[lit-ideas] literal meaning

  • From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "palma@xxxxxxxx" <palma@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 13:40:25 +0000

That Grice was  very confused is beyond doubt, that literal meaning intrudes is 
equally beyond any doubts, save by bigoted nincompoop.
In fact consider an intentionalist stance, x wants to communicate that Kigali 
is the capital of Rwanda. If literal meaning never "intrudes" try to do it by 
saying "Marseille is the capital of France"
Qed

Elaboration of the non existence of utterances as well as utterantial meaning 
are to be found in the excellent summary by s. neale at the sperber week in 
2012 at Ulm


http://www.institutnicod.org/seminaires-colloques/colloques/archives-345/2012-2013/semaine-sperber/article/sperber-week?lang=fr






















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Subject: [lit-ideas] Suppes on Grice: Hands Across the Bay

My last post today!
 
There is an interesting essay by Suppes on Grice in P. G. R. I. C. E., 
entitled, "The primacy of utterer's meaning", that may relate to O. Kusturica's 
 commentary on the role of shared intentions and pragmatics and whether one  
should concentrate on one speaker, two speakers, three speakers, or what (or  
utterers, as I prefer).
 
In that essay, Suppes considers three critics of Grice, and defends Grice 
against them. The three authors are Biro, Chomsky, and Yu. 
 
In fact, Biro was fascinated by Suppes's criticism, and wrote back to him.  
Their point concerns the distinction between observation and theory. One 
observes particular utterers but some think they can provide a theory for more  
than one utterer.
 
While Suppes speaks of 'geometry' he concludes that what Grice is into is a  
'physics' of meaning, since physics is much less abstract than geometry, and  
there's nothing abstract about utterer's meaning and its primacy. 
 
"The virtue of Grice's ideas is to require a strong sense of congruence", 
Suppes notes. And this, while geometrical in origin, finds its best realisation 
 in physics.

Suppes goes on to refer to permutational congruence alla  Grice.
 
He provides two pairs of examples:
 
"All men are mortal"
"Every man is mortal"
 
and 
 
"John and Mary are here"
"Mary and John are here"
 
"I have argued ...", Suppes writes, "that what we should have is what I have 
termed a "geometrical" theory of meaning. By this I mean that we replace the 
search for any fixed concept of synonymy by a hierarchy of concepts of 
congruence as is familiar in modern geometry."

Suppes criticises Yu's stipulative/descriptive definitions -- and we  agree 
with Suppes!

Yu's comments are, Suppes notes (and I agree), based on 'bad philosophy of 
science'.
 
Suppes: Yu's distinction is "as useful in the theory of explanation as is 
Aristotle's distinction between violent and natural motion in classical 
mechanics!" 

Grice is an intentionalist -- not a behaviourist, Suppes rightly notes. 

He writes: "It seems to me that Chomsky is badly off the mark" and I  agree "in 
the passages" on Grice in "Reflections on language" on Grice being a 
behaviourist."
 
"In terms of more reasoned and dispassionate analyses, it seems to me that one 
would ordinarily think of Grice not as a behaviourist" -- as Ryle was
--  "but as an intentionalist" -- as the good ole phenomenologists.
 
When does Suppes speak of congruence? Suppes speaks of congruence, when he 
writes that "in affine geometry that makes any two triangles CONGRUENT."
 
The idea of 'literal meaning' is an ABSTRACT one, in the literal sense of 
'abstract'.

Chomsky thinks 'literal meaning' INTRUDES. It never does!
 
Suppes: "It would seem odd if someone were to ask me what I'm doing (he sees me 
writing an entry in my journal) and I were to reply:"
 
"I am writing an entry in my journal -- and with STRICT MEANING, but of course 
it is NOT SUPPOSED to 'communicate' anything."
Of course it  communicates!

Section I of Suppes on Grice: Suppes on Chomsky  on Grice: the three
issues: literal meaning, rules, and behaviourism

Suppes notes: "Chomsky discusses Grice's theory of meaning along with a rather 
detailed discussion of related views of Strawson."
 
Suppes writes: "Grice's own formulations of basic concepts are  technical and 
intricate. It is a SURPRISING feature of his critics that they do  not ENTER 
into real deatails of these analyses."
 
Let p be a proposition and let *psi be a mood marker. Or mode-marker as 
Moravcsik would prefer.
 
As Grice puts it, psi is 'an auxiliary correlated with a propositional attitude 
psi from a given range of propositional attitudes.'
 
U means by uttering x that *psi p - U utters x intending

i. that A should actively psi that p.
ii. that A should recognize that U  intends (i) iii. that the fulfillment of 
(i) should be based on the  fulfillment of (ii).
 
 
Suppes writes: "A central aspect of H. Paul Grice's theory of MEANING is  
the basic character of utterer's meaning".
 
And it is.
 
"This feature of Grice's theory has been criticized
severely because of  its deviation from the conception
of semantics as an autonomous discipline  independent
of such general psychological concepts as speakers'  
intentions and listeners' recognition of intentions."
 
Only I prefer 'utterer' and 'addresee'. Suppes goes on:
 
"I believe that Grice is right and his critics are wrong."
 
As most here at the Grice club! Suppes writes: "The purpose of  this essay 
is to offer my reasons for holding this view", which may be worth  
reviewing. 
 
 
"Before getting down to business, there are some preliminary matters to get 
 out of the way."
 
"First, concerning the statement of Grice's views I primarily depend upon  
his three important 
essays ("Meaning", "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions",  and "Utterer's 
Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning")."
 
"The critics I shall explicitly consider are Chomsky ("Reflections on  
language"), Yu (On Grice) and Biro (Intentionalism)."
 
Suppes has a footnote: "It is a pleasure to dedicate this essay to H. Paul  
Grice, who over the years has patiently instructed me on more philosophical 
 points than I can HOPE to remember."
 
 
Suppes: "Grice's programme is to use the 
basic notion of utterer's  meaning
to EXPLICATE at the next level
of abstraction the concept  of
utterance-type occasion-meaning."
 
"At the next higher level is the analysis of the concept of the applied  
timeless meaning of an utterance-type (complete or incomplete) on a particular 
 occasion of utterance."
 
"Finaly, we reach the timeless meaning of an utterance-type."

Suppes met Grice when Grice had already settled in Berkeley and was engaged 
 in the "Hands-Across-the-Bay" programme. The Bay being San Francisco's 
Bay,  since Suppes was settled on what Grice called the 'wrong' side of it (the 
 bay).
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
References:

Suppes, P. "The primacy of utterer's meaning", in P. G.  R. I. C. E. 
(Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories,  Ends). 
 
 
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