[lit-ideas] a much better philosopher had sex with brigitte bardot

From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 09:46:35 +0200
Since this is not public knowledge, I avoid namings


On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 6:35 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>    Well, before we begin discussing 'meta-philosophical issues-' if such
> exist at all, perhaps we could discuss philosophical issues. It seems that,
> because Heidegger had sex with Hanna Arendt, he must have been the greatest
> philosopher of the 20. century. Admittedly the 20. century did not produce
> many great philosophers (if any) but that he will also 'tower above
> philosophy in the centuries in the centuries to come' is a rather bleak
> predicament. Perhaps we can let the centuries to come do their own work,
> good or bad.
>
>  O.K.
>
>
>  On Saturday, March 22, 2014 12:42 AM, "cblists@xxxxxxxx" <
> cblists@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 20 Mar 2014, at 11:35, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > ...
> > could any of the experts in the stuff xplain
> > two or three points?
> > 1. is sein und zeit a priori? or is it a posteriori?
> > ...
>
> I'm no expert, so I'll let an expert do the talking. (My offer to the list
> was a discussion of what I see as the meta-philosophical issue of
> Heidegger's Nazism.)
>
> The following excerpt is as close as I can get to an explanation of how
> Heidegger's project relates to that first 'point'.  It is from Michael
> Wheeler's "Martin Heidegger" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
> (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.):
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/heidegger/
>
> "...it is an essential characteristic of Dasein that, in its ordinary ways
> of engaging with other entities, it operates with a preontological
> understanding of Being, that is, with a distorted or buried grasp of the a
> priori conditions that ... make possible particular modes of Being. This
> suggests that a disciplined investigation of those everyday modes of
> engagement on the part of Dasein (what Heidegger calls an 'existential
> analytic of Dasein') will be a first step towards revealing a shared but
> hidden underlying meaning of Being. Heidegger puts it like this:
>
> "'whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of
> Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and
> motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological
> understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic... Therefore
> fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their
> rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein.' (Being and
> Time 3: 33-4)
>
> "It is important to stress here that, in Heidegger's eyes, this
> prioritizing of Dasein does not lead to (what he calls) 'a vicious
> subjectivizing of the totality of entities' (Being and Time 4: 34). This
> resistance towards any unpalatable anti-realism is an issue to which we
> shall return.
>
> "Dasein is, then, our primary 'object' of study, and our point of
> investigative departure is Dasein's everyday encounters with entities. But
> what sort of philosophical method is appropriate for the ensuing
> examination? Famously, Heidegger's adopted method is a species of
> phenomenology. In the Heideggerian framework, however, phenomenology is not
> to be understood (as it sometimes is) as the study of how things merely
> appear in experience. Rather, in a recognizably Kantian staging of the
> idea, Heidegger follows Husserl in conceiving of phenomenology as a
> theoretical enterprise that takes ordinary experience as its point of
> departure, but which, through an attentive and sensitive examination of
> that experience, aims to reveal the a priori, transcendental conditions
> that shape and structure it. In Heidegger's Being-centred project, these
> are the conditions 'which, in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may
> possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being' (Being
> and Time 5: 38). Presupposed by ordinary experience, these structures must
> in some sense be present with that experience, but they are not simply
> available to be read off from its surface, hence the need for disciplined
> and careful phenomenological analysis to reveal them as they are. So far so
> good. But, in a departure from the established Husserlian position, one
> that demonstrates the influence of Dilthey, Heidegger claims that
> phenomenology is not just transcendental, it is hermeneutic (for
> discussion, see e.g., Caputo 1984, Kisiel 2002 chapter 8). In other words,
> its goal is always to deliver an interpretation of Being, an interpretation
> that, on the one hand, is guided by certain historically embedded ways of
> thinking (ways of taking-as reflected in Dasein's preontological
> understanding of Being) that the philosopher as Dasein and as interpreter
> brings to the task, and, on the other hand, is ceaselessly open to
> revision, enhancement and replacement. For Heidegger, this hermeneutic
> structure is not a limitation on understanding, but a precondition of it,
> and philosophical understanding (conceived as fundamental ontology) is no
> exception. Thus Being and Time itself has a spiral structure in which a
> sequence of reinterpretations produces an ever more illuminating
> comprehension of Being. As Heidegger puts it later in the text:
> What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the
> right way... In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most
> primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this
> possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our
> first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight
> and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular
> conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out
> these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. (Being and Time
> 32: 195)
>
> "On the face of it, the hermeneutic conception of phenomenology sits
> unhappily with a project that aims to uncover the a priori transcendental
> conditions that make possible particular modes of Being (which is arguably
> one way of glossing the project of 'working out [the] fore-structures [of
> understanding] in terms of the things themselves'). And this is a tension
> that, it seems fair to say, is never fully resolved within the pages of
> Being and Time. The best we can do is note that, by the end of the text,
> the transcendental has itself become historically embedded. ... What is
> also true is that there is something of a divide in certain areas of
> contemporary Heidegger scholarship over whether one should emphasize the
> transcendental dimension of Heidegger's phenomenology (e.g., Crowell 2001,
> Crowell and Malpas 2007) or the hermeneutic dimension (e.g., Kisiel 2002)."
>
> I think that's more than enough for today.
>
> Chris Bruce,
> erstwhile hermenaut, in
> Kiel, Germany
> --
>
>
>
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[lit-ideas] a much better philosopher had sex with brigitte bardot

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