I submit there is nothing we humans can experience, taste, sense, smell,
hear, perceive, believe, infer, or judge that cannot be expressed with
reasonable accuracy in natural language. (And translated as such into another
language.)
And yet, I also wish to submit that the spectrum of sensory-perceptual
possibilities available to us is determined by the limits of natural language.
Which view is correct? I offer the following exhibit ....
Consider the 1975 Glenmorangie:
Colour: Full amber
Nose: Fudge, in a gift box [In this case, "a box of fudge" is perfectly
kosher.]
Body: Light, firm, slippery
Palate: Firm maltiness. Then big flavour development. The maltiness becomes
buttery, then lemon and burnt toast. This is a confident cerebral [Kantian]
whisky.
Finish: Perfectly pitched balancing dryness. Just when it all seems over, a
burst of Late spiciness and saltiness.
*Malt Whisky Companion,* Michael Jackson (NY & London: Penguin Group, 2004) 291
Like I always says:
"The limits of my whiskey ...."
Walter O
MUN
P.S. An Ancient Roman walks into a contemporary bar:
Roman: Give me a martinus.
Bartender: Do you mean a martini?
Roman: If I wanted a double, I would have asked for one.
Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
The 'limits of language' might well be a contingent matter, connected to
the needs of practical communication. English did not have the words for
proton and neutron in the 16th. century because they were not needed, but
it has them today. In a similar way, the reason that we might have trouble
to describe the taste of coffee or some color perceptions in language is
probably that such descriptions are seldom or never needed in every-day
communication. For practical purposes, it is usually enough to say that the
coffee tastes a little bitter so that another spoonful of sugar may be
added, for example. If there were a pressing need to describe the taste of
coffee in great detail, we would probably have the linguistic tools to do
it.
O.K.
On Fri, May 15, 2015 at 5:36 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
claimedDonal discusses philosophy like a bad lawyer defending a hopeless case.It was *not* said, as he states in (2), that the *experience* of
"jarring" or "non-jarring" sound or color combinations "results from some
'arbitrary, dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules,'" but that "*such
theory*" would>
Perhaps analogies with bad lawyers and hopeless cases should be put aside,
but if not then this rebuttal from Richard may be taken as an Aunt Sally
from a notional "bad lawyer".
For nowhere did I claim that what was stated as my (2) was "said" by
Wittgenstein:- rather I claimed he would agree with (2). And then I
that if W agreed with (2) then Richard's comment could not be correct.senses
These claims of mine do *not *rely on any assumption that W* says *"that
the *experience* of "jarring" or "non-jarring" sound or color
combinations "results from some 'arbitrary, dogmatic teaching of
unjustifiable rules"".
There is another reason I suspect Richard's comment is not correct - which
is that it is not "said" by W: that is, *nowhere does W say* something
that indicates that whatever "rules" we might teach, as to what is
"jarring"or "non-jarring", these rules will be "arbitrary, dogmatic...".
What I did suggest is that W thinks any such rules would be
"unjustifiable" in a certain important sense or in certain important
- for example, in the sense that attempts to justify them will sooner ornot
later "run dry"; and in the sense that such "rules" no more stand in need
of justification (or are susceptible of justification) than are our
experiences of what is "jarring" and "non-jarring".
But I do not accept that W thinks such "rules" would be "arbitrary". Nor
do I guess the word "dogmatic" is one we will find in W in the context of
this issue or is one which he would find appropriate (to adapt W's
metaphor: when our "spade is turned" because it has "hit bedrock" it is
because it is a "dogmatic" spade but because it is a tool with limits tovirtually
what it can do [yes - it is the "limits of language" that underlie W's
"Remarks on Colour" as they underlie nearly all his philosophising]) .
But of course I may be mistaken in all this (and in my general view of W
as engaged in examining philosophical problems given the "limits of
language"): perhaps Richard can show that W indeed uses the word
"arbitrary" or "dogmatic" in this context - more than this, perhaps W does
somewhere *say* "that whatever "rules" we might teach, as to what is
"jarring"or "non-jarring", these rules will be "arbitrary, dogmatic..""
But I doubt it. If W does say such things, I would like the actual words
quoted. Bad lawyer or not, I do not think we can infer any such thing from
what Richard quotes.
Dnl
On Friday, 15 May 2015, 13:20, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
To Donal I say, this conversation is interesting. Why? Because the issue
at hand is more than how to parse the words of this or that dead
philosopher.
To Richard I say, where did you get the notion that there is no
justifiable theory of harmony in color or music? Art and music schools
teach these things in introductory classes. In the case of color,
every piece of presentation, desktop publishing, or chart-generatinguses--*Lehre*--translated
software currently on the market comes with a choice of palettes, composed
of colors that work harmoniously together, where the harmonies in question
are defined by these theories.
