[lit-ideas] Re: anti-egalitarianism, more on

  • From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 21:17:13 +0200

yes, though the man lw would refuse to allow any talk of necessary and/or
sufficient conditions, so if asked the question would be fudged by the
usual bluster


On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 9:11 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>  So, perhaps W. does not mean that language is a necessary condition for
> something being a form of life, but that something having a language is a
> sufficient condition for it being a form of life. (To give it a charitable
> interpretation, although it certainly sounds like he is saying that life is
> defined by language.) Well, computers can use quite a few linguistic
> expressions nowadays; quite a few more than 'brick' and 'slab,' as the
> matter of fact. My computer is even capable of sending ambiguous messages
> like: "The application is not responding; you can close the window, or
> continue to wait." Is it therefore a form of life ?
>
>  To sum up, I don't think that there is any kind of necessary connection
> between forms of language use and forms of life.
>
>  O.K.
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 6:53 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> >"to imagine a language... is to imagine a form of life." is, in my
>> humble opinion, one of those solemn, semi-mystical pronouncements by W.
>> that do not stand to critical examination even of a superficial
>> sort. Rhododendrons don't have a language, yet are a form of life. On the
>> other hand, a mason and his assistant who have a very simplified and
>> specialized code of communication consisting of a few expressions like
>> 'brick', 'hammer' and the like do not thereby constitute a form of life
>> separate from wider human society. (For one thing, their work belongs to,
>> and makes sense only within, a wider network of economic relations.)>
>>
>>  Unlike some commentators, I take "form of life" as a non-technical
>> expression, at least in Wittgenstein's own hands: while admitting W might
>> have been clearer and his compressed style can be gnomic, the expression "to
>> imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" might be re-written as "to
>> conceive the sense of a language is to conceive of a form of life within
>> which it has that sense". It is a Kantian point:- that sense of what is
>> immediate in language depends on an assumed background that is not 'given'
>> by that immediate language but only against that background can immediate
>> language have the sense it has.
>>
>>  Long ago I posted how a 'slab-brick' language, which might appear to a
>> language for performing tasks with 'named' objects, might turn out to be a
>> language of prayer or of honour to the memory of a deceased builder - how a
>> hidden background, not apparent from the immediate language used by
>> speakers, might entirely change the sense of that immediate language from
>> its sense in the background we assumed. For Wittgenstein this kind of
>> background - the background we might check by making a 'surveyable
>> representation' - is indispensable to the sense of any kind of language;
>> and it is a background that can be seen as linked to a specific "form of
>> life".
>>
>>  As flowers do not have language in W's sense, it is irrelevant that
>> they are a "form of life": that they are a "form of life" (without
>> language) neither refutes nor proves W's contention about how the sense of
>> language correlates with the "form of life" within which it is used.
>>
>>  Nor is W suggesting the builders have a "form of life" distinct from
>> other humans: on the contrary, their slab language makes sense to other
>> humans because humans share a "form of life" within which referring to
>> objects to perform tasks makes sense across widely different cultures and
>> between widely different occupations.
>>
>>  As far as the above goes, it seems to me W's Kantian point is on the
>> right lines and is far from merely mystical. The key (as always with W) is
>> that W also thinks there are "limits of language" such that we cannot
>> express in language the conditions by which language has sense and we can
>> only show them - but we show them only by assuming a "form of life "
>> within which language has the sense it has. It is this doctrine of
>> showing that is perhaps 'the mystical'.
>>
>>  Dnl
>>  ldn
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>   On Sunday, 15 June 2014, 16:58, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>   "to imagine a language means is to imagine a form of life." is, in my
>> humble opinion, one of those solemn, semi-mystical pronouncements by W.
>> that do not stand to critical examination even of a superficial
>> sort. Rhododendrons don't have a language, yet are a form of life. On the
>> other hand, a mason and his assistant who have a very simplified and
