. Tit for tat, you know. Adieu.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> Fail to see the points. The idea of body is a senile idiocy of common
>> sense, likewise the embodiment etc.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
>> lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *John McCreery
>> *Sent:* 31 January 2015 02:16
>> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: The location of location
>>
>>
>>
>> One modern view says that the problem in question is a non-question
>> because, so far as anyone can actually see, knowledge is always embodied.
>> Why do we imagine objects embedded in space-time? The answer is
>> straightforward. Our bodies are so constructed that a limited set of
>> options, up or down, front or back, left or right, determine how we
>> naturally think about things. We can force ourselves to imagine worlds with
>> 1, 2, 4 or 11 dimensions -- mathematicians and physicists do it all the
>> time. But this is a matter of tweaking or extrapolating from our usual
>> three-dimensional way of describing the location of things. That may, if
>> current physics is right, be only a crude approximation of the way the
>> universe is. (The "11" mentioned above is borrowed from science news
>> descriptions of the number of dimensions required to account for the
>> behavior of elementary particles if they work in the ways that current
>> physics say they do.) It may be of historical interest to wonder how
>> Descartes (or others reading Descartes) dealt with a problem created by his
>> ontology. But, given that the ontology in question is pretty much defunct,
>> the issue is of only historical interest.
>>
>>
>>
>> Just saying,
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>> Sent from my iPad
>>
>>
>> On 2015/01/31, at 3:03, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> It would surely be contradictory on my part to argue that mind and
>> knowledge exist in time, and also to argue that they don't exist. :) The
>> observation that they exist in time clearly entails that they exist in some
>> sense, the question is how to make sense of that sense. It *might* not
>> necessarily be separate from the physical, but it might also be. Also,
>> integrating mind and matter is compatible with some versions of idealism
>> just as it is compatible with some forms of materialism. (Although radical
>> idealism seems to have little credibility nowadays, while radical
>> materialism has some credibility.) I certainly don't aspire to provide
>> answers to all these Questions here, or probably anywhere.
>>
>>
>>
>> O.K.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might seem>
>>
>>
>>
>> The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them, but,
>> for example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that are
>> extended in Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is
>> unextended in Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located
>> within a field that lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a
>> hypostasization to treat space and time as if they are 'extended' by
>> referring to them in measurable terms so that it appears they have
>> varieties of size; and even if it is true that they may be measured in
>> size, that does not make them extended in Descartes' sense)? [Compare: how
>> can an 'unextended' force like gravity affect an extended physical object,
>> even one the size of a sun?]
>>
>>
>>
>> We might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can
>> exist in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem of
>> explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time.
>>
>>
>>
>> These kinds of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers,
>> particularly philosophers without sound understanding of science - they
>> need to be approached taking into close account what we may conjecture
>> about these things in the light of our best contemporary theories in
>> physics.
>>
>>
>>
>> Popper would stress that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation
>> for these things - for example, we lack anything like an ultimate
>> explanation for how or why W1 objects are located within space/time. It may
>> be that contemporary physics will be overthrown before we have a better
>> approach to such questions - e.g. that the relations between space/time and
>> W1 objects will be theorised to be quite different to how they might be
>> taken to be in the light of our present physics (itself a difficult and
>> controversial question).
>>
>>
>>
>> Popper would also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be
>> achieved in this area - though we may make better or worse guesses in the
>> light of our evolving scientific knowledge.
>>
>>
>>
>> This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of locating W1 objects
>> within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing the admitted
>> difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to space/time and in
>> relation to W1.
>>
>>
>>
>> Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to doubt
>> the existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward affects on
>> W1) because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we do not
>> similarly and impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time do not
>> exist simply because there are difficulties in explaining how they relate
>> to one another.
>>
>>
>>
>> Dnl
>>
>> Ldn
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, 30 January 2015, 13:37, Donal McEvoy <
>> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> >If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it
>> exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious
>> point.>
>>
>>
>>
>> While trying to work out something more substantial on these issues of
>> 'location', I note that, in Popper's conception, W3 is not "timeless" a la
>> Plato but has a history - and so W3 content would apparently exist in time.
>> Likewise the succession of thoughts in W2 would seem to imply that W2
>> content also exists in time.
>>
>>
>>
>> I should also add that Popper, unlike Kant, is a realist as to time and
>> change - and has indeed asserted that the reality of time and change are
>> the crux of realism.
>>
>>
>>
>> But my own workings out began by reflecting on the location of W1 objects
>> within W1 - and particularly within space and time where these are
>> conceived as dimensions of W1. Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more
>> problematic that it might seem - and it seems to me these problems should
>> be addressed first if we are to keep in proper perspective the admitted
>> problems of localising W2 and W3 content.
>>
>>
>>
>> Dnl
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, 29 January 2015, 16:34, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it
>> exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious
>> point.
>>
>>
>>
>> Descartes' mind is obviously burdened with left-overs from Christian
>> soul, which is supposed to be eternal.
>>
>>
>>
>> O.K.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
>> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> In a message dated 1/26/2015 2:08:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
>> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>> I agree it would appear contradictory to argue (1) pain belongs to W2 but
>> (2) that pain also is located within the W1 brain and (3) W2 is located
>> in
>> a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2 events, like conscious
>> pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location of any W1
>> events].
>> I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem as to the
>> 'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there is
>> a large
>> and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But
>> these
>> admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive arguments
>> against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
>> I don't intend to suggest a solution to these large problems but here
>> clarify that Popper's position is that W3 "exists but exists nowhere"
>> and that
>> W2 is located not within W1 but somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
>> It seems that we have no obvious model for locating anything in space and
>> time except in the way we seek to locate W1 objects within W1: and this
>> creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of any clear model for
>> how we
>> 'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
>> Despite this, it seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness exists;
>> and though it is less overwhelming, the strong case is that consciousness
>> is distinct from being a mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
>> consciousness in any W1 processes as these are conceived by science.
>> So we quickly reach one of the immense and weird imponderables of the
>> mind-body problem, that have given rise to very different reactions -
>> including
>> that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes consciousness to be
>> merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an illusion, the
>> mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable
>> strangeness. There is
>> no present possible position without strangeness - the radical
>> materialist,
>> in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against the
>> strangeness
>> of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem less
>> strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2 that
>> cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms.
>>
>> It seems simpler to postulate that space-time belongs in w1 only?
>>
>> There's the physical world, and space and time are physical 'concepts' or
>> entities or items.
>>
>> w2 is the world of thinking.
>>
>> Palma:
>>
>> "Note that, if Descartes were right, thought can’t have extension
>> properties, such as temporal properties."
>>
>> The implicature is that Descartes ain't right?
>>
>> If an item in the world of 'psychology' has spatio-temporal
>> qualifications, it seems to me because it 'corresponds' in some way to
>> some item in the
>> physical world, which necessarily does.
>>
>> w3, the world of concepts and stuff surely does not require on the other
>> hand any sort of Cartesian spatio-temporal coordinate. But surely the
>> CONTENT of a book on space and time (such as Einstein's) belongs in this
>> 'third
>> reich', as Popper's predecessor also called it.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Speranza
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
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>>
>> --
>>
>> John McCreery
>> The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
>> Tel. +81-45-314-9324
>> jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
>> http://www.wordworks.jp/
>>
>>
>
> --
> Julie Campbell
> 573-881-6889
> https://juliesmusicandlanguagestudio.musicteachershelper.com
>
>
--
palma, etheKwini, KZN
palma
cell phone is 0762362391
*only when in Europe*:
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