[lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]

  • From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2015 08:31:42 +0900

我不懂你的意思。你可以用普通话说明吗? 我不知道你的方言。

马




Sent from my iPad

> On 2015/01/31, at 18:54, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> Par excellence mon ami basho sait comment rigoler avec les savants.
> Comme d’habitude avec la sottiserie mediatique
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> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] 
> On Behalf Of John McCreery
> Sent: 31 January 2015 11:35
> To: Lit-Ideas
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]
>  
> Have never noticed that your comments are more meaningful than the barking of 
> a mad dog. Tit for tat, you know. Adieu.
>  
>  
> John
>  
> On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Fail to see the points. The idea of body is a senile idiocy of common sense, 
> likewise the embodiment etc.
>  
> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] 
> On Behalf Of John McCreery
> Sent: 31 January 2015 02:16
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The location of location
>  
> One modern view says that the problem in question is a non-question because, 
> so far as anyone can actually see, knowledge is always embodied. Why do we 
> imagine objects embedded in space-time? The answer is straightforward. Our 
> bodies are so constructed that a limited set of options, up or down, front or 
> back, left or right, determine how we naturally think about things. We can 
> force ourselves to imagine worlds with 1, 2, 4 or 11  dimensions -- 
> mathematicians and physicists do it all the time. But this is a matter of 
> tweaking or extrapolating from our usual three-dimensional way of describing 
> the location of things. That may, if current physics is right, be only a 
> crude approximation of the way the universe is. (The "11" mentioned above is 
> borrowed from science news descriptions of the number of dimensions required 
> to account for the behavior of elementary particles if they work in the ways 
> that current physics say they do.) It may be of historical interest to wonder 
> how Descartes (or others reading Descartes) dealt with a problem created by 
> his ontology. But, given that the ontology in question is pretty much 
> defunct, the issue is of only historical interest. 
>  
> Just saying,
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>  
> John
> 
> Sent from my iPad
> 
> On 2015/01/31, at 3:03, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> It would surely be contradictory on my part to argue that mind and knowledge 
> exist in time, and also to argue that they don't exist. :) The observation 
> that they exist in time clearly entails that they exist in some sense, the 
> question is how to make sense of that sense. It *might* not necessarily be 
> separate from the physical, but it might also be. Also, integrating mind and 
> matter is compatible with some versions of idealism just as it is compatible 
> with some forms of materialism. (Although radical idealism seems to have 
> little credibility nowadays, while radical materialism has some credibility.) 
> I certainly don't aspire to provide answers to all these Questions here, or 
> probably anywhere.
>  
> O.K.
>  
> On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> 
> wrote:
> >Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might seem>
>  
> The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them, but, for 
> example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that are extended in 
> Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is unextended in 
> Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located within a field that 
> lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a hypostasization to treat 
> space and time as if they are 'extended' by referring to them in measurable 
> terms so that it appears they have varieties of size; and even if it is true 
> that they may be measured in size, that does not make them extended in 
> Descartes' sense)? [Compare: how can an 'unextended' force like gravity 
> affect an extended physical object, even one the size of a sun?]
>  
> We might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can 
> exist in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem of 
> explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time.
>  
> These kinds of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers, 
> particularly philosophers without sound understanding of science - they need 
> to be approached taking into close account what we may conjecture about these 
> things in the light of our best contemporary theories in physics.
>  
> Popper would stress that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for 
> these things - for example, we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for 
> how or why W1 objects are located within space/time. It may be that 
> contemporary physics will be overthrown before we have a better approach to 
> such questions - e.g. that the relations between space/time and W1 objects 
> will be theorised to be quite different to how they might be taken to be in 
> the light of our present physics (itself a difficult and controversial 
> question).
>  
> Popper would also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be achieved in 
> this area - though we may make better or worse guesses in the light of our 
> evolving scientific knowledge.
>  
> This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of locating W1 objects 
> within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing the admitted 
> difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to space/time and in 
> relation to W1.
>  
> Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to doubt the 
> existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward affects on W1) 
> because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we do not similarly and 
> impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time do not exist simply 
> because there are difficulties in explaining how they relate to one another.
>  
> Dnl
> Ldn
>  
> 
> On Friday, 30 January 2015, 13:37, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> 
> wrote:
>  
> 
> >If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it 
> >exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious 
> >point.>
>  
> While trying to work out something more substantial on these issues of 
> 'location', I note that, in Popper's conception, W3 is not "timeless" a la 
> Plato but has a history - and so W3 content would apparently exist in time. 
> Likewise the succession of thoughts in W2 would seem to imply that W2 content 
> also exists in time.
>  
> I should also add that Popper, unlike Kant, is a realist as to time and 
> change - and has indeed asserted that the reality of time and change are the 
> crux of realism.
>  
> But my own workings out began by reflecting on the location of W1 objects 
> within W1 - and particularly within space and time where these are conceived 
> as dimensions of W1. Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic 
> that it might seem - and it seems to me these problems should be addressed 
> first if we are to keep in proper perspective the admitted problems of 
> localising W2 and W3 content.
>  
> Dnl
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> 
> On Thursday, 29 January 2015, 16:34, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> 
> wrote:
>  
> 
> If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it 
> exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious point.
>  
> Descartes' mind is obviously burdened with left-overs from Christian soul, 
> which is supposed to be eternal.
>  
> O.K.
>  
> On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for DMARC 
> <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> In a message dated 1/26/2015 2:08:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> I agree it would appear contradictory to  argue (1) pain belongs to W2 but
> (2) that pain also is located within the W1  brain and (3) W2 is located in
> a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2  events, like conscious
> pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location  of any W1 events].
> I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem  as to the
> 'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there  is a 
> large
> and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But  these
> admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive arguments
> against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
> I don't intend to suggest  a solution to these large problems but here
> clarify that Popper's position is  that W3 "exists but exists nowhere" and 
> that
> W2 is located not within W1 but  somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
> It seems that we have no obvious model for  locating anything in space and
> time except in the way we seek to locate W1  objects within W1: and this
> creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of  any clear model for how 
> we
> 'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
> Despite this, it  seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness exists;
> and though it is less  overwhelming, the strong case is that consciousness
> is distinct from being a  mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
> consciousness in any W1 processes  as these are conceived by science.
> So we quickly reach one of the immense  and weird imponderables of the
> mind-body problem, that have given rise to very  different reactions - 
> including
> that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes  consciousness to be
> merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an  illusion, the
> mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable  strangeness. 
> There is
> no present possible position without strangeness - the  radical materialist,
> in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against  the strangeness
> of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem  less
> strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2 that
> cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms.
> 
> It  seems simpler to postulate that space-time belongs in w1 only?
> 
> There's  the physical world, and space and time are physical 'concepts' or
> entities or  items.
> 
> w2 is the world of thinking.
> 
> Palma:
> 
> "Note that, if  Descartes were right, thought can’t have extension
> properties, such as temporal  properties."
> 
> The implicature is that Descartes ain't right?
> 
> If an  item in the world of 'psychology' has spatio-temporal
> qualifications, it seems  to me because it 'corresponds' in some way to some 
> item in the
> physical world,  which necessarily does.
> 
> w3, the world of concepts and stuff surely does  not require on the other
> hand any sort of Cartesian spatio-temporal coordinate.  But surely the
> CONTENT of a book on space and time (such as Einstein's) belongs  in this 
> 'third
> reich', as Popper's predecessor also called it.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Speranza
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> --
> John McCreery
> The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
> Tel. +81-45-314-9324
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