[lit-ideas] Wittgenstein's Anticlimax
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- Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 06:23:39 -0400 (EDT)
If there are three Wittgensteins -- the first Wittgenstein, the latter
Wittgenstein, and the middle Wittgenstein (not necessarily in that order) --
can we say that one of his philosophies provides the anticlimax to the climax
of another of his philosophies?
Yes.
We are discussing Wittgenstein as considered by Stanford (Encyclopedia of
Philosophy).
McEvoy notes, in "The Independent Moralist", that the entry leaves
something to be desired.
"A lot to say about [a climactic part] of PI", on which he posted
extensive commentary some time ago, "but it does not suggest the interpretation
in
my commentary."
So, what _is_ McEvoy's suggested interpretation. In his words:
"[My] suggested interpretation takes W as seeking to show that, insofar as
we might seek to explain how language has sense through 'rule-following',
(a) no 'rule' says its own sense (a version of W's general position that
language never says its own sense) (b) the sense of a 'rule' can be shown but
cannot be said (a corollary to (a) that denies there is any metalinguistic
way to exhibit a 'rule' so that the sense of the 'rule' is said in the
meta-language)."
This may relate to Omar K.'s recent point that he would like to be shown
(or said) more about the show/say distinction.
"Sections leading to this climax seek to show (though they do not say)
that the 'rule' as to the correct sequence of natural numbers ['0,1,2,3,4'] is
neither said by stating that sequence nor can it be said
'metalinguistically':- as becomes clear when we face someone who does not
understand the
sequence 'correctly' - for there is nothing 'said' or 'sayable' by which we
may teach them the correct sense of the sequence merely by what we say [they
can only understand the 'correct' sequence if they grasp the sense of what
is shown, for us, by what is said]; these sections also show, though they
do no say, that a "same or similar" point holds for following a mathematical
'rule' like 'Take n and continue to add 2', for the sense of the 'correct'
sequence is not something said by this 'rule' nor can it be said
'metalinguistically':- as becomes clear when we face someone who interprets the
'rule' differently [so that after 1000, they insist that '1004' is next in the
sequence] - for there is nothing said in the stated 'rule', and nothing
otherwise 'sayable', by which we can teach them why their interpretation is
incorrect merely by what we say [again they can only understand the 'correct'
sequence - 'correct' in our terms - if they grasp the sense of what is
shown, in our terms, by what is said]."
"W thinks that language not saying its own sense is an ever-present fact
due to the "limits of language" but that we are typically blind to this - we
are so familiar, with the sense to be attached to much of the language we
use, that it becomes inconspicuous to us that this sense is not attached by
virtue of the language itself: indeed, we tend to treat language as if it
does say its own sense - so that faced with someone who does not understand
the sense of the sequence '0,1,2,3,4' in the order of natural numbers, we
might be first tempted to simply repeat the sequence to them as if this
repetition conveys the sense of the order we intend (which W shows,
emphatically, it doesn't)."
Indeed. Only I would NOT count '0' as a natural number. Variants with
Geary:
Speranza: How many members of the British royal family are visiting
Memphis?
Geary: Two.
The answer 'zero' would implicate that
Members of the British royal family are visiting Memphis; to wit: zero.
---
Back to Wittgenstein's anticlimax:
"What the Stanford passage (below) crucially omits is the key conclusion W
draws at this climactic part of PI - viz. that the considerations W has
canvassed show there is a way of following a rule that is not an
interpretation [201]: "What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a
rule which
is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying
the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases." Here an "interpretation"
may be taken to mean something that captures the requisite sense in
language: and W here makes clear what the foregoing in PI "shews" - that the
requisite sense is never something that can be captured in language in this
way,
though it may be shown or "exhibited". This is the fundamental theme of PI
from the Preface onwards: from the beginning (which shows the
naming-relation is not something said by a name but shown by how names are
used) to the
sections on 'rule-following' (which show we cannot say the sense of
language in terms of 'rule-following', though we may be able to show it in
such
terms in relation to "actual cases")."