If you wish to point out that these theories are imperfect and subject to
change over time, the only rational response is "Yes." We know that
audiences in Paris rebelled at the first performance of Stravinsky's *Rite
of Spring. *The Fauves, Cubists, et al, were being daring, disgusting to
many critics, in their use of unnatural colors in their paintings. These
musical and artistic transgressions are now taken for granted. Theories
that purport to account for them remain debatable.
The same is true of theories in physics, history or any other scholarly
domain. Given that all theories are human constructions and necessarily
imperfect, all can be improved to account for new ideas or fresh evidence.
Only philosophers or theologians obsessed with Truth Eternal get upset
about this reality. For the rest of us, "If this isn't truth, it will have
to do...until something better comes along." That is justification enough.
John
Sent from my iPad
On 2015/05/15, at 20:06, Richard Henninge <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
*To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
*Sent:* Friday, May 15, 2015 10:09 AM
*Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Wittgenstein and Remarks on Color 91-93
>From *Remarks on Color*:
91. If there were a harmony theory of colors, it would probably begin with
a division of the colors into different groups and would forbid certain
mixtures or combinations, would allow others; and it would, like harmony
theory, not justify its rules.
92. Can that not shed us some light on the *nature *[Art] of those
differences between the colors?
93. [We do not say A knows something, B knows the opposite. But if one
replaces "knows" by "believes," then it is a proposition.] >
Richard then comments:
In other words, there is no way to justify jarring and non-jarringdifferences between colors and sounds: in the end, such theory [Lehre]
remains arbitrary, dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules.>
(1) This comment is not justified by what is quoted. (Which is typical, I
find, of much commentary on Wittgenstein).
(2) It is not correct to assert that whether a combination of sounds is
[experienced as] "jarring" or "non-jarring" results from some "arbitrary,
dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules": e.g. many people, without any
musical training or much musical sense nevermind any "theory", can wince
when they experience sounds that are "jarring". A child can wince at
jarring sounds when it is the first time they have experienced any such
sounds - and obviously without having been instructed in any "arbitrary,
dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules" about what constitutes "jarring"
sounds.
It is not correct to describe such responses to sounds (experienced as
"jarring") as "arbitrary".
My response:
Donal discusses philosophy like a bad lawyer defending a hopeless
case. It was *not* said, as he states in (2), that the *experience* of
"jarring" or "non-jarring" sound or color combinations "results from some
'arbitrary, dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules,'" but that "*such
theory*" would (I provided the German word Wittgenstein
as *theory* here, but also translated at times by *teaching*, with whichexperience
it is cognate--to teach is *lehren*--or by *doctrine*, to stress that
Wittgenstein is saying that there is no way to provide grounds or reasons
or justifications for this experience or response over any other
or response; hence such teaching, theory or doctrine would necessarily bea
arbitrary). Grant that child infinite wisdom and the ability to create a
theory to account for his or her every wince--scientifically, rigorously,
testably, verifiably--he or she could not do it. You also won't find such
harmony theory or harmony theory of colors anywhere and, if you did, yousound.
should be able to subject it to Popperian strictures to see if it is
That no such theory--grounded, founded, justified, backed by controllableon
data--can be proposed: that is Wittgenstein's point.
An interesting sidelight:
The *Remarks on Color [Bemerkungen über die Farben]* were written by
Wittgenstein during his last years. In letters to Norman Malcolm on 16
January 1950, to G. H. von Wright on 19 January 1950, and to Rush Rhees
22 January 1950 he refers, respectively, to his "reading various odds andgreat
ends, e.g. Goethes [sic] Theory of color which, with all its absurdities,
has very interesting points and stimulates me to think," "read[ing] a
deal in Goethe's 'Farbenlehre' . . . . partly boring and repelling, but inFarben":
some ways also *very *instructive and philosophically interesting," and
"reading again parts of Goethes [sic] 'Farbenlehre' which attracts and
repels me."
He has just referred to Goethe's Farbenlehre (Color theory, theory of
color or colors) in Remark 90 preceding the three remarks discussed here
and refers to Ãt as "Goethes Bemerkungen über die Charaktere der
"I doubt that Goethe's remarks about the characters [characteristics,is,
qualities] of colors could be useful to a painter. Even for a decorator."
Then follows Remark 91 that we are discussing. At Remark 92 Wittgenstein
then uses an unusual, to the Wahrig German dictionary a colloquial,
expression referring to light--"Licht aufstecken"--that Wahrig defines as
"jemandem ein Licht aufstecken (über), jemanden aufklären (über)," that
to enlighten somebody (about, on, concerning--über).
Goethe's famous last words were "More light"--"Mehr Licht."
Richard Henninge
University of Mainz
