[lit-ideas] Re: last try
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 09:04:55 +0100
It is not that I disagree with everything Palma says in his "last try" but,
sadly, nothing in that "last try" validly shows that -
>For W. the opposite is the case [and] "the tree is growing" is a fact
>ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.>
What Palma writes does not come close to showing this is W's claim, valid or
not.
We may agree that, in TLP, W takes language and reality as isomorphic - as
having the same underlying structure. And W takes this isomorphism as the
explanation for how language can have purchase on reality.
But it does not follow from this isomorphism that
>For W. the opposite is the case [and] "the tree is growing" is a fact
>ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.>
The whole notion of "ontologically prior" here deployed is not shown to be
derived from W's text.
And here we may bear in mind the question has been asked whether, given the
"isomorphism", W has a view on whether this isomorphism is a result of the
nature of language or of the nature of reality (or both in combination):
various people have speculated on this question, but it seems clear it is
speculation in that there is no textual evidence expressing W's view. We might
say then that there is clearly no textual evidence showing whether, "[f]or W"
in TLP, language or reality are "ontologically prior" to each other.
In the light of this, it might seem very mistaken that Palma thinks a claim of
this "ontologically prior" sort can be read into what Palma quotes from TLP.
And there are reasons to suggest that a claim of this sort is, for W in TLP,
cobblers - because such a claim attempts to go beyond not only what can be said
with sense but also what can be shown (where what can be shown is itself
limited in a way indicated by TLP).
Dnl
Ldn
On Friday, 20 June 2014, 8:02, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
One of the interesting facts about Wittgenstein is that he was acutely aware of
the problems of his fact-philosophy.
E.g. not ‘words’ are units of ontology but facts, for instance he has no theory
of the copula, he inherited the view that a definite article dissolves into
quantificational devices (this Russell circa 1904/1905.)
In that sense Wittgenstein is almost responsible for inventing the notion of
reference (a proposition refers to truth values etc.)
His having studied Frege (above all) and Russell, who was obsessed by
epistemology is rather clear
From:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Adriano Palma
Sent: 20 June 2014 08:51
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] last try
As the passages testify the world is the totality of what is conceivable. A
subset of the world is what is the Fall (“what is the case”.)
Hence by instantiation, take a single fact.
Arbitrarily select the fact that one (the/def descry) is growing.
The case is (or is less opaque terms, it is true that the tree is growing) that
the tree is growing.
Question: entities involved in the fact are
An “object” (the tree) and a second “object” (the staged event of growing, or
if one prefers events, the single event of the growth of the tree), call it G
Hence G(t) is true.
The question asked makes reference to the claim that there is a priority of the
fact over the components of the fact.
Components
a. The two objects above mentioned
b. The copula
c. The definite descriptor
Wittgenstein makes the claim neither trivial (not on the face of it idiotic)
that what the world is is what can be true or false, hence a Satz (a
“proposition”.) A tree is not true or false hence it secondary in being a
component of the fact, by itself it is not the world since it does compose (via
truth tables.)
As for the idiocy of the taunts on the bible, it is purely the responsibility
of the writer, luckily not of Wiggenstein that was wrong & not that idiotic.
Regards
From:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Donal McEvoy
Sent: 19 June 2014 19:04
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Some Wittgenstein passages
The "full section" quoted does not explicitly make the claim attributed to W,
nor is any explanation supplied so we might see how this claim might be derived
from the section quoted.
I mean surely if Palma says so then the Bible claims that London hotel rooms
can tonight be had for as little as £3.99, and this is shown by the "full
section" "In the beginning was the light..."
Dnl
Ldn
On Thursday, 19 June 2014, 15:50, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
a full section was quoted for the delight of the upset reader who finds
anything "cobblers"
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact ontologically
>prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.>
This sounds to me like just the kind of cobblers that both the early and later
Wittgenstein were dead against. In case I am mistaken about this, and this is
in fact what is claimed as "the case" "For W.", please could someone explain
how _from Wittengenstein's
writings_ we arrive at the claim '"the tree is growing" is a fact
ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree."
If this claim is in W's writings I appear to have missed it.
DnlLdn
On Thursday, 19 June 2014, 7:56, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
the point can be read, easily, as being non trivial.
For, consider that the realm of the expressible is the realm of the real, give
or take some fluff about the unsayable etc.
what is expressible is propositionally structured, hence it is a thought (see
G. Frege Gedankefuge, in LU.)
It follows that things, independently from how ro who refers to "things", are
not the what the totality of the world is.
Whether this is true or false, lemme know. By my counts most people think there
are things (they have in mind pens, trees, cars, houses, sometime even stars
and atoms) and believe that "facts" are mental constructs of some sort.
For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact ontologically
prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 12:19 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I will try to post in the coming days some W. passages with questions /
comments. I apologize that the comments will likely be brief, as I am in a
rather gloomy mood these days. The passages will probably be from the Tractatus
and the PI. (I haven't got access to the Blue Book.)
Tractatus 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
First, it is not entirely clear what is meant by the facts/things opposition,
but I suppose that what is meant is mental facts, as opposed to material
things. If so, where is the argument for this ? I mean, the materialist /
idealist debate has been going on in philosophy since the pre-Socratics, so
what makes W. think that we should accept his take on the matter just on his
say-so ? It is not given as an axiom, as in Spinoza for example, instead it is
pronounced by fiat.
O.K.
--
palma, e TheKwini, KZN
palma
cell phone is 0762362391
*only when in Europe*:
inst. J. Nicod
29 rue d'Ulm
f-75005 paris france
--
palma, e TheKwini, KZN
palma
cell phone is 0762362391
*only when in Europe*:
inst. J. Nicod
29 rue d'Ulm
f-75005 paris france
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