I wonder why G. E. M. Anscombe thought of using 'shew' rather than 'shows'.
Does this show that she was rather pedantic and found the archaism a way
to distinguish her talk from 'hoi polloi'?
McEvoy goes on:
"It is a theme that makes understandable what is otherwise hard to
understand: for example, W writing "Teaching which is not meant to apply to
anything but the examples given is different from that which 'points beyond'
them
[208]." We may distinguish teaching children to recite sounds like
'Nought, one, two etc.' by rote, without understanding more about what these
sounds mean, and teaching them '0,1,2 etc.' so they understand the sense of
this in terms of the sequence of natural numbers - the latter teaching
involves using examples to convey a sense that "points beyond" the examples
used:-
a sense, W contends, that may be shown but cannot be said."
Again, 'nought' is not really a _number_, less so a _natural_ one. The
Latins were so confused with it that they thought it declined:
ex nihilo nihil.
The lack of things featured large in Greek thought, too. When the Cyclops
asked Odysseus for his name, he said, "No-one". The Cyclops misunderstood
that as a _name_, which isn't ("No-one blinded me!").
McEvoy notes:
"From this POV, the Stanford entry has the drawback of not even canvassing
this suggested interpretation as a serious possibility, even though it
mentions what is a radical misinterpretation a la Kripkenstein (an
interpretation that posits W as a radical sceptic about "sense":- when W
actually
takes "sense" to be shown in a quite matter-of-fact and sufficiently
determinate way but does want emphatically to deny that this "sense" is
something
that it is within the "limits of language" to capture):- "These considerations
lead to PI 201, often considered the climax of the issue: “This was our
paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made
out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict
here.” Wittgenstein's formulation of the problem, now at the point of
being a “paradox”, has given rise to a wealth of interpretation and debate
since it is clear to all that this is the crux of the general issue of
meaning,
and of understanding and using a language. One of the influential readings
of the problem of following a rule (introduced by Fogelin 1976 and Kripke
1982) has been the interpretation, according to which Wittgenstein is here
voicing a skeptical paradox and offering a skeptical solution. That is to
say, there are no facts that determine what counts as following a rule, no
real grounds for saying that someone is indeed following a rule, and
Wittgenstein accepts this skeptical challenge (by suggesting other conditions
that
might warrant our asserting that someone is following a rule). This
reading has been challenged, in turn, by several interpretations (such as
Baker
and Hacker 1984, McGinn1984, and Cavell 1990), while others have provided
additional, fresh perspectives (e.g., Diamond, “Rules: Looking in the Right
Place” in Phillips and Winch 1989, and several in Miller and Wright 2002)."
McEvoy is right that there are fresh perspectives that the Stanford
Encyclopedia should (and we hope shall) take into account.
The best way to deal with these questions is via the Wittgenstein Society.
There is a Grice Club and a Wittgenstein Society. They publish a
Wittgenstein Journal. And they celebrate Wittgenstein's birthday every year --
with
cake.
To stick with the metaphor, we may see the new interpretations as
'climactic', while those who ignore or dismiss them as merely sticking with
Wittgenstein's anti-climax.
I.e., it is anticlimactic to see Wittgenstein, with Fogelin and Kripke, as
a Sceptic, when Baker/Hacker, McGinn, Cavell, Diamond, and Miller and
Wright have sought to locate Wittgenstein's climax where it belongs.
Palma would possibly say, rightly, that 'zero' IS a number, if not a
'natural' one. Perhaps Witters could have clarified his case by providing
FURTHER examples of 'rule-following' where the 'sense' of the 'rule' cannot be
said, but just shown, by behavioural evidence of those following it, rather
than saying that they are following ("Do as I show you I'm doing it and not
as I say").
Cheers,
Speranza
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