In effect the paranoid approach by this “speranza” is ambiguous between a silly pun (is it?) and the demented ranting of anyone who has the following argument form “decided to be sound”, the form is P, grice said something or other in general wholly unrelated to p. hence not P. The corollary is: some deceased fart decided that the way to discover something is to meet with aligned middle class war veteran on Saturday morning and discuss problems that do not exist, hence not P Consider: suppose , per impossibile, that something were to be understood by the discovery that not in any and all instances of sentential forms “highly” is replaced by “very”. So frikking what? But of course Warnock explained that what he found very illuminating in order to become knight fo the order fo the asshole of the second cousin thrice removed of the king of Lesotho, well, it “matters for him” hence it is true…. Come off it guys.. From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Donal McEvoy Sent: 23 November 2014 14:22 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Very Highly Griceian >Grice (WoW -- Way of Words): "Even if my assumption of what goes for me goes for others is mistaken, it does not matter;> But it does matter. Very much so. It goes to the heart of the value of this kind of philosophising. And what Grice goes on to say after the quoted words shows this - for it shows that insofar as the assumption that 'what goes for me goes for others' is mistaken so what goes for me is not a correct basis for preaching to others. Grice's philosophy becomes a preaching to the converted or those who share his claims as to sense. Btw, JLS refusal to admit he mistakenly attributed to me a view I never expressed, and which is a silly view, is itself silly; and the idea he can defend his view by snipping words out of context is also silly; and the idea he can continue to defend himself by repeatedly snipping words out of context is also silly - even highly silly. But not the first time we have seen this. Facing up to one's mistakes requires more than some kinds of education provide. Dnl On Sunday, 23 November 2014, 6:18, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx<mailto:Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>> wrote: Yes, it is of value to him, so why bust my balls with this junk? -----Original Message----- From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent: 22 November 2014 23:29 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Very Highly Griceian In a message dated 11/22/2014 3:32:38 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> writes: "The reality is that there is a vast swathe of English speakers outside of Oxbridge who would not bat an eye nor have a problem understanding sentences [containing 'highly wicked' and 'highly depressed'] Just to clarify a few points. >speakers outside Oxbridge. I'm not so sure I want Cambridge included. One good thing of Grice's Oxonian type of ordinary language philosophy is that it could never have a counterpart on the other stone-wall varsity on the Cam. But even within Oxford, surely the formulation of the thesis by Grice and by Warnock differ. I happen to prefer Grice's formulation. He refers to: "an effort to explain why sometimes the word 'very' allows, with little or no change of meaning the substitution of the word 'highly' (as in 'very unusual') and sometimes does not (as in 'very depressed' or 'very wicked'). Warnock's formulation is in terms of a question: "Why can one be highly intelligent or highly interesting, but not highly stupid or highly dull?" Note that in Grice's formulation there is a reference to 'a change of meaning'. This can be 'small' or not small, i.e. what I propose to call 'huge'. In Warnock's formulation, there is a reference to a _modality_: what one can and what one cannot. Warnock's formulation is stronger. Back to Grice: "an effort to explain why sometimes the word 'very' allows, with little or no change of meaning the substitution of the word 'highly' (as in 'very unusual') and sometimes does not (as in 'very depressed' or 'very wicked'). Commentary: Grice gives this as a fact. So the effort is to explain the fact. Not to question the fact. The fact is that i. Sometimes (as in the case of 'unusual'), there is a little change of meaning (utterer's meaning or implicature, surely) between the following: ------------------ That's very unusual of her. ------------------ That's highly unusual of her. There is no need to introduce E(+) and E(-) at this point, since 'unusual' is neutral (cfr. 'highly sacrilegious' vs. 'lowly sacrilegious'). The second part of Grice's thesis is the negation of (i). ii. Sometimes (as in the case of 'depressed' and 'wicked') there is a HUGE change of meaning (or implicature) between ----------------- He is very depressed. ----------------- He is highly depressed and ----------------- That's very wicked. ----------------- That's highly wicked. So to go back to McEvoy:: "there is a vast swathe of English speakers outside of Oxbridge who would not bat an eye nor have a problem understanding sentences [containing 'highly wicked' and 'highly depressed']" Grice would possibly say that as long as Grice does bat an eye (usually the left) there's room for a highly peculiar form of Oxonian analysis. Grice (WoW -- Way of Words): "Even if my assumption of what goes for me goes for others is mistaken, it does not matter; my philosophical puzzles have arisen in connection with my use of an expression and my conceptual analysis will be of value TO ME, and to any others who may find that their use of the expression coincides with mine. It may also be of value to those whose use of the expresssion is *different*, though different only in minor respects, from mine; but if this is not so, then we have a different use of the expression, to be dealt with separately, to be subjected to separate conceptual analysis. This we can do if the need arises (since cooperation in conceptual analysis does not demand identity as regards the uses of the analyzed expressions; I can, with you, attempt the conceptual analysis of your use of an expression, even if your use is different from mine)." Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html<http://www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html>