John McCreery wrote: "It is quite clear from Geertz' career that he had a great many general ideas." If I may be so bold, I think Walter's point was that Geertz' "plunging into 'thick description' of whatever we are trying to understand" isn't devoid of 'general ideas', and therefore it isn't clear how this is a response to the strawman set up in the passage from Langer. After all, Geertz' 'thick description' is aimed at something that can't be adequately accounted for solely with empirical descriptions. John again: "This 'no serious philosopher' business carries no weight without some explication of what serious philosophers actually do and a method or criterion for distinguishing the serious from the non-serious ones." This 'this "no serious philosopher" business carries no weight without some explication of what serious philosophers actually do and a method or criterion for distinguishing the serious from the non-serious ones' business carries no weight without some explication of ... etc. Really, must the 'business' always begin with definitions? And if so, how does it ever start? If I may be so bold, again, Walter was making a good point: Langer is wrong to claim that philosophers hold the principle that philosophy 'deals with general notions'. Instead of insisting that Walter must provide definitions for this claim, why not expand or defend the original claim from Langer? Isn't that what the original post was about? Following, I think, Walter, I would like to hear John expand on the quote from Langer. Sincerely, Phil Enns Glen Haven, NS ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html