The whereabouts are probably specified in Popper's _Unended Quest_.
Dn
On Monday, 22 June 2015, 9:21, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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div.yiv8059885534WordSection1 {}--> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Donal McEvoy
Sent: 22 June 2015 08:27
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Eighth Wonder >Tarski thought that truth
was a wonder.> If Popper is right about these things, Tarski cleared up the
problems of speaking of "truth":- rehabilitating the correspondence theory into
the bargain. Tarski showed how we can, provided we observe an object and
meta-language distinction, always state the terms under which a proposition
will be the "truth" - it turns out, for example, that "The snow is white" will
be "the truth" if the snow is white. Tarski himself, and rightly, notes
that his correspondence theory of truth does not prove any further
philosophical contentions, such as whether the white snow is in an external
world or is just a product of a human internal world of experience. But Popper,
again rightly, shows how Tarski's result can be allied with a realism and a
truth-seeking theory of knowledge.
Afaik there is no valid refutation of Tarki's theory - there is only often
muddled criticism by philosophers who do not understand it (because they are
inadequate logicians) and also dispute as to what further philosophical
conclusions might be derived from it or allied with it. Tarski's theory
stands as a most important result. Popper introduced it into British philosophy
in 1936, having run through the theory with Tarski while they were both seated
on a park bench in central Europe. A measure of its importance is that Popper,
although a believer in "truth", avoided the term "truth" throughout his _Logik
der Forschung_ so as not to stir the hornet's nest of problems that were
thought to attend speaking of "truth". Tarski got rid of the hornet's nest by
logical analysis, using an object and metalanguage distinction. Tarski
brought the notion of "truth" back down to earth rather than rendering it a
"wonder". But Tarski's own theory is a wonder worth contemplating. Donal
On Monday, 22 June 2015, 6:53, David Ritchie <profdritchie@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
On Jun 21, 2015, at 6:52 PM, Mike Geary wrote:
Yes, my good friend Heidegger loves the word "aletheia". Says it means theThere had to be a poem or song in that. Never been to Greece myself. I
"unconcealed" or some such. I like it because it makes me sound erudite. I
once knew a lovely young woman named Aletheia. She was very impressed that I
knew what her name meant. But she never did.
