[lit-ideas] Re: Wilson and Wade on the nature of European religion
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 08:54:45 +0100 (BST)
Nicholas Wade writes,
"His thesis is that human groups function as units subject to
natural selection when behavior within the group is regulated by a
moral system or religion. Supernatural agents are an essential
part of the moral system because they operate as the sanction that
enforces it. Well-functioning groups coordinated by such a moral
system out-compete other groups. The social coordination provided
by the moral system enables groups to secure resources and other
items of value that would be beyond the reach of individuals."
This "thesis" might be rewritten without bringing in the term "natural
selection", and so without having to clarify how "natural selection" is being
used here.
So: "His thesis is that human groups function as units..when behavior within
the group is regulated by a moral system or religion....Well-functioning groups
coordinated by such a moral system out-compete other groups. The social
coordination provided by the moral system enables groups to secure resources
and other items of value that would be beyond the reach of individuals."
We might even expand on this idea of "social coordination": the "moral system"
may lessen violence (including murder), theft and crime within the group, set
better standards of acceptable behaviour and facilitate greater effort by
individuals. It may function as an esprit d'corp: even if the "moral system"
does not embody knowledge of a technological kind it may embody a kind of
"knowing-that" as to conduct and cooperation that simulates "know-how".
Yet we should not assume that because this "moral system" confers practical
advantages, and historically its 'descent-with-modification' may be explained
because it is 'adaptive' in practical terms, that this process is one of
"natural selection" - rather than something that may be merely analogous to
natural selection in certain ways.
"Natural selection" depends on variation and how "natural selection" pressures
winnow out the less adaptive of the variations: it would be a mistake to apply
natural selection to physics - to say that 'plutonium' is 'selected against'
because it is too unstable, given "natural selection", to leave many
descendants in nature; or to say that some compounds like salt are much more
prevalent than others because they are 'selected for' by "natural selection".
We could try to bring physics within the framework of "natural selection" this
way, but it would end up confusing the issues: the reasons why plutonium is
rare in nature and why salt is common may be put in terms that are analogous to
"natural selection" but they are not to do with "natural selection" in
Darwinian terms.
We can make a similar error in the opposite direction: instead of bringing
physics within a framework of "natural selection" we try to bring W2 and W3
within than framework. It might appear we can do so - because there are obvious
analogies between adaptiveness at a W2 and W3 level and adaptiveness at a W1
genomic level. But this appearance is likely to deceive us because what
explains the process of W2 and W3 adaptiveness goes beyond "natural selection".
The W2 and W3 processes go beyond "natural selection" even if those processes
must occur within a broader framework of "natural selection" as this explains
the W1 substrata on which evolution at the level of W2 and W3 depend, and even
if adaptiveness at a W2 and W3 level make the analogy with "natural selection"
very marked.*
Dnl
no W3 in London
*Hence Popper has an "Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge" but not a theory that
"knowledge" at a W2 and W3 level is merely a product of "natural selection"
(though it will partly be explicable in terms of natural selection).
On Monday, 2 June 2014, 17:04, Lawrence Helm <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Nicholas Wade writes,
"In his bookDarwin’s Cathedral [David Sloan Wilson] argues, with the help of
several case studies, that group selection can indeed explain many features of
religion.
"His thesis is that human groups function as units subject to
natural selection when behavior within the group is regulated by a
moral system or religion. Supernatural agents are an essential
part of the moral system because they operate as the sanction that
enforces it. Well-functioning groups coordinated by such a moral
system out-compete other groups. The social coordination provided
by the moral system enables groups to secure resources and other
items of value that would be beyond the reach of individuals.
Wilson’s concept draws on several works already described here,
such as Durkheim’s theory of religion as the embodiment of society
and Boehm’s description of egalitarianism among hunter gatherers,
as well as his own research on group selection. He distinguishes
between what religion achieves— the social coordination for which
religious behavior was selected— and what its practitioners feel,
which he acknowledges is entirely different. “Since writing Darwin’s
Cathedral, I have spoken with many religious believers who feel that my focus
on practical benefits misses the essence of religious experience, which is a
deeply felt relationship with God ,” he writes. But there is no necessary
connection, he points out, between an end that evolution has favored and the
means it has arrived at to get there. People fall in love in part to have
children, he notes, “but that doesn’t remotely describe the subjective
experience of falling in love.” Similarly, the experience of communing with the
deity is one of many benefits that make people practice a religion.
Wilson rejects the view of many social scientists and others that
belief in the supernatural and nonrational elements of religion
should be seen as some kind of mental aberration. To the contrary,
religious belief “is intimately connected to reality by motivating
behaviors that are adaptive in the real world— an awesome
achievement when we appreciate the complexity that is required to
become connected in this practical sense.”
One of the ways in which religion connects to reality is through
its use of sacred symbols. These symbols evoke emotions, and
emotions are ancient, evolved mechanisms for motivating adaptive
behavior, often doing so beneath or partly beneath the level of
consciousness. “Sacred symbols organize the behavior of the people
who regard them as sacred,” Wilson notes. It’s this organization—
not the implausibility of certain elements in a religion’s sacred
narrative—that should be seen as the criterion of a creed’s
effectiveness. The adaptedness of religious beliefs “must be
judged by the behaviors they motivate, not by their factual
correspondence to reality,” Wilson says." Wade, Nicholas
(2009-10-27). The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolved and Why It
Endures (Kindle Locations 1255-1277). Penguin Group US. Kindle
Edition.
Comment: In The Disenchantment of the World, a Political History of Religion,
Marcel Gauchet argues (among other arguments) that while Christianity was
necessary to the creation of Western Europe, it is now superfluous in that all
of Christianities practical virtues have been incorporated into its culture.
As to its impractical attributes, like the worship of God and the rituals
Wilson is quoted as describing, they are as harmless as any other fad or fancy
and can be safely tolerated. While Nicholas Wade does not single out
Christianity, it was Christianity which (according to Gauchet) was vital to the
creation of Western Europe and perhaps (if we can overlay Wade upon Gauchet) we
might now suggest that Christianity is still vital, not perhaps to any further
development of Western Europe, but to the well being of its citizens.
Freud argued (consistent with Wade) that there is indeed a moral
overseer that governs our behavior, but whereas Wade calls it a
belief in God or gods, Freud called it the Superego. Wade, I
suppose, will propose that Religion has ongoing viability. Freud
believed that we should reject the Christian input to our
Superegos and substitute something more rationale, something Freud
himself was willing to suggest (if memory serves me -- although I
can't recall what it was).
The sort of Christianity that has always interested me involves a
church in which the pastor is heavily steeped in theology and
philosophy and capability of debating all the interesting issues.
I would have enjoyed being in Jonathan Edwards' church, for
example, but Wade isn't interested in that sort of Religion, and
perhaps most American Christians aren't either. They are more
interested in the sort of Christianity Wade describes, one in
which a church becomes unified by its rituals and customs. Alas,
if Wade is right, I don't seem to be a Christian at all.
Lawrence
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
