[lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]

  • From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2015 22:35:59 +0900

ありがとうございます。Mercy buckets, as my grandma used to say.

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 1, 2015, at 4:50 PM, Julie Campbell <juliereneb@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> Je suis avec tu, John.
> 
>> On Saturday, January 31, 2015, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> 我不懂你的意思。你可以用普通话说明吗? 我不知道你的方言。
>> 
>> 马
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Sent from my iPad
>> 
>>> On 2015/01/31, at 18:54, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Par excellence mon ami basho sait comment rigoler avec les savants.
>>> 
>>> Comme d’habitude avec la sottiserie mediatique
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
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>>>  
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>>>  
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>>>  
>>> 
>>> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>>> [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John McCreery
>>> Sent: 31 January 2015 11:35
>>> To: Lit-Ideas
>>> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Have never noticed that your comments are more meaningful than the barking 
>>> of a mad dog. Tit for tat, you know. Adieu.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> John
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Fail to see the points. The idea of body is a senile idiocy of common 
>>> sense, likewise the embodiment etc.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>>> [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John McCreery
>>> Sent: 31 January 2015 02:16
>>> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The location of location
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> One modern view says that the problem in question is a non-question 
>>> because, so far as anyone can actually see, knowledge is always embodied. 
>>> Why do we imagine objects embedded in space-time? The answer is 
>>> straightforward. Our bodies are so constructed that a limited set of 
>>> options, up or down, front or back, left or right, determine how we 
>>> naturally think about things. We can force ourselves to imagine worlds with 
>>> 1, 2, 4 or 11 dimensions -- mathematicians and physicists do it all the 
>>> time. But this is a matter of tweaking or extrapolating from our usual 
>>> three-dimensional way of describing the location of things. That may, if 
>>> current physics is right, be only a crude approximation of the way the 
>>> universe is. (The "11" mentioned above is borrowed from science news 
>>> descriptions of the number of dimensions required to account for the 
>>> behavior of elementary particles if they work in the ways that current 
>>> physics say they do.) It may be of historical interest to wonder how 
>>> Descartes (or others reading Descartes) dealt with a problem created by his 
>>> ontology. But, given that the ontology in question is pretty much defunct, 
>>> the issue is of only historical interest. 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Just saying,
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> John
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Sent from my iPad
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 2015/01/31, at 3:03, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> 
>>> It would surely be contradictory on my part to argue that mind and 
>>> knowledge exist in time, and also to argue that they don't exist. :) The 
>>> observation that they exist in time clearly entails that they exist in some 
>>> sense, the question is how to make sense of that sense. It *might* not 
>>> necessarily be separate from the physical, but it might also be. Also, 
>>> integrating mind and matter is compatible with some versions of idealism 
>>> just as it is compatible with some forms of materialism. (Although radical 
>>> idealism seems to have little credibility nowadays, while radical 
>>> materialism has some credibility.) I certainly don't aspire to provide 
>>> answers to all these Questions here, or probably anywhere.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> O.K.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> >Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might seem>
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them, but, for 
>>> example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that are extended in 
>>> Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is unextended in 
>>> Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located within a field 
>>> that lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a hypostasization to 
>>> treat space and time as if they are 'extended' by referring to them in 
>>> measurable terms so that it appears they have varieties of size; and even 
>>> if it is true that they may be measured in size, that does not make them 
>>> extended in Descartes' sense)? [Compare: how can an 'unextended' force like 
>>> gravity affect an extended physical object, even one the size of a sun?]
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> We might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can 
>>> exist in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem of 
>>> explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> These kinds of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers, 
>>> particularly philosophers without sound understanding of science - they 
>>> need to be approached taking into close account what we may conjecture 
>>> about these things in the light of our best contemporary theories in 
>>> physics.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Popper would stress that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for 
>>> these things - for example, we lack anything like an ultimate explanation 
>>> for how or why W1 objects are located within space/time. It may be that 
>>> contemporary physics will be overthrown before we have a better approach to 
>>> such questions - e.g. that the relations between space/time and W1 objects 
>>> will be theorised to be quite different to how they might be taken to be in 
>>> the light of our present physics (itself a difficult and controversial 
>>> question).
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Popper would also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be achieved 
>>> in this area - though we may make better or worse guesses in the light of 
>>> our evolving scientific knowledge.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of locating W1 objects 
