60. After some correspondence on the topic, Ogden stays with "to make propositions clear" as a translation of das Klarwerden von Sätzen; Pears and McGuinness render it as "the clarification of propositions." Neither of these renderings is ideal; each has something to be said in its favor. Wittgenstein objects to Ogden's translation as follows: This seems to me wrong now. I think it cannot be the RESULT of philosophy "to make propositions clear": this can only be its TASK. The result must be that the propositions now have become clear that they ARE clear." (Letters to C. K. Ogden [Oxford: Blackwell, 1973], p. 50) One can see why Ogden might have found this unhelpful. ********** The above footnote 60 is taken from "Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism" by James Conant, professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago (my alma, but not in philosophy), as his contribution to Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond, edited by Alice Crary, M.I.T. Press, 2007 http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/conant/Mild_Mono-Wittgensteinianism.pdf He is without doubt our best guide to the state of Wittgenstein studies today, but, mark my words, I do not agree with everything he says, which, on some plane and some days, granting for the nonce the latter's ambiguity, can either mean(a) near total disagreement with what he says, based on the perception of a basic or fundamental fault
(Verschiebung, architectonically speaking) running through and underpinning(undermining) his thought, an outcropping of which I hope to analyze beginning with the above footnote
and the text to which it is a note) or (b) mild registering of an occasionalprotest to what he is saying, while appreciatively going along (with him and the rest,
sightseer-like in a strange land) for the ride. But now it's this plane and this day, and, let's face it, the Tractatus is 90 years old and the best minds working on the subject of Wittgenstein still have trouble figuring out what he is saying in everything (and maybe in anything) he says, to the point that when Wittgenstein himself tries to clarify a point in his text, "one can see why Ogden might have found this unhelpful," in other words, James Conant too finds Wittgenstein's attempted help "unhelpful," even though Wittgenstein purported no more and no less than that philosophy's task, goal, aim, purpose, Zweck--was to elucidate just such things as this. Richard Henninge University of Mainz----- Original Message ----- From: <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:39 AM Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: "There is no such thing as philosophic logic"
In a message dated 2/15/2013 9:10:44 P.M. UTC-02, RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: [Ludwig Wittgenstein (in a letter dated April 23, 1922, from Trattenbach, Austria, where he was functioning as an elementary school teacher, to C.K. Ogden with regard to the translation of the Tractatus):] "As to the title I think the latin one is better than the present title. For allthough 'Tractatus logico-philosophicus' isn't ideal still it has something like the right meaning, whereas 'Philosophic logic' is wrong. In fact I don't know what it means! There is no such thing as philosophic logic. (Unless one says that as the whole book is nonsense the title might as well be nonsense too.) From page 20 of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Letters to C.K. Ogden with Comments on the English Translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Edited with an Introduction by G.H. von Wright and an Appendix of Letters by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Basil Blackwell, Oxford; Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1973.
------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html