[lit-ideas] examples
- From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 5 Apr 2014 14:50:00 +0200
to me the main problem is the lack of objects.
assume x knows that witches infest the souls of congolese children (the
example is not fictional)
then it turns out there are no souls and no witches, what did x know? that
some sentence is true? (they are all false) that some [what] term denotes
[none does...] etc.
On Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
> >Popper stresses that 'knowledge' is a conjecture etc.
> does he say that he rejects ant of the standard notions of knowledge?
> meaning:
> if
>
>
> x knows that q
> ENTAILS
> 'q' is true (hence, modulo Tarski, q)>
>
>
> Popper does indeed contest the standard notion that "knowledge" equals
> "justified, true belief". Prior to and over the Christmas period, there was
> much discussion of so-called 'JTB theory'; and various fundamental
> criticisms were offered. The most fundamental are that we can have
> "knowledge" even without this correlating to (degrees of) belief, we can
> have false "knowledge" (e.g. false scientific theories, like Newton's
> physics), and that no "knowledge" is "justified" in a way that removes its
> fallible and conjectural character.
>
> Secondary to this is the criticism that those who defend JTB theory
> against these kinds of criticism do so typically by adopting stipulations
> as to what constitutes "knowledge" (so, for example, false scientific
> theories are deemed not "knowledge" because they are false), and this
> dogamatic defence by stipulation empties JTB theory of substantive content
> and interest - for something true merely by stipulation cannot be
> simultaneously true by virtue of it corresponding with any substantive
> reality.
>
> No real counter-argument of any worth - such as would trouble any serious
> epistemolgist - was offered to this critique of 'JTB theory'. But we did
> find that the dogma of 'JTB theory', like much other philosophical dogma,
> dies hard for those long inculcated with it.
>
> Dnl
> Ldn
>
>
> On Saturday, 5 April 2014, 11:23, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Popper stresses that 'knowledge' is a conjecture etc.
> does he say that he rejects ant of the standard notions of knowledge?
> meaning:
> if
>
>
> x knows that q
> ENTAILS
> 'q' is true (hence, modulo Tarski, q)
>
> x knows conjecturally that q
> entails or not that
> 'q' is true?
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 12:16 PM, Donal McEvoy
> <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
> Had a he above site, that Popper does not agree with this theory.
> Nevertheless it not only long antedates H and Davidson (both of whom will
> arguably prove extremely minor figures in terms of anything worthwhile
> philosophically) but may be a much greater and more interesting kind of
> theory.
>
>
>
>
>
--
palma, e TheKwini, KZN
palma
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