https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjcwLAMmMzU On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 7:35 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > D. P. Henry notes that a mediaeval philosopher said something like, "By > necessity, nothing must be nothing", which Henry claims is like the > predecessor of Heidegger's claim. > > O.K.: Does "Das Nicht nichtet" simply mean "nothing is nothing" ? > > Well, if Henry is right that there is some deductive system in which "The > Nothing noths" becomes a logical truth, we may find this conclusion as > being > yielded by premises and axioms in the system which are the logical > correlates of 'rules of grammar'. > > O.K.: On the above reading, the mysterious Henry is surely right. There > is such a logical system, and it's called tautology. > > Well, I do think Heidegger was illustrating 'annihilation' and nihilism, > and came up with "The Nothing noths" as a good adage to abbreviate that way > of looking at things. > > O.K.: Here I would like to see some further clarification. (Or perhaps > simply clarification) What is "nihilism" and how is it illustrated by the > above truism ? > > > > On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 12:09 AM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for > DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> O. K. writes: >> >> "[S]urely it is possible to argue that certain statements that purport to >> be metaphysical are actually nonsense without making the sweeping claim >> that they all are. Neither is it necessary to posit the criterion of >> empirical >> verifiability for statements to be meaningful as the positivists did. (It >> might be argued that statement has to be meaningful in at least some >> sense >> in order for us to be able to tell whether it expresses an empirically >> verifiable proposition.) Here are some of the possibilities: A statement >> in >> metaphysics [a metaphysical statement, proposition] may have at least >> three >> values: 1. It may be nonsense -- i.e. an undefined combination of words. >> (Of >> course this might be the value of a statement in any subject, not just >> philosophy.)" >> >> Well, this seems to be Carnap's and Ayer's view re: >> >> Heidegger >> >> i. The Nothing noths. >> >> or >> >> ii. The nothing noths. >> >> D. P. Henry notes that a mediaeval philosopher said something like, "By >> necessity, nothing must be nothing", which Henry claims is like the >> predecessor of Heidegger's claim. >> >> Henry does not find the verb 'noth' nonsensical at all. And his use of the >> "[[ ... ]]" is meant to provide a corresponding verb for any noun ('noth' >> for 'nothing'). We are familiar with that from Quine, "Pegasus >> pegasises". >> >> "2. It may be a disguised rule of grammar (PP p. 312) -- rather than the >> statement of fact ("real definition") its author the metaphysician >> intends it >> to be." >> >> Well, if Henry is right that there is some deductive system in which "The >> Nothing noths" becomes a logical truth, we may find this conclusion as >> being >> yielded by premises and axioms in the system which are the logical >> correlates of 'rules of grammar'. So "The nothing noths" fits here too. >> >> "3a. It may be a suggestive picture -- i.e. one that suggests images to >> us, >> but that takes us no further. The proposition 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' >> illustrated by "a grandfather clock which points to 5" (PI§ 350), and >> maybe >> the "questions without answers", are examples of these. Many such >> pictures >> give a false account of the way we use some "sign" or other of our >> language -- i.e. they are a mistaken understanding of the sign's >> "grammar" (The >> distinction between a sign and its use in the language), e.g. the word >> 'mind' >> as the name of an invisible object." >> >> Well, this applies perfectly to >> >> "The Nothing noths". >> >> Henry spends some time discussing Lewis Carroll's >> >> "Nobody runs faster than me". >> "That's not true," said the King, "or he had come here earlier". >> >> "3b. Or it may be a way of looking at things -- i.e. speculation that is >> not subject to falsification by anomaly. (Note that some scientific >> theories >> are also ways of looking at things -- that is, ways of summarizing >> [organizing] a selected set of data [Every scientific theory is facts >> plus >> imagination] -- that are not falsifiable, e.g. the heliocentric and >> geocentric >> models of the solar system.) Of course it may also simply be an idle >> picture -- >> although note well that metaphysicians know that their pictures cannot be >> compared with "perceptible reality" -- i.e. that their metaphysical >> propositions are not empirical propositions -- and therefore it does not >> trouble >> them that their speculative propositions cannot be verified or tested by >> experience. For, metaphysics says, "Our experience is only experience of >> appearances, not of reality itself"; cf. Plato's cave image (Republic >> 515c). >> Which statement may be an example of senses (2) or (3a) of the word >> 'metaphysics'." >> >> Well, I do think Heidegger was illustrating 'annihilation' and nihilism, >> and came up with "The Nothing noths" as a good adage to abbreviate that >> way >> of looking at things. >> >> "Some religious pictures may resemble these "idle pictures", because they >> also are not hypotheses; however, pictures in religion are used very >> differently from the way metaphysicians use pictures, e.g. they are not >> speculative. 3c. Or it may be a picture that it is "logically >> impossible" for us to >> be taught how to apply: "How is this picture, e.g. Michelangelo's God >> creating Adam (LC, p. 63), to be compared with what it is said to be a >> picture >> of?" But there is no answer -- i.e. the word 'compare' is not defined in >> this >> particular case; indeed, the artist did not intend for a comparison to be >> made." >> >> Well, there are some paradoxes associated with "Nothing" that Henry >> considers: >> >> iii. Nothing taught me to fly. >> >> iv. No-thing taught me to fly. >> >> was a well-known sophisma. Henry notes that the best answer to the sophism >> is: "Well, then: show us how you fly". >> >> The references to 'signs' is apt in that 'nihil' was much discussed by >> mediaeval philosophers as a 'sign' of some second imposition, and not a >> real >> name. And so on. >> >> Cheers, >> >> Speranza >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------ >> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, >> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html >> > > -- palma, etheKwini, KZN palma cell phone is 0762362391 *only when in Europe*: inst. J. 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