[lit-ideas] Re: criteria
- From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2015 11:15:47 +0000
Sorry Omar, Hume if not Kant determined that in pretty clear (or minimally to
me convincing) fashion.
The existence of causal laws, namely the nomic nature of nature is, at best,
assumed by sciences or general knowledge, it is not itself an empirical finding
of anybody or of any individual.
From: Omar Kusturica [mailto:omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx]
Sent: 20 February 2015 13:05
To: Adriano Palma
Subject: Re: criteria
I am not sure that these examples constitute metaphysical statements. If "vague
statements" are defined in a non-vague way, the claim that there are vague
statements could be empirically verifiable. I don't think that it is something
that can be deduced a priori. So presumably with "causal laws."
O.K.
On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 11:43 AM, Adriano Palma
<Palma@xxxxxxxxxx<mailto:Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
Then, a metaphysical statement can be true (e.g. there are laws, for instance,
to pick easy cases ‘there are laws of consequence” “ there are causal laws”
“there are vague statements”) none of this is in physics, it may be worthwhile
that metaphysics, even for Aristotelians, is what comes after physics. Nothing
ever proposed a verifiability “criterion” that meets its own constraints, let
alone a minimal of intelligence applied to it. Even Carnap understood it was
bullshit by empiricist standards, not to mention Quine. Wittgensten, as usual,
was confused since he had “pictures” and not theories of anything in
particular. It may be a good ploy to be read non stop by the English department
and the adverstising companies, who love Wittgenstein, I was told by two
colleagues
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]
On Behalf Of Omar Kusturica
Sent: 20 February 2015 12:35
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The nothing noths
Hm... surely it is possible to argue that certain statements that purport to be
metaphysical are actually nonsense without making the sweeping claim that they
all are. Neither is it necessary to posit the criterion of empirical
verifiability for statements to be meaningful as the positivists did. (It might
be argued that statement has to be meaningful in at least some sense in order
for us to be able to tell whether it expresses an empirically verifiable
proposition.) Here are some of the possibilities:
A statement in metaphysics [a metaphysical statement, proposition] may have at
least three values:
1. It may be nonsense -- i.e. an undefined combination of words. (Of course
this might be the value of a statement in any subject, not just philosophy.)
2. It may be a disguised rule of grammar (PP p. 312) -- rather than the
statement of fact ("real definition") its author the metaphysician intends it
to be.
3a. It may be a suggestive picture -- i.e. one that suggests images to us, but
that takes us no further. The proposition 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun'
illustrated by "a grandfather clock which points to 5" (PI§ 350), and maybe the
"questions without answers", are examples of these.
Many such pictures give a false account of the way we use some "sign" or other
of our language -- i.e. they are a mistaken understanding of the sign's
"grammar" (The distinction between a sign and its use in the language), e.g.
the word 'mind' as the name of an invisible object.
3b. Or it may be a way of looking at things -- i.e. speculation that is not
subject to falsification by anomaly. (Note that some scientific theories are
also ways of looking at things -- that is, ways of summarizing [organizing] a
selected set of data [Every scientific theory is facts plus imagination] --
that are not falsifiable, e.g. the heliocentric and geocentric models of the
solar system.)
Of course it may also simply be an idle picture -- although note well that
metaphysicians know that their pictures cannot be compared with "perceptible
reality" -- i.e. that their metaphysical propositions are not empirical
propositions -- and therefore it does not trouble them that their speculative
propositions cannot be verified or tested by experience. For, metaphysics says,
"Our experience is only experience of appearances, not of reality itself"; cf.
Plato's cave image (Republic515c). Which statement may be an example of senses
(2) or (3a) of the word 'metaphysics'.
Some religious pictures may resemble these "idle pictures", because they also
are not hypotheses; however, pictures in religion are used very differently
from the way metaphysicians use pictures, e.g. they are not speculative.
3c. Or it may be a picture that it is "logically impossible" for us to be
taught how to apply: "How is this picture, e.g. Michelangelo's God creating
Adam (LC, p. 63), to be compared with what it is said to be a picture of?" But
there is no answer -- i.e. the word 'compare' is not defined in this particular
case; indeed, the artist did not intend for a comparison to be made.