>> specialized code of communication consisting of a few expressions like
>> 'brick', 'hammer' and the like do not thereby constitute a form of life
>> separate from wider human society. (For one thing, their work belongs to,
>> and makes sense only within, a wider network of economic relations.)
>>
>>  O.K.
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 4:03 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> >As in Wittgenstein's game of chess, the rules serve to constitute the
>> players and pieces.>
>>
>>   Wittgenstein's "game of chess" is offered as an analogy rather than an
>> explanation; and one of the main points W wishes to make is against the
>> possibility of a fully stated explanation of "rules":- W's view is that
>> what we might accept as a "game of chess" is never said by the "rules" [for
>> no "rule", whether of chess or of mathematics or of "grammar", ever says
>> its own sense] but is something that may be shown - shown, for example, by
>> considering what variations on a standard game of chess we might accept as
>> a compatible with it remaining a "game of chess" and what variations we
>> would not so accept, instead saying that what was happening was no longer a
>> "game of chess". [If a dictator played a "game of chess" with blindfolded
>> humans who were shot when 'taken' in the game, we might say this was really
>> a form of sadistic torture or a cruel exercise in caprice rather than a
>> "game of chess", even if it were played according to the "rules" of a
>> normal "game of chess": the dictator's "game of chess" might not have
>> anything like the same sense or play the same role as a standard "game of
>> chess" within our "form of life".]
>>
>>  Given this, it is going too far to say "the rules serve to constitute
>> the players and pieces" for in many senses they do not, and Wittgenstein is
>> alert to the ways they do not; in particular, they do not "constitute"
>> in that the "rules" do not say exactly what counts as a player or a
>> piece for all purposes and all occasions, rather (in Wittgenstein's view)
>> what we accept as a player and piece etc. shows the "rule".
>>
>>  Dnl
>>  Ldn
>>
>>
>>
>>   On Sunday, 15 June 2014, 14:17, Torgeir Fjeld <torgeir_fjeld@xxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>   its much talk of the subject -- grammatically and policed state
>>
>>  it may be futile blabber
>>
>>  the coming community will be characterized by singularity. and not just
>> any singularity, but any-singularity. singolarita qualunque.
>>
>>  this kind of any-singularity disregards the specificity of singularity.
>> its sole interest is in "unqualified" belonging.
>>
>>  it is NOT established though categories of belonging (being republican,
>> canadian, state-employed, say). it is ALSO NOT established though the
>> absence of such conditions (this is the case with the kind of "negative
>> community" suggested by georges bataille and maurice blanchot [and
>> HEGEL???] -- the community of those without community)
>>
>>  the child at play, the vagabond, the franciscan monk signify forms of
>> life  NOT based on group belonging, NOT based on class, NOT based on
>> rights. they share an approach to life characterized by practice and an
>> ethic of openness. can we describe their life forms without recourse to
>> metaphysical categories (such as subjectivity, rights, class projects)?
>>
>>  the franciscan monk abandoned all claims to property, to rights, and so
>> challenged sacred and political authority. "how can we imagine a form of
>> life, a human life, entirely exempted from the clutches of the law; and how
>> can we imagine a USE OF THE BODY and the world that never materializes AS
>> POSESSION?"
>>
>>  Saint Francis of Assisi insised that the example of the Master should
>> be sufficient and that He alone should serve as guide. It is a claim to a
>> way of life, NOT a doctrine. A life in poverty -- absolute poverty. In
>> stead of property and rights the Franciscans lived by "free use": in
>> accordance with natural law they would freely consume food, drink, wear
>> clothes without ownership. (In the manner of the Master who may not have
>> had ownership of the robe He wore.)
>>
>>  What has this to do with Wittgenstein? What the Fanciscans did was to
>> establish a third element between law (rule, universality) and life
>> (application, particularity), and this is USE (usus) -- practice. As in
>> Wittgenstein's game of chess, the rules serve to constitute the players and
>> pieces. The rules that establish the space of possibilities come about
>> through common practice -- use. Language games are parts of life forms: "to
>> imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."
>>
>>  Mvh / Yours,
>>
>>
>>  Torgeir Fjeld
>> Gdansk, Poland
>>
>>
>>  Blogs: http://phatic.blogspot.com // http://norsketegn.blogspot.com
>> Web: http://independent.academia.edu/TorgeirFjeld
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>


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