[lit-ideas] h5

From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2015 07:11:34 +0000
I ma no good at graphics, high “five” to Omar

From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On 
Behalf Of Omar Kusturica
Sent: 30 January 2015 00:44
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Popper's Trialism: Chapter III

On the second thought, it may be that the concept of time does not apply to all 
minds. Some minds don't change whatever happens.

O.K.

On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 11:34 PM, Redacted sender 
Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx<mailto:Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> for DMARC 
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
My last post today!

In a message dated 1/29/2015 2:43:47 A.M.  Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
D**
(Who  publishes in non-redacted and redacted)
L**

We may still need to  answer Omar K.'s question about the spatial location
of spatial location.

Omar K. was noticing that psychological states occur in time, yet time
belongs in the physical world.

I read at

http://vixra.org/pdf/1307.0077v1.pdf
"According to philosopher Osho, there are three types of time, namely
chronological time,
psychological time and real time"

and I wouldn't be surprised if Popper held a similar view -- "even if his
surname doesn't rhyme with "Osho" as Geary would add").

Cheers,

Speranza


McEvoy:
"I agree it would appear contradictory to  argue (1) pain  belongs to W2
but
(2) that pain also is located within the W1  brain  and (3) W2 is located
in
a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e.  W2  events, like conscious
pain, do not share the identical  spatio-temporal location  of any W1
events].
I also agree that there is  a large and unresolved problem  as to the
'location' of consciousness,  and thus of W2. I would also agree there  is
a large
and unresolved  problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But
these
admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive  arguments

against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
I  don't intend to suggest  a solution to these large problems but here
clarify that Popper's position is  that W3 "exists but exists nowhere"  and
that
W2 is located not within W1 but  somehow adjacent to the W1  brain.
It seems that we have no obvious model for  locating anything in  space and
time except in the way we seek to locate W1  objects within  W1: and this
creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of  any  clear model for
how we
'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
Despite this,  it  seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness exists;
and though  it is less  overwhelming, the strong case is that consciousness
is  distinct from being a  mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
consciousness in any W1 processes  as these are conceived by science.
So we quickly reach one of the immense  and weird imponderables of the
mind-body problem, that have given rise to very  different reactions -
including
that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes   consciousness to be
merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply  an  illusion, the
mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently  unsolvable  strangeness.
There is
no present possible position without  strangeness - the  radical
materialist,
in denying consciousness, is  one of the strangest. Against  the
strangeness
of these alternative  positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem  less
strange to accept the  admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2 that

cannot readily be  'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms."
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[lit-ideas] h5

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