[lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]

  • From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: Lit-Ideas <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 18:34:58 +0900

Have never noticed that your comments are more meaningful than the barking
of a mad dog. Tit for tat, you know. Adieu.


John

On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>  Fail to see the points. The idea of body is a senile idiocy of common
> sense, likewise the embodiment etc.
>
>
>
> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
> lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *John McCreery
> *Sent:* 31 January 2015 02:16
> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: The location of location
>
>
>
> One modern view says that the problem in question is a non-question
> because, so far as anyone can actually see, knowledge is always embodied.
> Why do we imagine objects embedded in space-time? The answer is
> straightforward. Our bodies are so constructed that a limited set of
> options, up or down, front or back, left or right, determine how we
> naturally think about things. We can force ourselves to imagine worlds with
> 1, 2, 4 or 11 dimensions -- mathematicians and physicists do it all the
> time. But this is a matter of tweaking or extrapolating from our usual
> three-dimensional way of describing the location of things. That may, if
> current physics is right, be only a crude approximation of the way the
> universe is. (The "11" mentioned above is borrowed from science news
> descriptions of the number of dimensions required to account for the
> behavior of elementary particles if they work in the ways that current
> physics say they do.) It may be of historical interest to wonder how
> Descartes (or others reading Descartes) dealt with a problem created by his
> ontology. But, given that the ontology in question is pretty much defunct,
> the issue is of only historical interest.
>
>
>
> Just saying,
>
>
>
>
>
> John
>
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
>
> On 2015/01/31, at 3:03, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>  It would surely be contradictory on my part to argue that mind and
> knowledge exist in time, and also to argue that they don't exist. :) The
> observation that they exist in time clearly entails that they exist in some
> sense, the question is how to make sense of that sense. It *might* not
> necessarily be separate from the physical, but it might also be. Also,
> integrating mind and matter is compatible with some versions of idealism
> just as it is compatible with some forms of materialism. (Although radical
> idealism seems to have little credibility nowadays, while radical
> materialism has some credibility.) I certainly don't aspire to provide
> answers to all these Questions here, or probably anywhere.
>
>
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
> >Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might seem>
>
>
>
> The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them, but,
> for example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that are
> extended in Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is
> unextended in Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located
> within a field that lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a
> hypostasization to treat space and time as if they are 'extended' by
> referring to them in measurable terms so that it appears they have
> varieties of size; and even if it is true that they may be measured in
> size, that does not make them extended in Descartes' sense)? [Compare: how
> can an 'unextended' force like gravity affect an extended physical object,
> even one the size of a sun?]
>
>
>
> We might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can
> exist in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem of
> explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time.
>
>
>
> These kinds of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers,
> particularly philosophers without sound understanding of science - they
> need to be approached taking into close account what we may conjecture
> about these things in the light of our best contemporary theories in
> physics.
>
>
>
> Popper would stress that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for
> these things - for example, we lack anything like an ultimate explanation
> for how or why W1 objects are located within space/time. It may be that
> contemporary physics will be overthrown before we have a better approach to
> such questions - e.g. that the relations between space/time and W1 objects
> will be theorised to be quite different to how they might be taken to be in
> the light of our present physics (itself a difficult and controversial
> question).
>
>
>
> Popper would also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be achieved
> in this area - though we may make better or worse guesses in the light of
> our evolving scientific knowledge.
>
>
>
> This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of locating W1 objects
> within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing the admitted
> difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to space/time and in
> relation to W1.
>
>
>
> Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to doubt
> the existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward affects on
> W1) because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we do not
> similarly and impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time do not
> exist simply because there are difficulties in explaining how they relate
> to one another.
>
>
>
> Dnl
>
> Ldn
>
>
>
> On Friday, 30 January 2015, 13:37, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> >If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it
> exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious
> point.>
>
>
>
> While trying to work out something more substantial on these issues of
> 'location', I note that, in Popper's conception, W3 is not "timeless" a la
> Plato but has a history - and so W3 content would apparently exist in time.
> Likewise the succession of thoughts in W2 would seem to imply that W2
> content also exists in time.
>
>
>
> I should also add that Popper, unlike Kant, is a realist as to time and
> change - and has indeed asserted that the reality of time and change are
> the crux of realism.
>
>
>
> But my own workings out began by reflecting on the location of W1 objects
> within W1 - and particularly within space and time where these are
> conceived as dimensions of W1. Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more
> problematic that it might seem - and it seems to me these problems should
> be addressed first if we are to keep in proper perspective the admitted
> problems of localising W2 and W3 content.
>
>
>
> Dnl
>
>
>
> On Thursday, 29 January 2015, 16:34, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it
> exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious
> point.
>
>
>
> Descartes' mind is obviously burdened with left-overs from Christian soul,
> which is supposed to be eternal.
>
>
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> In a message dated 1/26/2015 2:08:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> I agree it would appear contradictory to  argue (1) pain belongs to W2 but
> (2) that pain also is located within the W1  brain and (3) W2 is located in
> a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2  events, like conscious
> pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location  of any W1
> events].
> I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem  as to the
> 'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there  is
> a large
> and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But
> these
> admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive arguments
> against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
> I don't intend to suggest  a solution to these large problems but here
> clarify that Popper's position is  that W3 "exists but exists nowhere" and
> that
> W2 is located not within W1 but  somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
> It seems that we have no obvious model for  locating anything in space and
> time except in the way we seek to locate W1  objects within W1: and this
> creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of  any clear model for
> how we
> 'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
> Despite this, it  seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness exists;
> and though it is less  overwhelming, the strong case is that consciousness
> is distinct from being a  mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
> consciousness in any W1 processes  as these are conceived by science.
> So we quickly reach one of the immense  and weird imponderables of the
> mind-body problem, that have given rise to very  different reactions -
> including
> that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes  consciousness to be
> merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an  illusion, the
> mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable  strangeness.
> There is
> no present possible position without strangeness - the  radical
> materialist,
> in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against  the strangeness
> of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem  less
> strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2 that
> cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms.
>
> It  seems simpler to postulate that space-time belongs in w1 only?
>
> There's  the physical world, and space and time are physical 'concepts' or
> entities or  items.
>
> w2 is the world of thinking.
>
> Palma:
>
> "Note that, if  Descartes were right, thought can't have extension
> properties, such as temporal  properties."
>
> The implicature is that Descartes ain't right?
>
> If an  item in the world of 'psychology' has spatio-temporal
> qualifications, it seems  to me because it 'corresponds' in some way to
> some item in the
> physical world,  which necessarily does.
>
> w3, the world of concepts and stuff surely does  not require on the other
> hand any sort of Cartesian spatio-temporal coordinate.  But surely the
> CONTENT of a book on space and time (such as Einstein's) belongs  in this
> 'third
> reich', as Popper's predecessor also called it.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
>
>
>
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-- 
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
Tel. +81-45-314-9324
jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
http://www.wordworks.jp/

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