[lit-ideas] Re: Wittgenstein's Lion

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2015 16:07:02 -0400

If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. "Wenn ein Löwe sprechen
könnte, wir könnten ihn nicht verstehen."

A conceptual analysis of "mean" "might reasonably be expected to help us
with "x meansNN (timeless) something (that so-and-so)," "A meansNN (timeless)
by x something (that so-and-so)," and with the explication of "means the
same as," "UNDERSTANDS," "entails," and so on."

In a message dated 6/9/2015 12:41:49 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: "the fact we would understand the words "Take
a
photo" if they were uttered by a lion does not refute the aphorism, for it
does not mean we would understand "the lion" saying those words (JLS thinks I
overlooked this point because I never mentioned Strawson, but this point is
made very clearly in that post, and it is clearly acknowledged that this
is part of Wittgenstein's point)."

Point taken.

This, for the record, is Strawson:

"I suggest, then, that for A (in the appropriate sense of "understand") to
understand something by utterance x, it is necessary (and perhaps
sufficient) that there should be some complex intention of the (i2) form,
[...]
which A takes [U] to have, and that for A to understand the utterance
*correctly*, it is necessary that A should take [U] to have the complex
intention of
the (i2) form which [U] DOES have. In other words, if A is to understand
the utterance correctly, [U]'s (i4) intention and hence his (i2) intention
must be fulfilled. Of course it does not follow from the fulfillment of
these intentions that his (i,) intention is fulfilled; nor, consequently, that
his (i3) intention is fulfilled."

Strawson speaks of four intentions -- i1, i2, i3, and i4:

"[U] intends by a certain action to induce in A the [psychological
attitude] that P; so he satisfies condition (i1) and [U] intends A to
recognise
his (i1) intention. So S satisfies condition (i2), and he intends that A's
recognition of his intention (i2) should [be operative in the fulfillment
of (i1), and he intends A to recognize
his intention to get A to recognize his intention to get A to think that
p, i.e. [U] intends (i4) that A should recognize his intention (i3)."

If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. "Wenn ein Löwe sprechen
könnte, wir könnten ihn nicht verstehen."

I realise McEvoy is inviting us NOT to take the above as an 'empirical'
claim. But people like Strawson are making a conceptual claim (via a
conceptual analysis, in this case of 'understand', i.e. understanding that an
utterer U means that p by uttering x), that may have an empirical consequence.

If understanding involves such a hierarchy it may well be that we have
understand-homo-sapiens and understand-panthera-lio. And that while a homo
sapiens may mean that p by uttering x and another homo sapiens may
understand-homo-sapiens what the other homo sapiens means-homo-sapiens, there
is still
room for a panthera lio to mean-panthera-lio and for another lion to
understand-panthera-lio what another lion means-panthera-lio.

But Witters is merely trading on 'form of life', leaving 'understanding' as
lacking a conceptual analysis, and providing his aphorism, which MIGHT be
taken as empirical (even if counterfactual) as analytic.

It would be nice if an unambiguous account of "mean" and (crucially)
"understand" (as used by Witters) would allow for the possibility that
non-linguistic and indeed non-conventional 'utterances', perhaps even
manifesting
some degree of structure, might be WITHIN THE POWER OF CREATURES who lack any
linguistic or otherwise conventional apparatus for communication but who
are NOT thereby deprived of the capacity to *MEAN* this or that by things
they do.

To provide for THIS POSSIBILITY, it is plainly necessary that the key
ingredient in any representation of meaning, namely _intending_, should be a
_STATE_ the capacity for which does NOT require the possession of a language.

Now, some might be unwilling to allow the possibility of such
pre-linguistic intending.

Against them, I THINK I ****WOULD***** have good prospects of winning the
day even if somewhat unfortunately a victory on this front would NOT BE
ENOUGH.

For, in a succession of increasingly elaborated moves designed to thwart a
sequence of counterexamples, some philosophers of language have been led to
restrict the intentions which are to constitute utterer's meaning to
*M-intentions* and whatever might be the case in general with regard to
intending, M-intending is PLAINLY too sophisticated a state to be found in a
language-destitute creature -- such as a lion?

There is a way out for this if we are considering the alleged
'raison-d'etre' of a program or 'campaign'. And the unavoidable rearguard
actions seem
to have undermined the raison-d'etre of the campaign". Unless we (or the
lions) attack again -- tomorrow.

Cheers,

Speranza

References:

Peirce, Semiotics.
Strawson, Intention and convention in speech acts.
Strawson, Review of Witters, "Philosophical Investigations".






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