[lit-ideas] it occurred to me
- From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 10 May 2014 09:57:32 +0200
as if in a quick flash that the relevant source of much of this
wittgensteinian imbecillity derives from a form of A Geulincx
principle (in *Metaphyisca
Vera*) hence it would follow that I cannot follow a rule unless I know he
rule and how it does work. Compare and contrast: the reason one cannot
"say" that a rock follows the rules of "gravity" is that rocks know nothing
about gravity. Likewise a neuron cannot count because cells know nothing
about numbers. In this moronic problem of the "criterion" one gets the same
issue backward. how could x name y without x's knowing how "naming
criteria" are assigned, etc.
I found recently out that Geulincx was not read by Wittgenstein
(Wittgenstein if he knew Latin was very poor at it) but it as read, and
quite interestingly by Wittgenstein's contemporary Beckett.
the "ethics" has been also translated in English (by Brill) with sam
beckett's notes. does anyone know whether wittgenstein knew or read
Beckett? I doubt it for reason of style, but I do not know one way or
another
On Fri, May 9, 2014 at 9:54 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
> >For the record, while I _know_ (or _believe_) that 'criterion' (or
> perhaps
> better 'criteria') is a 'technicism' (as it were) in Witters's scheme of
> things, it was this below I was having in mind when I brought criteria
> in:>
>
> It is academic commentators who treat it as a 'technicism': afaik
> Wittgenstein nowhere makes such a claim. The explanation may be that it is
> not a 'technicism' as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, given the purposes
> for which he deploys it, but it becomes one in the hands of some
> commentators.
>
> As I understand it, Wittgenstein is not using the notion of 'criterion'
> in the strict sense in which we might say the positivist 'verificationist
> theory of meaning' is offered as a strict criterion of "sense" - that is, a
> definitive (rather than partial and defeasible) yardstick. In Investigations
> Wittgenstein's sense of 'criterion' is looser: more elastic and flexible,
> as it is deployed to reflect the sometime elasticity and flexibility of
> many different uses of language.
>
> Dnl
> Ldn
> On Friday, 9 May 2014, 17:32, "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <
> dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> My last post today!
>
> : There's no criterion? There's not ONE criterion, but criteria?
>
> ---
>
> Rather, Witters ON 'criterion' (or 'criteria' if you must).
>
> In a message dated 5/9/2014 12:11:47 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes, among other interesting things:
> "This post may help explain why I do not find what W writes about
> criteria
> (mentioned in a previous post by JLS) to be at all incompatible with the
> interpretation I am suggesting."
>
> For the record, while I _know_ (or _believe_) that 'criterion' (or
> perhaps
> better 'criteria') is a 'technicism' (as it were) in Witters's scheme of
> things, it was this below I was having in mind when I brought criteria in:
>
> McEvoy, under "lw" thread:
>
> "To give examples where names
> name is NOT [emphasis Speranza's] to give
> an EXPLANATION [emphasis Speranza's] of the naming-relation
> but merely to illustrate it: what
> the challenge asks is to provide an
> explanation so that the relation is
> captured in language, PERHAPS [emphasis Speranza's] by way
> of some "theory" or "criterion"
> by which we can determine that a
> word is being used as a name and not otherwise."
>
> McEvoy does write 'perhaps', which is good.
>
> 'Criterion' can be difficult.
>
> "Theory" is perhaps a different animal, since a theory introduces what we
> may call a 'theoretical object' (as I think it's called) -- a theoretical
> posit. And meaning (or what we mean) is said to be a matter of
> 'intuition'
> (as Grice emphasised) -- perhaps even 'analysis' -- rather than 'theory'.
>
> For the record it may do to revise the use of 'ostensive definition' as
> per
> the Stanford Encyclopedia link -- which concerned the 'meaning' of
> 'metre'.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
> REFERENCES:
> Albritton, "On Wittgenstein's use of the Term "Criterion"".
> Wellman, C. "Wittgenstein's Conception of a Criterion"
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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--
palma, e TheKwini, KZN
palma
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