Source: http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit24.html
On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 11:14 AM, Redacted sender
Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx<mailto:Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> for DMARC
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
On p. 121 of "Quaestio Subtilissima", D. P. Henry proposes this
formalisation of
i. The Nothing noths
(He distinguishes this from
ii. The nothing noths.)
iii. ͻ[[Λ]](Λ)
The use of "[[...]]" Henry borrows from Oxford philosopher A. N. Prior.
On p. 120, he notes that the 'the' "portents some sort of singularity",
which Henry symbolises as
iv. sol(Λ)
Henry says that (iv) justifies "the use of the capital initial letter".
Henry concludes the section on Heidegger with the remark that (i) can thus
be seen as being sensical and "a truth derivable from the deductive
metaphysics" which he is constructing.
I agree with J. L. Scherb that this was a "pre-war debate" (pre-Second
World War) between Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger about allegedly (as D.
P. Henry has it) meaningless metaphysical statements such as "The Nothing
noths" ("Das Nichts
nichtet").
Within the mainstream of 20th century analytical philosophy this
statement, "The Nothing noths" has come to be regarded as obvious metaphysical
nonsense.
And it was Sir Freddie Ayer who brought the news to Oxford. It is said that
Oxford could not BEAR with the 'enfant terrible' -- but I WOULD
distinguish between a Carnapian scientist approach and Ayer's, which was
directed
towards empiricist epistemoly in general -- and Ayer did not stay at Oxford
for long, finding a post in London. In terms of the history of philosophy,
this is seen as Oxford never having 'bought' the idea that metaphysical
statements were, as Ayer thought he had shown, after Carnap, 'meaningless'.
There were hordes of philosophers practicising metaphysics THEN (think
Collingwood) as there are hordes of philosophers practising metaphysics NOW at
Oxford
As we all know, this led to an unfortunate confrontation between
analytical and continental philosophy -- with Sartre assuming the
Heideggerian
position and generalising it: "Das Nichts nichtet" and consciousness is "le
néant néantisant".
The judgement of "The Nothing noths" as nonsense was somewhat 'corrected'
by D. P. Henry.
But the conflict still seems to exist.
Henry's remark didn't find its way to a greater audience, because Henry
didn't *prove* his claim in a canonical way, and because Henry's remark
may be alleged to contains an ambiguity, which may give rise to criticism.
The required disambiguation, together with the missing proofs, can be given
within the ontology introduced by Stanisław Leśniewski -- notably
protothetic -- that Grice adored ("protothetic (why?)" -- "Aspects of Reason" --
Grice had a taste for a Polish neologism).
Ludger Honnefelder calls the systems Stanisław Leśniewski, which were
developed roughly at the same pre-war time (1913-1939), a new beginning of
metaphysics.
They systems of Stanisław Leśniewski (that Henry learned via Geach --
whose mother was Polish) provide the missing link (to use a metaphor) between
Heidegger and Carnap (and Ayer).
The systems of Stanisław Leśniewski can thus be regarded as an ontological
(if not metaphysical) supplement to and a partial correction of Michael
Friedman's essay on Heidegger, Carnap and Cassirer.
A hermeneutical conclusion may be drawn from this that allows for a
reconciliation between two types of
philosophy.
This is possible not only in terms of Cassirer's observations, but also
along the lines of "logical form", broadly conceived -- as Henry suggested.
The hermeneutical outcome suggests that one CAN make use of PRECISE logic
tools in a more general way than Carnap himself allowed (if not Ayer and
less so Grice), alla D. P. Henry, without having to declare that at a few
central statements of Heidegger's Fundamentalontologie are pure nonsense --
but rather pretty illuminating -- if you think of them ("and even if you
don't").
Cheers,
Speranza
Refs.:
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic
Grice, "System Q"
Grice, "Philosophical Eschatology".
Henry, Quæstio subtilissima.
Ryle, Review of Heidegger, "Sein und Zeit", Mind, 1929, vol. 38.
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