i
n these hard times with Jerusalem nd what not it is indeed a relief that
the dynamic duet of speranza and mrs evoy are back in form, emitting
geysers of nothingness analyzed from their aristocratic friends, this
"lord" roberts and assorted imbeciles, there si also the study of crichton
called an inquiry into mental derangement.
On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 6:21 AM, Redacted sender jlsperanza for DMARC <
dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The adjective ‘representative’ is also used chiefly in philosophy, for
that presents or makes manifest to the mind; that describes or evokes a
thing (esp. one existing in the external world); (of the mind, etc.) that
imagines or forms a clear concept of a thing, or has the capacity to do
this. 1605. Bacon, “Of the Advancement of Learning”: “The division of
poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof is into POESY
narrative; REPRESENTATIVE, and allusive. REPRESENTATIVE POESY is as a
visible history, and is an image of actions AS IF they were present.” 1670.
S. Gott, “The Divine History of the Genesis of the World”: “God being
infinite, and infinitely different from all finite nature, there is not,
nor can there be, anything like unto him, in any intuitive
or REPRESENTATIVE MANNER whatsoever.” 1701. J. Norris, “Essays on an Ideal
World”: “By our ideas we ordinarily understand certain REPRESENTATIVE FORMS
of things in our Minds, which we contemplate as the immediate objects of
them, so in like manner by the divine ideas we are to conceive
the REPRESENTATIVE FORMS of things in the mind of God.” 1753. “Chambers’s
Cyclopaedia”: “REPRESENTATIVE POWER, in metaphysics, a term introduced by
Leibnitz, to signify that power of the human soul, by which it represents
to itself the universe.” 1798 A. Crichton, “An Inquiry into Mental
Derangement”: “A disproportionate activity of the REPRESENTATIVE FACULTY
may arise from accidental causes.” 1807. “New Ann. Reg. Lit. Select. &
Retrospect”: “Descartes held it as certain, that it is only
a REPRESENTATIVE PICTURE, form, or species of an object, that is present in
the mind when we perceive, and not the object itself.” 1814. W. Taylor
<https://maps.google.com/?q=1814.+W.+Taylor&entry=gmail&source=g> in “Monthly
Magazine”: “The REPRESENTATIVE MEMORY must be exercised.” 1842. W.
Hamilton, “Dissertation in T. Reid”: “The distinction between perception
as a presentative, and Memory as a REPRESENTATIVE, COGNITION.” 1856. W.
Hamilton, “Lectures in Metaphysics”: “We have thus a REPRESENTATIVE
FACULTY; and this obtains the name of Imagination.” 1885. R. L. Stevenson,
“Contemporary Review”: “In all ideal and material points, literature, being
a REPRESENTATIVE ART, must look for analogies to painting and the like.”
1946. M. Carré, “Realists and Nominalists”: “We are told that the mind
grasps immediately, without REPRESENTATIVE INTERFERENCE, the objects which
confront it.” 2000. D. Moreau, “A Companion to Malebranche”: “The technical
dispute over the nature of ideas as REPRESENTATIVE MODALITIES makes sense
only in the context of a larger framework.”
Finally, the adjective ‘representative’ can also be used in metaphysics and
psychology,
of the nature of or relating to representationalism. Vide: “
presentative-representative” under “presentative.”
<http://www.oed.com.libraryproxy.quinnipiac.edu/view/Entry/150688#eid28610332>1830.
“Edinb. Review”: “All possible forms of the REPRESENTATIVE HYPOTHESIS are
thus reduced to three, and these have all been actually maintained. 1.
The REPRESENTATIVE OBJECT not a modification of mind. 2. The REPRESENTATIVE
OBJECT a modification of mind, dependent for its knowledge, but not for its
existence, on the act of consciousness. 3. The REPRESENTATIVE OBJECT a
modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness.” 1847. Blackwood’s
Magazine: “It is the very essence of the REPRESENTATIVE THEORY to
recognise, in perception, a remote as well as a proximate object of the
mind.” 1851. H. L. Mansel, “Prolegomena Logica”: “Idea has been
indifferently employed by modern philosophers, to denote the object of
thought, of imagination, and even (under the REPRESENTATIVE HYPOTHESIS) of
perception.” 1904. W. James, “Essays in Radical Empiricism”:
“REPRESENTATIVE THEORIES of perception avoid the logical paradox, but on
the other hand they violate the reader’s sense of life, which knows no
intervening mental image.” 1934. A. Ewing, “Idealism”: “By the phrase
‘REPRESENTATIVE THEORY of perception’ I mean to cover any theory of
perception which admits the existence of physical objects in the realist
sense but is not a direct theory.” 1967. Edwards, “Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy”: “REPRESENTATIVE REALISM also accounts for illusions, dreams,
images, hallucinations, and the relativity of perception.” 2004. S. Haack,
“Handbk. Epistemology”: “The realist position that contrasts with
the REPRESENTATIVE THEORY of perception is perceptual realism, anticipated
in some passages of Book IV of Locke’s Essay and articulated in Thomas
Reid.”
So I would think that a conceptual analysis of ‘representative capacity’
vis-à-vis ‘personal capacity’ may be both formally important (rather than
treating the collocations as ‘mere formalities’) AND of some, shall we say,
substance – notably as premises in this or that piece of legal reasoning.
And stuff.
Cheers,
Speranza
