[lit-ideas] Re: Wittgenstein and Remarks on Color 91-93
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 15 May 2015 15:36:05 +0000 (UTC)
Donal discusses philosophy like a bad lawyer defending a hopeless case. It was
not said, as he states in (2), that the experience of "jarring" or
"non-jarring" sound or color combinations "results from some 'arbitrary,
dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules,'" but that "such theory" would>
Perhaps analogies with bad lawyers and hopeless cases should be put aside, but
if not then this rebuttal from Richard may be taken as an Aunt Sally from a
notional "bad lawyer".
For nowhere did I claim that what was stated as my (2) was "said" by
Wittgenstein:- rather I claimed he would agree with (2). And then I claimed
that if W agreed with (2) then Richard's comment could not be correct. These
claims of mine do not rely on any assumption that W says "that the experience
of "jarring" or "non-jarring" sound or color combinations "results from some
'arbitrary, dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules"".
There is another reason I suspect Richard's comment is not correct - which is
that it is not "said" by W: that is, nowhere does W say something that
indicates that whatever "rules" we might teach, as to what is "jarring"or
"non-jarring", these rules will be "arbitrary, dogmatic...".
What I did suggest is that W thinks any such rules would be "unjustifiable" in
a certain important sense or in certain important senses - for example, in the
sense that attempts to justify them will sooner or later "run dry"; and in the
sense that such "rules" no more stand in need of justification (or are
susceptible of justification) than are our experiences of what is "jarring" and
"non-jarring".
But I do not accept that W thinks such "rules" would be "arbitrary". Nor do I
guess the word "dogmatic" is one we will find in W in the context of this issue
or is one which he would find appropriate (to adapt W's metaphor: when our
"spade is turned" because it has "hit bedrock" it is not because it is a
"dogmatic" spade but because it is a tool with limits to what it can do [yes -
it is the "limits of language" that underlie W's "Remarks on Colour" as they
underlie nearly all his philosophising]) .
But of course I may be mistaken in all this (and in my general view of W as
engaged in examining philosophical problems given the "limits of language"):
perhaps Richard can show that W indeed uses the word "arbitrary" or "dogmatic"
in this context - more than this, perhaps W does somewhere say "that whatever
"rules" we might teach, as to what is "jarring"or "non-jarring", these rules
will be "arbitrary, dogmatic..""
But I doubt it. If W does say such things, I would like the actual words
quoted. Bad lawyer or not, I do not think we can infer any such thing from what
Richard quotes.
Dnl
On Friday, 15 May 2015, 13:20, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
To Donal I say, this conversation is interesting. Why? Because the issue at
hand is more than how to parse the words of this or that dead philosopher.
To Richard I say, where did you get the notion that there is no justifiable
theory of harmony in color or music? Art and music schools teach these things
in introductory classes. In the case of color, virtually every piece of
presentation, desktop publishing, or chart-generating software currently on the
market comes with a choice of palettes, composed of colors that work
harmoniously together, where the harmonies in question are defined by these
theories.
If you wish to point out that these theories are imperfect and subject to
change over time, the only rational response is "Yes." We know that audiences
in Paris rebelled at the first performance of Stravinsky's Rite of Spring. The
Fauves, Cubists, et al, were being daring, disgusting to many critics, in their
use of unnatural colors in their paintings. These musical and artistic
transgressions are now taken for granted. Theories that purport to account for
them remain debatable.
The same is true of theories in physics, history or any other scholarly domain.
Given that all theories are human constructions and necessarily imperfect, all
can be improved to account for new ideas or fresh evidence. Only philosophers
or theologians obsessed with Truth Eternal get upset about this reality. For
the rest of us, "If this isn't truth, it will have to do...until something
better comes along." That is justification enough.
John
Sent from my iPad
On 2015/05/15, at 20:06, Richard Henninge <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
----- Original Message ----- From: Donal McEvoy To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Friday, May 15, 2015 10:09 AM Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Wittgenstein and
Remarks on Color 91-93
>From Remarks on Color: 91. If there were a harmony theory of colors, it
would probably begin with a division of the colors into different groups and
would forbid certain mixtures or combinations, would allow others; and it
would, like harmony theory, not justify its rules. 92. Can that not shed us
some light on the nature [Art] of those differences between the colors? 93.
[We do not say A knows something, B knows the opposite. But if one replaces
"knows" by "believes," then it is a proposition.] >
Richard then comments:
>In other words, there is no way to justify jarring and non-jarring
differences between colors and sounds: in the end, such theory [Lehre] remains
arbitrary, dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules.>
(1) This comment is not justified by what is quoted. (Which is typical, I
find, of much commentary on Wittgenstein).
(2) It is not correct to assert that whether a combination of sounds is
[experienced as] "jarring" or "non-jarring" results from some "arbitrary,
dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules": e.g. many people, without any
musical training or much musical sense nevermind any "theory", can wince when
they experience sounds that are "jarring". A child can wince at jarring sounds
when it is the first time they have experienced any such sounds - and obviously
without having been instructed in any "arbitrary, dogmatic teaching of
unjustifiable rules" about what constitutes "jarring" sounds.
It is not correct to describe such responses to sounds (experienced as
"jarring") as "arbitrary".
My response:
Donal discusses philosophy like a bad lawyer defending a hopeless case. It
was not said, as he states in (2), that the experience of "jarring" or
"non-jarring" sound or color combinations "results from some 'arbitrary,
dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules,'" but that "such theory" would (I
provided the German word Wittgenstein uses--Lehre--translated as theory here,
but also translated at times by teaching, with which it is cognate--to teach is
lehren--or by doctrine, to stress that Wittgenstein is saying that there is no
way to provide grounds or reasons or justifications for this experience or
response over any other experience or response; hence such teaching, theory or
doctrine would necessarily be arbitrary). Grant that child infinite wisdom and
the ability to create a theory to account for his or her every
wince--scientifically, rigorously, testably, verifiably--he or she could not do
it. You also won't find such a harmony theory or harmony theory of colors
anywhere and, if you did, you should be able to subject it to Popperian
strictures to see if it is sound. That no such theory--grounded, founded,
justified, backed by controllable data--can be proposed: that is Wittgenstein's
point.
An interesting sidelight:
The Remarks on Color [Bemerkungen über die Farben] were written by
Wittgenstein during his last years. In letters to Norman Malcolm on 16 January
1950, to G. H. von Wright on 19 January 1950, and to Rush Rhees on 22 January
1950 he refers, respectively, to his "reading various odds and ends, e.g.
Goethes [sic] Theory of color which, with all its absurdities, has very
interesting points and stimulates me to think," "read[ing] a great deal in
Goethe's 'Farbenlehre' . . . . partly boring and repelling, but in some ways
also very instructive and philosophically interesting," and "reading again
parts of Goethes [sic] 'Farbenlehre' which attracts and repels me." He has
just referred to Goethe's Farbenlehre (Color theory, theory of color or colors)
in Remark 90 preceding the three remarks discussed here and refers to ít as
"Goethes Bemerkungen über die Charaktere der Farben": "I doubt that Goethe's
remarks about the characters [characteristics, qualities] of colors could be
useful to a painter. Even for a decorator." Then follows Remark 91 that we are
discussing. At Remark 92 Wittgenstein then uses an unusual, to the Wahrig
German dictionary a colloquial, expression referring to light--"Licht
aufstecken"--that Wahrig defines as "jemandem ein Licht aufstecken (über),
jemanden aufklären (über)," that is, to enlighten somebody (about, on,
concerning--über). Goethe's famous last words were "More light"--"Mehr
Licht." Richard Henninge University of Mainz
Other related posts:
