That Grice was very confused is beyond doubt, that literal meaning intrudes is equally beyond any doubts, save by bigoted nincompoop. In fact consider an intentionalist stance, x wants to communicate that Kigali is the capital of Rwanda. If literal meaning never "intrudes" try to do it by saying "Marseille is the capital of France" Qed Elaboration of the non existence of utterances as well as utterantial meaning are to be found in the excellent summary by s. neale at the sperber week in 2012 at Ulm http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/colloques/archives-345/2012-2013/semaine-sperber/article/sperber-week?lang=fr -----Original Message----- From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: 24 November 2014 15:33 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Suppes on Grice: Hands Across the Bay My last post today! There is an interesting essay by Suppes on Grice in P. G. R. I. C. E., entitled, "The primacy of utterer's meaning", that may relate to O. Kusturica's commentary on the role of shared intentions and pragmatics and whether one should concentrate on one speaker, two speakers, three speakers, or what (or utterers, as I prefer). In that essay, Suppes considers three critics of Grice, and defends Grice against them. The three authors are Biro, Chomsky, and Yu. In fact, Biro was fascinated by Suppes's criticism, and wrote back to him. Their point concerns the distinction between observation and theory. One observes particular utterers but some think they can provide a theory for more than one utterer. While Suppes speaks of 'geometry' he concludes that what Grice is into is a 'physics' of meaning, since physics is much less abstract than geometry, and there's nothing abstract about utterer's meaning and its primacy. "The virtue of Grice's ideas is to require a strong sense of congruence", Suppes notes. And this, while geometrical in origin, finds its best realisation in physics. Suppes goes on to refer to permutational congruence alla Grice. He provides two pairs of examples: "All men are mortal" "Every man is mortal" and "John and Mary are here" "Mary and John are here" "I have argued ...", Suppes writes, "that what we should have is what I have termed a "geometrical" theory of meaning. By this I mean that we replace the search for any fixed concept of synonymy by a hierarchy of concepts of congruence as is familiar in modern geometry." Suppes criticises Yu's stipulative/descriptive definitions -- and we agree with Suppes! Yu's comments are, Suppes notes (and I agree), based on 'bad philosophy of science'. Suppes: Yu's distinction is "as useful in the theory of explanation as is Aristotle's distinction between violent and natural motion in classical mechanics!" Grice is an intentionalist -- not a behaviourist, Suppes rightly notes. He writes: "It seems to me that Chomsky is badly off the mark" and I agree "in the passages" on Grice in "Reflections on language" on Grice being a behaviourist." "In terms of more reasoned and dispassionate analyses, it seems to me that one would ordinarily think of Grice not as a behaviourist" -- as Ryle was -- "but as an intentionalist" -- as the good ole phenomenologists. When does Suppes speak of congruence? Suppes speaks of congruence, when he writes that "in affine geometry that makes any two triangles CONGRUENT." The idea of 'literal meaning' is an ABSTRACT one, in the literal sense of 'abstract'. Chomsky thinks 'literal meaning' INTRUDES. It never does! Suppes: "It would seem odd if someone were to ask me what I'm doing (he sees me writing an entry in my journal) and I were to reply:" "I am writing an entry in my journal -- and with STRICT MEANING, but of course it is NOT SUPPOSED to 'communicate' anything." Of course it communicates! Section I of Suppes on Grice: Suppes on Chomsky on Grice: the three issues: literal meaning, rules, and behaviourism Suppes notes: "Chomsky discusses Grice's theory of meaning along with a rather detailed discussion of related views of Strawson." Suppes writes: "Grice's own formulations of basic concepts are technical and intricate. It is a SURPRISING feature of his critics that they do not ENTER into real deatails of these analyses." Let p be a proposition and let *psi be a mood marker. Or mode-marker as Moravcsik would prefer. As Grice puts it, psi is 'an auxiliary correlated with a propositional attitude psi from a given range of propositional attitudes.' U means by uttering x that *psi p - U utters x intending i. that A should actively psi that p. ii. that A should recognize that U intends (i) iii. that the fulfillment of (i) should be based on the fulfillment of (ii). Suppes writes: "A central aspect of H. Paul Grice's theory of MEANING is the basic character of utterer's meaning". And it is. "This feature of Grice's theory has been criticized severely because of its deviation from the conception of semantics as an autonomous discipline independent of such general psychological concepts as speakers' intentions and listeners' recognition of intentions." Only I prefer 'utterer' and 'addresee'. Suppes goes on: "I believe that Grice is right and his critics are wrong." As most here at the Grice club! Suppes writes: "The purpose of this essay is to offer my reasons for holding this view", which may be worth reviewing. "Before getting down to business, there are some preliminary matters to get out of the way." "First, concerning the statement of Grice's views I primarily depend upon his three important essays ("Meaning", "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions", and "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning")." "The critics I shall explicitly consider are Chomsky ("Reflections on language"), Yu (On Grice) and Biro (Intentionalism)." Suppes has a footnote: "It is a pleasure to dedicate this essay to H. Paul Grice, who over the years has patiently instructed me on more philosophical points than I can HOPE to remember." Suppes: "Grice's programme is to use the basic notion of utterer's meaning to EXPLICATE at the next level of abstraction the concept of utterance-type occasion-meaning." "At the next higher level is the analysis of the concept of the applied timeless meaning of an utterance-type (complete or incomplete) on a particular occasion of utterance." "Finaly, we reach the timeless meaning of an utterance-type." Suppes met Grice when Grice had already settled in Berkeley and was engaged in the "Hands-Across-the-Bay" programme. The Bay being San Francisco's Bay, since Suppes was settled on what Grice called the 'wrong' side of it (the bay). Cheers, Speranza References: Suppes, P. "The primacy of utterer's meaning", in P. G. R. I. C. E. (Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends). ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html