>>> within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing the admitted 
>>> difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to space/time and in 
>>> relation to W1.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to doubt 
>>> the existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward affects on 
>>> W1) because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we do not 
>>> similarly and impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time do not 
>>> exist simply because there are difficulties in explaining how they relate 
>>> to one another.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Dnl
>>> 
>>> Ldn
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On Friday, 30 January 2015, 13:37, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> >If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it 
>>> >exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious 
>>> >point.>
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> While trying to work out something more substantial on these issues of 
>>> 'location', I note that, in Popper's conception, W3 is not "timeless" a la 
>>> Plato but has a history - and so W3 content would apparently exist in time. 
>>> Likewise the succession of thoughts in W2 would seem to imply that W2 
>>> content also exists in time.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I should also add that Popper, unlike Kant, is a realist as to time and 
>>> change - and has indeed asserted that the reality of time and change are 
>>> the crux of realism.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> But my own workings out began by reflecting on the location of W1 objects 
>>> within W1 - and particularly within space and time where these are 
>>> conceived as dimensions of W1. Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more 
>>> problematic that it might seem - and it seems to me these problems should 
>>> be addressed first if we are to keep in proper perspective the admitted 
>>> problems of localising W2 and W3 content.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Dnl
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, 29 January 2015, 16:34, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it 
>>> exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious 
>>> point.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Descartes' mind is obviously burdened with left-overs from Christian soul, 
>>> which is supposed to be eternal.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> O.K.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for 
>>> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> 
>>> In a message dated 1/26/2015 2:08:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
>>> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>>> I agree it would appear contradictory to  argue (1) pain belongs to W2 but
>>> (2) that pain also is located within the W1  brain and (3) W2 is located in
>>> a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2  events, like conscious
>>> pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location  of any W1 
>>> events].
>>> I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem  as to the
>>> 'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there  is a 
>>> large
>>> and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But  these
>>> admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive arguments
>>> against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
>>> I don't intend to suggest  a solution to these large problems but here
>>> clarify that Popper's position is  that W3 "exists but exists nowhere" and 
>>> that
>>> W2 is located not within W1 but  somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
>>> It seems that we have no obvious model for  locating anything in space and
>>> time except in the way we seek to locate W1  objects within W1: and this
>>> creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of  any clear model for 
>>> how we
>>> 'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
>>> Despite this, it  seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness exists;
>>> and though it is less  overwhelming, the strong case is that consciousness
>>> is distinct from being a  mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
>>> consciousness in any W1 processes  as these are conceived by science.
>>> So we quickly reach one of the immense  and weird imponderables of the
>>> mind-body problem, that have given rise to very  different reactions - 
>>> including
>>> that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes  consciousness to be
>>> merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an  illusion, the
>>> mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable  strangeness. 
>>> There is
>>> no present possible position without strangeness - the  radical materialist,
>>> in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against  the strangeness
>>> of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem  less
>>> strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2 that
>>> cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms.
>>> 
>>> It  seems simpler to postulate that space-time belongs in w1 only?
>>> 
>>> There's  the physical world, and space and time are physical 'concepts' or
>>> entities or  items.
>>> 
>>> w2 is the world of thinking.
>>> 
>>> Palma:
>>> 
>>> "Note that, if  Descartes were right, thought can’t have extension
>>> properties, such as temporal  properties."
>>> 
>>> The implicature is that Descartes ain't right?
>>> 
>>> If an  item in the world of 'psychology' has spatio-temporal
>>> qualifications, it seems  to me because it 'corresponds' in some way to 
>>> some item in the
>>> physical world,  which necessarily does.
>>> 
>>> w3, the world of concepts and stuff surely does  not require on the other
>>> hand any sort of Cartesian spatio-temporal coordinate.  But surely the
>>> CONTENT of a book on space and time (such as Einstein's) belongs  in this 
>>> 'third
>>> reich', as Popper's predecessor also called it.
>>> 
>>> Cheers,
>>> 
>>> Speranza
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
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>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> --
>>> 
>>> John McCreery
>>> The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
>>> Tel. +81-45-314-9324
>>> jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> http://www.wordworks.jp/
>>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Julie Campbell 
> 573-881-6889
> https://juliesmusicandlanguagestudio.musicteachershelper.com
> 

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