On page 78, Berman asks the question "what drives these efforts? It is certainly not the desire to create a true Islamic Republic of Iraq. Officials in Tehran understand full well that Iraq's holy cities, Najaf and Karbala, supersede Iranian religious sites in the theological hierarchy of Shi'a Islam, and that the emergence of an Iraqi theocracy might well relegate Iran to the role of a satellite, at least in religious terms. Rather, the goals of Iran's ayatollahs are more strategic - and more ambitious. They realize that success in Iraq is central to the long-term realization of American strategy in the Middle East. And they hope that a U.S. failure will blunt the impact of Iraq's liberation on their own restive population, and derail Washington's plans for a sweeping post-totalitarian transition in the region. In the words of Ahaya Rahim Safavi, commander of Iran's Pasdaran: 'If [American] strategy fails heavily in Iraq, it will undoubtedly stop. Otherwise it may extend to neighboring countries.'" Lawrence