To Donal I say, this conversation is interesting. Why? Because the issue at
hand is more than how to parse the words of this or that dead philosopher.
To Richard I say, where did you get the notion that there is no justifiable
theory of harmony in color or music? Art and music schools teach these things
in introductory classes. In the case of color, virtually every piece of
presentation, desktop publishing, or chart-generating software currently on the
market comes with a choice of palettes, composed of colors that work
harmoniously together, where the harmonies in question are defined by these
theories.
If you wish to point out that these theories are imperfect and subject to
change over time, the only rational response is "Yes." We know that audiences
in Paris rebelled at the first performance of Stravinsky's Rite of Spring. The
Fauves, Cubists, et al, were being daring, disgusting to many critics, in their
use of unnatural colors in their paintings. These musical and artistic
transgressions are now taken for granted. Theories that purport to account for
them remain debatable.
The same is true of theories in physics, history or any other scholarly domain.
Given that all theories are human constructions and necessarily imperfect, all
can be improved to account for new ideas or fresh evidence. Only philosophers
or theologians obsessed with Truth Eternal get upset about this reality. For
the rest of us, "If this isn't truth, it will have to do...until something
better comes along." That is justification enough.
John
Sent from my iPad
On 2015/05/15, at 20:06, Richard Henninge <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
----- Original Message -----
From: Donal McEvoy
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Friday, May 15, 2015 10:09 AM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Wittgenstein and Remarks on Color 91-93
From Remarks on Color:
91. If there were a harmony theory of colors, it would probably begin with a
division of the colors into different groups and would forbid certain
mixtures or combinations, would allow others; and it would, like harmony
theory, not justify its rules.
92. Can that not shed us some light on the nature [Art] of those differences
between the colors?
93. [We do not say A knows something, B knows the opposite. But if one
replaces "knows" by "believes," then it is a proposition.] >
Richard then comments:
In other words, there is no way to justify jarring and non-jarring
differences between colors and sounds: in the end, such theory [Lehre]
remains arbitrary, dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules.>
(1) This comment is not justified by what is quoted. (Which is typical, I
find, of much commentary on Wittgenstein).
(2) It is not correct to assert that whether a combination of sounds is
[experienced as] "jarring" or "non-jarring" results from some "arbitrary,
dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules": e.g. many people, without any
musical training or much musical sense nevermind any "theory", can wince when
they experience sounds that are "jarring". A child can wince at jarring
sounds when it is the first time they have experienced any such sounds - and
obviously without having been instructed in any "arbitrary, dogmatic teaching
of unjustifiable rules" about what constitutes "jarring" sounds.
It is not correct to describe such responses to sounds (experienced as
"jarring") as "arbitrary".
My response:
Donal discusses philosophy like a bad lawyer defending a hopeless case.
It was not said, as he states in (2), that the experience of "jarring" or
"non-jarring" sound or color combinations "results from some 'arbitrary,
dogmatic teaching of unjustifiable rules,'" but that "such theory" would (I
provided the German word Wittgenstein uses--Lehre--translated as theory here,
but also translated at times by teaching, with which it is cognate--to teach
is lehren--or by doctrine, to stress that Wittgenstein is saying that there
is no way to provide grounds or reasons or justifications for this experience
or response over any other experience or response; hence such teaching,
theory or doctrine would necessarily be arbitrary). Grant that child infinite
wisdom and the ability to create a theory to account for his or her every
wince--scientifically, rigorously, testably, verifiably--he or she could not
do it. You also won't find such a harmony theory or harmony theory of colors
anywhere and, if you did, you should be able to subject it to Popperian
strictures to see if it is sound. That no such theory--grounded, founded,
justified, backed by controllable data--can be proposed: that is
Wittgenstein's point.
An interesting sidelight:
The Remarks on Color [Bemerkungen über die Farben] were written by
Wittgenstein during his last years. In letters to Norman Malcolm on 16
January 1950, to G. H. von Wright on 19 January 1950, and to Rush Rhees on
22 January 1950 he refers, respectively, to his "reading various odds and
ends, e.g. Goethes [sic] Theory of color which, with all its absurdities, has
very interesting points and stimulates me to think," "read[ing] a great deal
in Goethe's 'Farbenlehre' . . . . partly boring and repelling, but in some
ways also very instructive and philosophically interesting," and "reading
again parts of Goethes [sic] 'Farbenlehre' which attracts and repels me."
He has just referred to Goethe's Farbenlehre (Color theory, theory of color
or colors) in Remark 90 preceding the three remarks discussed here and refers
to ít as "Goethes Bemerkungen über die Charaktere der Farben": "I doubt that
Goethe's remarks about the characters [characteristics, qualities] of colors
could be useful to a painter. Even for a decorator." Then follows Remark 91
that we are discussing. At Remark 92 Wittgenstein then uses an unusual, to
the Wahrig German dictionary a colloquial, expression referring to
light--"Licht aufstecken"--that Wahrig defines as "jemandem ein Licht
aufstecken (über), jemanden aufklären (über)," that is, to enlighten somebody
(about, on, concerning--über).
Goethe's famous last words were "More light"--"Mehr Licht."
Richard Henninge
University of Mainz
