[lit-ideas] What Makes Realism Metaphysical
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2015 18:16:37 -0500
In a message dated 2/20/2015 2:02:16 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, d
onalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes in 'Re: criteria': "A fortiori, assertions like
"There exist natural laws" or even "There exists at least one natural law" -
which are not even falsifiable - remain forever and entirely metaphysical.
Yet Popper asserts that "There exist natural laws" is true, and its truth can
be argued for. He defends this assertion as part of what he calls
"metaphysical realism".
And then I suppose he would also hold that there are other metaphysical
-isms that CAN be falsified? (Metaphysical Idealism, say) -- or IS indeed
falsified.
I would not think so, since that may lead to an inconsistency.
For we may be having Popper defending a preference for some metaphysical
-ism, which, unlike metaphysical realism, IS 'falsifiable'?
Cheers,
Speranza
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