From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Mike Geary Sent: 27 February 2015 06:43 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Bartley's Non-Justificationism (Was: Justifying Moral Principles?) Philosophy is fun. So is chess. On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 10:14 AM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx<mailto:Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> for DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote: In a message dated 2/26/2015 10:36:47 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx<mailto:omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> writes: Cleopatra presumably didn't expect much of Augustus' clemency, since she killed herself rather than falling into his clutches. Caesar was a 'dictator' in the sense that term was used in Roman times, not in the sense it is used today. I guess I was being inspired by McEvoy's reference, in another thread, to the time-scale. There, McEvoy wrote about something that may relate to KEYWORD: RELATIVISM. McEvoy is discussing 'best world', including what I take to be morally best world. McEvoy writes: "Much depends on how we might unpack the "best of all possible worlds" claim - for example, within what time-scale we judge a world [e.g. the rise of Nazism might seem to obviously refute the 1930s-40s being the "best of all possible worlds", unless, that is, the rise of Nazism at that point was necessary to ward off the greater evil of a later World War involving totalitarian regimes where they had nuclear weapons etc.]" There seems to be a direct question there somewhere: "Within what time-scale do we judge a world as being morally better than another?" One answer may involve an appeal to some moral principle. Hence my reference to Julius Caesar, a 'dictator' in the view of his contemporary Romans, and the idea that the world of Augustus (a 'clement emperor' in the eyes of Corneille ("Cinna") was a morally better one. But as O. K. notes, there may be a needed qualification or two here somewhere. Cheers, Speranza McEvoy: "Much depends on how we might unpack the "best of all possible worlds" claim - for example, within what time-scale we judge a world [e.g. the rise of Nazism might seem to obviously refute the 1930s-40s being the "best of all possible worlds", unless, that is, the rise of Nazism at that point was necessary to ward off the greater evil of a later World War involving totalitarian regimes where they had nuclear weapons etc.] But even this kind of "time-scale" defence weakens the claim so that it means something like 'in the overall scheme of things everything now that is less than best is part of a process necessary for everything to work out for the best' - again not obviously falsifiable and more like an optimistic promise with a false ring to it." ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html<http://www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html>