[lit-ideas] Re: anti-egalitarianism, more on

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 21:11:59 +0200

So, perhaps W. does not mean that language is a necessary condition for
something being a form of life, but that something having a language is a
sufficient condition for it being a form of life. (To give it a charitable
interpretation, although it certainly sounds like he is saying that life is
defined by language.) Well, computers can use quite a few linguistic
expressions nowadays; quite a few more than 'brick' and 'slab,' as the
matter of fact. My computer is even capable of sending ambiguous messages
like: "The application is not responding; you can close the window, or
continue to wait." Is it therefore a form of life ?

To sum up, I don't think that there is any kind of necessary connection
between forms of language use and forms of life.

O.K.


On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 6:53 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

>
> >"to imagine a language... is to imagine a form of life." is, in my humble
> opinion, one of those solemn, semi-mystical pronouncements by W. that do
> not stand to critical examination even of a superficial
> sort. Rhododendrons don't have a language, yet are a form of life. On the
> other hand, a mason and his assistant who have a very simplified and
> specialized code of communication consisting of a few expressions like
> 'brick', 'hammer' and the like do not thereby constitute a form of life
> separate from wider human society. (For one thing, their work belongs to,
> and makes sense only within, a wider network of economic relations.)>
>
> Unlike some commentators, I take "form of life" as a non-technical
> expression, at least in Wittgenstein's own hands: while admitting W might
> have been clearer and his compressed style can be gnomic, the expression "to
> imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" might be re-written as "to
> conceive the sense of a language is to conceive of a form of life within
> which it has that sense". It is a Kantian point:- that sense of what is
> immediate in language depends on an assumed background that is not 'given'
> by that immediate language but only against that background can immediate
> language have the sense it has.
>
> Long ago I posted how a 'slab-brick' language, which might appear to a
> language for performing tasks with 'named' objects, might turn out to be a
> language of prayer or of honour to the memory of a deceased builder - how a
> hidden background, not apparent from the immediate language used by
> speakers, might entirely change the sense of that immediate language from
> its sense in the background we assumed. For Wittgenstein this kind of
> background - the background we might check by making a 'surveyable
> representation' - is indispensable to the sense of any kind of language;
> and it is a background that can be seen as linked to a specific "form of
> life".
>
> As flowers do not have language in W's sense, it is irrelevant that they
> are a "form of life": that they are a "form of life" (without language)
> neither refutes nor proves W's contention about how the sense of language
> correlates with the "form of life" within which it is used.
>
> Nor is W suggesting the builders have a "form of life" distinct from other
> humans: on the contrary, their slab language makes sense to other humans
> because humans share a "form of life" within which referring to objects to
> perform tasks makes sense across widely different cultures and between
> widely different occupations.
>
> As far as the above goes, it seems to me W's Kantian point is on the right
> lines and is far from merely mystical. The key (as always with W) is that W
> also thinks there are "limits of language" such that we cannot express in
> language the conditions by which language has sense and we can only show
> them - but we show them only by assuming a "form of life " within which
> language has the sense it has. It is this doctrine of showing that is
> perhaps 'the mystical'.
>
> Dnl
> ldn
>
>
>
>
>
>   On Sunday, 15 June 2014, 16:58, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
> "to imagine a language means is to imagine a form of life." is, in my
> humble opinion, one of those solemn, semi-mystical pronouncements by W.
> that do not stand to critical examination even of a superficial
> sort. Rhododendrons don't have a language, yet are a form of life. On the
> other hand, a mason and his assistant who have a very simplified and
> specialized code of communication consisting of a few expressions like
> 'brick', 'hammer' and the like do not thereby constitute a form of life
> separate from wider human society. (For one thing, their work belongs to,
> and makes sense only within, a wider network of economic relations.)
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 4:03 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
> >As in Wittgenstein's game of chess, the rules serve to constitute the
> players and pieces.>
>
> Wittgenstein's "game of chess" is offered as an analogy rather than an
> explanation; and one of the main points W wishes to make is against the
> possibility of a fully stated explanation of "rules":- W's view is that
> what we might accept as a "game of chess" is never said by the "rules" [for
> no "rule", whether of chess or of mathematics or of "grammar", ever says
> its own sense] but is something that may be shown - shown, for example, by
> considering what variations on a standard game of chess we might accept as
> a compatible with it remaining a "game of chess" and what variations we
> would not so accept, instead saying that what was happening was no longer a
> "game of chess". [If a dictator played a "game of chess" with blindfolded
> humans who were shot when 'taken' in the game, we might say this was really
> a form of sadistic torture or a cruel exercise in caprice rather than a
> "game of chess", even if it were played according to the "rules" of a
> normal "game of chess": the dictator's "game of chess" might not have
> anything like the same sense or play the same role as a standard "game of
> chess" within our "form of life".]
>
> Given this, it is going too far to say "the rules serve to constitute the
> players and pieces" for in many senses they do not, and Wittgenstein is
> alert to the ways they do not; in particular, they do not "constitute" in
> that the "rules" do not say exactly what counts as a player or a piece
> for all purposes and all occasions, rather (in Wittgenstein's view) what we
> accept as a player and piece etc. shows the "rule".
>
> Dnl
> Ldn
>
>
>
>   On Sunday, 15 June 2014, 14:17, Torgeir Fjeld <torgeir_fjeld@xxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
>  its much talk of the subject -- grammatically and policed state
>
> it may be futile blabber
>
> the coming community will be characterized by singularity. and not just
> any singularity, but any-singularity. singolarita qualunque.
>
> this kind of any-singularity disregards the specificity of singularity.
> its sole interest is in "unqualified" belonging.
>
> it is NOT established though categories of belonging (being republican,
> canadian, state-employed, say). it is ALSO NOT established though the
> absence of such conditions (this is the case with the kind of "negative
> community" suggested by georges bataille and maurice blanchot [and
> HEGEL???] -- the community of those without community)
>
> the child at play, the vagabond, the franciscan monk signify forms of life
>  NOT based on group belonging, NOT based on class, NOT based on rights.
> they share an approach to life characterized by practice and an ethic of
> openness. can we describe their life forms without recourse to metaphysical
> categories (such as subjectivity, rights, class projects)?
>
> the franciscan monk abandoned all claims to property, to rights, and so
> challenged sacred and political authority. "how can we imagine a form of
> life, a human life, entirely exempted from the clutches of the law; and how
> can we imagine a USE OF THE BODY and the world that never materializes AS
> POSESSION?"
>
> Saint Francis of Assisi insised that the example of the Master should be
> sufficient and that He alone should serve as guide. It is a claim to a way
> of life, NOT a doctrine. A life in poverty -- absolute poverty. In stead of
> property and rights the Franciscans lived by "free use": in accordance with
> natural law they would freely consume food, drink, wear clothes without
> ownership. (In the manner of the Master who may not have had ownership of
> the robe He wore.)
>
> What has this to do with Wittgenstein? What the Fanciscans did was to
> establish a third element between law (rule, universality) and life
> (application, particularity), and this is USE (usus) -- practice. As in
> Wittgenstein's game of chess, the rules serve to constitute the players and
> pieces. The rules that establish the space of possibilities come about
> through common practice -- use. Language games are parts of life forms: "to
> imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."
>
> Mvh / Yours,
>
>
> Torgeir Fjeld
> Gdansk, Poland
>
>
> Blogs: http://phatic.blogspot.com // http://norsketegn.blogspot.com
> Web: http://independent.academia.edu/TorgeirFjeld
>
>
>
>
>
>

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